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Choreographing Agonism  
Chantal Mouffe’s Political Philosophy and Contemporary Performing Arts 
Summary 
This PhD employs contemporary political philosophy and performance theory. Its 
objective is to explores the relevance of political philosopher Chantal Mouffe’s notion of 
agonism for performance theory, by continuously looking at the different philosophical, 
political and artistic discourses that cherish performance theory nowadays. Since agonism 
implies conflict and struggle, the main research question of this dissertation is: how might 
performance contest dominant politics and contribute to the constitution of democratic 
politics giving rise to alternative ways of living together?  
To answer this question, it was necessary to unfold a politico-philosophical 
framework of Mouffe’s notion of agonism. Therefore, this dissertation starts with the 
observation of two distinct trajectories within contemporary continental philosophical 
thought: the trajectory of immanence (Deleuze) and the trajectory of quasi-transcendence 
(Derrida).  Whereas the former gives rise to the project of absolute democracy (Hardt, 1
Negri), the latter gives rise to the project of agonistic democracy (Mouffe). The distinction 
between these two philosophical and political trajectories is deepened in psychoanalytic 
terms and envisaged as a distinction between the positive ontological imaginary of 
abundance — desire for being in-itself, and the negative ontological imaginary of lack — 
desire for the lack-of-being. It is stressed that the negative ontological imaginary of lack 
anticipates a co-constitutive relationship between lack and abundance, precisely because 
the dimension of negativity precludes both the idealisation of lack and the idealisation of 
abundance.  The suggested co-constitutive and agonistic type of relationship between the 2
paradoxically differential positions, such as lack and abundance, also became a challenge 
to philosopher Jacques Rancière’s one-sided political model of communal anarchism, 
which advocates politics of disorder above the politics of order, or mise-en-sense above 
mise-en-scène.  In order to move towards pluralism, relations between the paradoxically 3
differential positions are envisaged in terms of dialectics. Relational dialectics recognise 
antagonistic conflicts and polemics to be inherent in societies (Gramsci, Schmitt). Further 
on, antagonistic conflicts and polemics are envisaged by means of discourse formation 
(Laclau, Mouffe), allowing for the articulation of antagonism into agonism (Mouffe).  The 4
operation of articulation requires articulation of initial immediacy into discursive 
 See chapter 1.1
 See chapter 2. 2
 See chapter 3. 3
 See chapter 4. 4
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mediation: of order into disorder, abject bodies into intelligible bodies, mise-en-sense into 
mise-en-scène , horizontal politics into vertical politics, passive onlookers into active 5
citizenship,  the multitude into the people , and affects into representation . The operation 6 7 8
of articulation requires a view on societies — including social practices of performance — 
in terms of discourse, hegemony and antagonism. These three political components enable 
us to envisage what I call the contesting political dimension of performance that is 
manifested through the strategies of engagement, giving rise to the choreography of 
articulation. The insights into contemporary performances by Arkadi Zaides , Mette 9
Edvardsen , Marlene Monteiro Freitas , and Rimini Protokoll , are just some of the 10 11 12
possible examples that allow us to observe how choreographing agonism performance 
practice and performance theory may contribute to the constitution of democratic politics 
and different ways of living together. 
 See chapter 3. 5
 See chapter 4. 6
 See chapter 5. 7
 See chapter 6. 8
 See chapter 1. 9
 See chapter 2. 10
 See chapter 3. 11
 See chapter 5. 12
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Choreografie van agonisme  
Hedendaagse podiumkunsten en de politieke filosofie van Chantal Mouffe  
Samenvatting  
Dit doctoraat is een toepassing van politieke filosofie en performancetheorie, met 
als doelstelling het onderzoeken van de relevantie van de notie ‘agonisme’ in het werk van 
de politieke filosofe Chantal Mouffe voor performancetheorie. Dit wordt bereikt door 
grondige inspectie van de verschillende filosofische, politieke en artistieke discoursen die 
performancetheorie heden ten dage koesteren. Aangezien agonisme conflict en strijd 
impliceert, is de hoofdonderzoeksvraag van deze dissertatie: hoe kan performance 
tegenstand bieden aan de heersende politiek en bijdragen aan de totstandbrenging van een 
democratische politiek die alternatieve manieren van samenleven doet ontstaan?   
Om deze vraag te beantwoorden, was het noodzakelijk om het politiek-filosofisch 
kader van Mouffe’s notie van agonisme uiteen te zetten. Daarom begint deze dissertatie 
bij de observatie van twee verschillende trajecten binnen het hedendaagse continentale 
filosofische denken: het traject van immanentie (Deleuze) en het traject van quasi-
transcendentie (Derrida).  Waar eerstgenoemde het project van absolute democratie op 13
gang brengt (Hardt, Negri), brengt laatstegenoemde het project van agonistische 
democratie op gang (Mouffe). Het onderscheid tussen deze twee filosofische en politieke 
trajecten wordt uitgediept in psychoanalytische termen en beschouwd als een onderscheid 
tussen het positieve ontologische denkbeeldige van overvloed - het verlangen naar in-
zichzelf-zijn, en het negatieve ontologische denkbeeldige van gebrek - het verlangen naar 
gebrek-aan-zijn. Het wordt beklemtoond dat het negatieve ontologische denkbeeldige van 
gebrek de co-constitutieve relatie tussen gebrek en overvloed anticipeert, precies omdat de 
dimensie van negativiteit zowel de idealisering van verlangen als de idealisering van 
overvloed vooropstelt.  Het gesuggereerde co-constitutieve en agonistische type relatie 14
tussen de paradoxaal differentiële posities, zoals gebrek en overvloed, werd ook een 
uitdaging voor het eenzijdige politieke model van communaal anarchisme van filosoof 
Jacques Rancière, dat pleit voor een politiek van wanorde boven een politiek van orde, 
ofwel mise-en-sense boven mise-en-scène.  Om naar een pluralisme van posities te gaan, 15
worden relaties tussen paradoxaal differentiële posities beschouwd in termen van 
dialectiek. Relationele dialectiek erkent antagonistische conflicten en polemiek als 
inherent aan samenlevingen (Gramsci, Schmitt). Verder worden antagonistische conflicten 
 Zie hoofdstuk 1.13
 Zie hoofdstuk 2. 14
 Zie hoofdstuk 3. 15
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en polemiek beschouwd door middel van discoursvorming (Laclau, Mouffe), wat de 
uitdrukking van antagonisme in agonisme toelaat (Mouffe).  De operatie van uitdrukking 16
van een initiële directheid in een discursieve bemiddeling: van orde in wanorde, abjecte 
lichamen in begrijpelijke lichamen, mise-en-sense in mise-en-scène , horizontale politiek 17
in verticale politiek, passieve omstaanders in actief burgerschap,  de menigte in het 18
volk , en affecten in representatie . De operatie van uitdrukking vereist een visie op de 19 20
samenleving - met inbegrip van de sociale praktijk van performance - in termen van 
discours, hegemonie en antagonisme. Deze drie politieke componenten stelden ons in 
staat om in beschouwing te nemen wat ik de tegenstrevende politieke dimensie van 
performance noem, gemanifesteerd in strategieën van engagement, die de choreografie 
van uitdrukking doet ontstaan. De inzichten in hedendaagse performance van Arkadi 
Zaides , Mette Edvardsen , Marlene Monteiro Freitas , en Rimini Protokoll , zijn maar 21 22 23 24
enkele van de mogelijke voorbeelden die ons toelaten om te observeren hoe 
performancepraktijk en -theorie door de choreografie van agonisme kunnen bijdragen aan 
de totstandbrenging van democratische politiek en verschillende manieren van 
samenleven.  
 Zie hoofdstuk 4. 16
 Zie hoofdstuk 3. 17
 Zie hoofdstuk 4. 18
 Zie hoofdstuk 5. 19
 Zie hoofdstuk 6. 20
 Zie hoofdstuk 1. 21
 Zie hoofdstuk 2. 22
 Zie hoofdstuk 3. 23
 See chapter 5. 24
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INTRODUCTION 
By ‘the political’ I mean the dimension of antagonism which I take to be 
constitutive of human societies, while by ‘politics’ I mean the set of 
practices and institutions through which an order is created, organizing 
human coexistence in the context of conflictuality provided by the political. 
Chantal Mouffe, On the Political (London: Routledge, 2005), 9.  
This dissertation is an investigation of the political dimension of art and, more 
specifically, of what I call the contesting political dimension of performance. The main 
research question is: how might performance contest existing politics and contribute to the 
constitution of democratic politics giving rise to alternative ways of living together? My 
research starts with an inquiry into the natures of discourses on ‘the political’ in 
performance theory. Many books have been written about the relationship between 
performing arts and politics. In Theatre & Politics (2009), performance scholar Joe 
Kelleher gives an overview of the different philosophical discourses that inspired theatre 
and performance philosophers to envisage the political dimension of performing arts.  25
Throughout the years, the political dimension of performing arts had been designated by a 
variety of verbs: to mark (Peggy Phelan), to mobilise (Randy Martin), to engage (André 
Lepecki), to transgress (Hans-Thies Lehmann), to transform (Erika Fischer-Lichte), to 
undermine (Bojana Cvejić) or to avoid (Bojana Kunst). For theatre scholar Lehmann, 
modernity succeeded to expel the political dimension from dramatic representation 
associated with conflict.  This is why, what he calls ‘the political gesture’ in theatrical 26
event stands for tragic experience enabled by transgression, by overstepping all moral, 
ethical or political limits.  Accordingly, in postdramatic theatre, the political gesture is 27
the immediate experience of reality through affects.  It designates an immanently de-28
structured processional event that is ‘more presence than representation’.  In contrast, 29
performance and dance scholar Lepecki insists on an engagement with existing 
 Joe Kelleher, Theatre and Politics (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009).25
 Hans-Thies Lehmann, “A Future for Tragedy? Remarks on the Political and the Postdramatic,” in 26
Postdramatic Theatre and the Political, eds. Karen Jurs-Munby, Jerome Carroll and Steve Giles (London: 
Bloomsbury, 2013), 95. 
 Ibid., 93-95. 27
 Hans-Thies Lehmann, Tragedy and Dramatic Theatre (Abingdon: Routledge, 2016). 28
    Hans-Thies Lehman, Postdramatic Theatre, trans. Karen Jürs-Munby (Abingdon: Routlege, 2006), 85. 29
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representations. Lepecki’s theory suggests that the politics of engagement with the full 
and fixed representations of bodies along upright vertical axis, open up a possibility for 
the multiplying operations of vision.  This type of engagement requires the introduction 30
of horizontal lines on the representational surface. As such, it enables the creation of ‘a 
co-extensive affective field of compossibilization of political purpose and action’.  What 31
is at stake in compossibilisation is a mutual sharing of ‘a true affective-political field’  32
that can allow the rise and actualisation of the unthinkable subjectivities, bodies, identities 
and spaces.  
I think that it is vital to stress, as Lepecki does, the need for the activation of 
critical and corporal capacities to engage with existing representational modes. However, 
instead of identifying the political in performance practice with the critical engagement 
and the affective compossibilisation, I would like, firstly, to point out the distinction 
between the two aspects of the political in the realm of art, including performing arts.  
On the one hand, there are artistic practices, theories and institutions that disclose 
the political dimension by complying with dominant politics and representations that they 
have established. For example, in 2016, as an appointed artistic director of the Athens and 
Epidaurus Festival, the Belgian artist Jan Fabre planed to turn Greece’s major arts festival 
into ‘a tribute to Belgium’ and devoted eight of the festival’s ten productions to those from 
his homeland. In the midst of the Greek economic and political crisis, informed by the 
harsh austerity measures introduced by the EU Commission in 2010, Fabre’s proposal had 
been seen by local arts communities to reproduce the EU’s neoliberal elitist discourse of 
domination and neo-colonialism. Oppositions of the local art communities against Fabre’s 
intentions led to his resignation.   33
On the other hand, there are those artistic practices, theories and institutions that 
disclose the political dimension, by contesting established politics and representations, 
and by contributing to their constitution in alternative ways. For example, the former 
director of the KVS - the Flemish Royal Theatre in Brussels, Jan Goossens (director from 
2001 to 2016), had a goal to build a programme with the local multicultural community in 
order to address actualities in the country, such as the administrative and political division 
    Andre Lepecki, Exhausting Dance, Performance and the Politics of Movement (London: Routledge, 2006), 30
68-76. 
 André Lepecki, “From Partaking to Initiating: Leading/following as Dance's (a-presonal) Political 31
Singularity,” in Dance, Politics & Co-Immunity, eds. Gerald Siegmund and Stefan Holscher (Zurich, Berlin: 
Diaphanes, 2013), 31. 
 Ibid.,32
 Parallels may be drawn with Adam Szymczyk, the artistic director of the Documenta 14 (2017). Szymczyk 33
split the festival, traditionally taking place in Kassel, between Kassel and Athens. At the midst of the Greek 
economic crisis his move had been seen as exploitative, as a sort of 'a crisis tourism’.
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of Belgium between the different language communities and cultures.  Goossens also 34
dedicated a great part of the KVS programme to the Belgian colonial past, a topic 
insufficiently at stake in current Belgian education system.   35
Given these two examples, we can start thinking how art can always integrate a 
political dimension, either by complying with the dominant politics and representations, 
or by contesting them. What I call the contesting political dimension of art entails the 
possibility of art to form a constituent of a chain consisting of various social practices that 
intend to challenge dominant politics and representations. The critical practice of 
contesting enables art to engage with the dominant politics and representational norms, 
revealing techniques that maintain dominant politics in power.  
Secondly, in order to properly grasp the artistic strategies of engagement, I would 
like to stress the importance of coming to terms with the nature of dominant politics that 
are put into question and contested. Modern liberal democracy is constructed out of two 
traditions: the liberal discourse which puts emphasis on individual liberty and universal 
human rights, and the democratic discourse whose values are equality and popular 
sovereignty. Today, as political philosopher Chantal Mouffe has pointed out, dominates 
the liberal political discourse formulated as neoliberalism. Neoliberalism is an order of 
politics that undermines the democratic element of popular sovereignty.  It relies on 36
semiotic techniques that reproduce a specific symbolic order beneficial to the production 
of capital. Accordingly, every social practice that critically engages with the hegemony of 
the neoliberal political discourse relates to the exercise of democratic rights within the 
symbolic framework informed by capitalism. This view on liberal democracy suggests 
that critical or contesting artistic practices require the engagement with the hegemonic 
politics, representational norms and values that are not simply com-possible as a true 
affective field, as Lepecki’s theory suggests, but more importantly, symbolically 
articulated by the dominant politics on many levels, weather social, moral, or economic 
  One of the significant programmes established within this framework is Tok Toc Knock festival, or the 34
location project, launched in 2001. Since then, every year artists are invited to to create works in an 
encounter with the city of Brussels. 
  KVS organised and produced performances, exhibitions, and discussions, around Belgian colonial past and 35
colonialism in general. The programme also included the development of collaborations between art 
institutions in Congo and Belgium. This is how Connection Kin festival was born in 2009, taking place in 
Kinshasa. In its 2015 edition, it involved Congolese artists, such as Freddy Tsimba, Toto Kisaku, Vitshois 
Mwilambwe, Bebson de la rue, Fransix Tenda and Violet Nantume. The programme also included 
performances of The Dialogue Series : IV. Moya (Faustin Linyekula / Studios Kabako & KVS), Badke (KVS, 
les ballets C de la B & A.M. Qattan Foundation), Kinshasa Electric (Ula Sickle / KVS & 
KunstenfestivaldesArts) et Fanfare funérailles (Papy Ebotani / Studios Kabako). On the subject of 
colonialism KVS produced and coproduced many performances, that do not only engage with the colonial 
past, but also with the neo-colonialism. Some of them are: Het leven en de werken van Leopold II (2003) en 
Missie (2008) / The Life and Work of Leopold II (2003) and Mission (2008) / by a Belgian theatre director 
Raven Ruëll, Coup Fatal (2014) by a Belgian performance director Alain Platel, and Macbeth (2014) by the 
South African performance maker Brett Bailey. 
 Chantal Mouffe, The Democratic Paradox (London: Verso, 2009), 3-4. 36
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levels, including the level of politics. This implies that initial affectivity of critical and 
corporeal capacities needs to become symbolically constituted and discursively articulated 
in a counter-hegemonic horizon of representation, in the mise-en-scène.  It is only 37
through the choreography of articulation of affects into representations that art in general, 
and performing arts in particular, may contribute to the constitution of alternative ways of 
living together.  38
In the post-political era, which reduces the possibility of people to exercise their 
democratic rights to the level of social administration, questions about the articulating 
power of art are becoming urgent. Art plays a significant role in recovering the democratic 
element of popular sovereignty. Artists, art theorists and other cultural agents are those 
people whose role is not only to maintain, nor only to anticipate political change in some 
utopian terms, turning to the strategies of transgression or avoidance of the dominant 
politics and representational norms.  More importantly, they can also inspire political 39
change; they can engage with the existing politics and symbolic frameworks in order to 
call them into question and criticise them, disrupt and rearticulate them, make numerous 
excluded voices heard, organise themselves across differences, stimulate particular 
affects, encourage innovative ideas, and mobilise people to construct politics that would 
be representing a variety of social discourses characteristic for the migrating, 
multinational and network society. It is within this framework of artistic strategies of 
engagement that I locate the contesting political dimension of art in general, and 
performing arts in particular.  
In this dissertation, the contesting political dimension of art and the artistic 
strategies of engagement that are giving rise to the choreography of articulation are 
theoretical outcomes that emerge once political philosophy engages with performance 
theory through the following performances: Archive (2014) by the Israeli choreographer 
Arkadi Zaides , Black (2011), No Title (2014), and We to Be (2015) by the Norwegian 40
choreographer Mette Edvardsen , Bacantes - Prelúdio Para Uma Purga / Bacchae – 41
Prelude to a Purge (2017) by the Cape Verdean choreographer Marlene Monteiro 
Freitas , and 100% Brussels (2014) by the Berlin team of author-directors, Helgard Kim 42
Haug, Stefan Kaegi and Daniel Wetzel, who work under the label Rimini Protokoll . The 43
  I discuss mise-en-scène in relation to mise-en-sense in chapter 4. 37
 Choreography of articulation is explained throughout different chapters, and particularly in chapter 4. 38
 The strategies of transgression are discussed in chapter 4, and the strategies of avoidance in chapter 5. 39
  Arkadi Zaides’ performance is discussed in chapter 1. 40
 Mette Edvardsen’s performances are discussed in chapter 2. 41
  Marlene Monteiro Freitas’ performance is discussed in chapter 3. 42
 Rimini Protokoll’s performance is discusses in chapter 5. 43
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selection of performances is guided by a view on performance practice as a dramaturgy 
that may appropriate elements from different artistic genres and different genres of 
performing arts (dance, theatre, mime, opera, concert, video, drawing, among others), as 
well as from various social practices (dance, sport, aerobics, promenading, jumping, 
boxing, working, and so on) and discourses (economic, political, cultural, moral, ethical, 
archeological, mathematical, or any other discourse). Hence, this dissertation does not 
necessary focus on the form of performance, on its ontic dimension. The analytical 
approach that I employ in this dissertation puts focus on the reasons for constructing 
performances as such, that is on the ontological dimension of performance. Within this 
framework, the object of investigation becomes the way performance practices and 
theories engage with the hegemony of dominant politics and established representational 
norms and hence with the ways they contribute to the constitution of alternative politics. 
art at the time of post-democracy and populism  
The significance of art for political change comes to the fore once it is considered 
within the current post-political context. The consensual mode of politics which has been 
progressively developed since the Second World War — first in Europe, then, turning into 
a mode of global politics, in the Americas and Oceania — aims at overcoming the left / 
right distinction from the political realm in order to create a harmonious society of liberate 
individuals driven by self-interests. In order to impose control over free individuals ‘a 
consensus at the centre’ stripped state institutions of their democratic role of governance, 
paving the way for a politics in which the interests of people became regulated by 
financial capital.  The consequence is the establishment of a powerful and wealthy 44
business elite and the foundation of the hegemony of transnational corporations. This is 
how the role of the state weakened and, consequently, people became deprived from the 
possibility to exercise their democratic rights through state institutions. Political theorist 
Timothy Mitchell calls this type of politics ‘carbon democracy’, binding its origins to the 
era of exploitation of coal and oil. Mitchell writes that carbon democracy created 
‘economentality’, a form of govermentality of the state which rationalises economy to the 
level of the object.  The hegemony of consensual politics and economentality suppressed 45
the differences between the left and right political parties, by leaving the people without 
 ‘Consensus at the centre’ is a term introduced by Chantal Mouffe to describe the neoliberal politics that 44
stands for the politics of centre. In: Chantal Mouffe, On the Political (London: Routledge, 2005), 66. 
 Timothy Mitchell showed that before the Second World War the term economy ‘referred to the act of 45
economising, of making prudent use of limited resources’. In: Timothy Mitchell, “Economentality: How the 
Future Entered the Government,” in Critical Inquiry 40, no. 4 (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 
2014), 481. 
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choice. This is how consensual politics silenced a variety of citizens’ voices. This 
circumstance gave rise to populist movements acting against the domination of the elite. 
Political philosopher Ernesto Laclau defines populism as a way of constituting a unity of 
the people. He wrote that populism manifests in the articulation of plurality of unsatisfied 
demands in an equivalential chain of popular demands.  From this viewpoint, populist 46
discourse may take different forms.   47
Generally speaking we can distinguishing between the right-wing and the left-wing 
populist discourses. Both discourses play important role in strengthen the institutional 
framework for the agonistic struggle characteristic for the popular sovereignty. 
Nevertheless, there are significant differences between them. Mouffe associates the right-
wing populist discourse with the ‘parties that present themselves as the voice of the 
people against the “Establishement”.  In the course of the EU economic and refugee 48
crisis, the right-wing populist discourse constructs the people by successfully connecting 
anti-immigratory, racist and nationalistic interests with the anxiety of the workers. It 
designates immigrants as the enemy and a threat to the economic stability of the welfare 
state. In the European Union, ‘burdened’ by an economic crisis and increased migrations, 
the far-right populist movements foster euro-sceptic sentiments, essentially longing for a 
return to a purely nationalistic politics. Their rhetoric is grounded in the communitarian 
conception of moral values that are supposed to be found in the affective field of family 
and local community life. This is why the EU is turning into a fortress of fractious, 
authoritarian and conservative politics, affecting the EU’s security and stability. The 
xenophobic parties are at record levels in Sweden, the Netherlands, Austria, France, 
Hungary, Slovakia and Poland. The French Front National, the Dutch Party for Freedom, 
the Freedom Party of Austria, the Poland’s Congress of the New Right, and the UK 
Independent Party, are, ironically, united in a Eurosceptic-parliamentary block. Besides, 
when Middle Eastern refugees began arriving in Europe in 2015, police crackdowns and 
border controls have been introduced and new fences have been constructed along the EU 
frontiers — between Turkey and Bulgaria, and between Hungary and Serbia. In the advent 
of the economic crisis and immigrant onslaught, on 23 June 2016, a great part of the UK 
citizens voted for Brexit, to leave the EU; on 7 April 2017, the EU Commission 
pronounced a mandatory systematic checks of the EU citizens crossing external Schengen 
borders; during the 2017 French presidential campaign, Marine Le Pen, the president of 
   Ernesto Laclau, On Populist Reason (London: Verso, 2005), 74. 46
  Political scientists Cas Mudde and Cristóbal Rovira Kaltawasser defined populism as an ‘ideology that 47
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Rovira Kaltwasser (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012), 8.
   Íñigo Errejón and Chantal Mouffe, In the Name of the People (London: Lawrence & Wishart, 2016), 99.  48
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the right-wing populist party Front National (National Front), introduced a programme 
which suggested Frexit — France’s withdrawal from the EU Schengen zone; on 16 April 
2017, in the constitutional referendum held in Turkey, the EU candidate country, allegedly 
out of 85% of voters, 51,4% ‘YES’ votes approved the abolishment of the parliamentary 
system of government in favour of executive presidency — a system which is supposed to 
significantly increase the powers of Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan (2014 - ), 
under whose presidency peoples’ freedoms have been significantly limited, and the EU 
relationships severely weakened. Across the Atlantic Ocean, in the USA, the political 
status quo was challenged in the Presidential elections held on 8 November 2016, when a 
businessman and TV reality star, Donald Trump, won the elections on the grounds of anti-
establishment, anti-immigration and a nationalistic rhetoric.  
On the other hand, the left-wing populist discourse aims at connecting a variety of 
social demands, including the workers’ demands, in a struggle against the powerful 
corporate elite. In contrast to the right-wing populism, which designates the immigrants as 
the enemy, the left-wing populist discourse intends to designate the neoliberal politicians /
businessmen bond as the elite that threatens global stability. Mouffe suggests that ‘the 
adversary for a left-wing populist movement should be constituted by the configuration of 
forces that sustains neo-liberal hegemony’.  Alexis Tsipras, the president of Syriza 49
(Coalition of Radical Left) in Greece, Pablo Iglesias, the frontman of Podemos (We Can) 
in Spain, and Jean-Luc Mélenchon, the head of La France Insoumise (Unbowed France) 
and the French presidential candidate in 2017,  see the EU treaties, The North Atlantic 50
Treaty Organization (NATO), the World Trade Organisation (WTO), the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Bank (WB), as well as many national institutions and 
transnational corporations, as instruments of a failing globalised capitalism.  Therefore, 51
they seek a reform of the neoliberal politics on the global, EU and national level, and 
oppose strict anti-immigration and anti-refugee legislations. The left-wing populist 
discourse advocates a model of pluralist democracy — an order of politics that embraces a 
network of multicultural and multinational associations. This politics aims at re-evaluating 
the dominant political order, displacing the domination of corporate elite and returning 
  Chantal Mouffe, Agonistics (London: Verso, 2015), 123. 49
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power to the people.  In contrast to the right-wing populism, the left-wing populism is 52
inclined to mobilise affects towards the creation of a progressive collective will.  53
Nevertheless, while the populist movements on the right are successfully uniting in a 
strategy of engaging with the current political institutions in order to take power over 
them and to transform current politics on the national and the EU level, the democratic 
movements on the left are still to a great extent divided around the strategic approach for 
challenging and restructuring the current EU politics. The dilemma rising on the left reads 
like this: should the change be maintained outside state institutions or within them?  
This dilemma may be very well observed if we take a look at protest movements 
emanating from political and economic crises since the beginning of the millennium, 
across the EU and Europe more generally. These protests, against austerity measures and 
illimitable power of business elite, can be generally distinguished between those that are 
horizontal by nature and others that are vertical by nature. The horizontal protest 
movements are the leaderless protests. They advocate direct political change by means of 
withdrawal from the state and its institutions. Some of the examples are the international 
Occupy movement (2011), the Spanish Indignados (2011), the Greek Aganaktismenoi 
(2011), the French Nuit debut (2016) and the Serbian Ne davimo Beograd / Let's Not 
Drown Belgrade (2016- ). The vertical protest movements assert that political change may 
be achieved through engagement with the state and its institutions. They seek 
representatives within the parliamentary political system that would defend the protestors’ 
demands. Some of the examples of the movements that turned into political parties are the 
Spanish Podemos / We Can (2011 - 2014) and the Slovenian Združena levica / United Left 
(2011 - 2014), that grew out of protest movements against austerity measures, and the 
Croatian Zagreb je naš / Zagreb is Ours (2009 - 2017), a political party that grew out of 
the initiative of Croatian intellectuals rising against the politics of private interest.   54
absolute democracy and agonistic democracy  
The different natures of protest movements, horizontal and vertical, gave rise to the 
  The Catalan referendum for independence held on 1 October 2017, may be seen as a reaction to the 52
dominance of the conservative Popular Party (PP) of Mariano Rajoy, the Spanish Prime Minister, over 
Catalonia. The president of Catalonia, Carles Puigdemont, is backed by a coalition of Catalan nationalist 
forces from the conservative Convergència Democràtica de Catalunya (CDC) and the leftist Esquerra 
Republicana de Catalunya (ERC) parties, which, together with the radical Left-wing Candidatura d’Unitat 
Popular (CUP) party, command a majority in the region’s parliament. The conservative Popular Party is only 
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  Mouffe, Agonistics, 123. 53
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following questions: How can we generate alternative ways of living together resulting 
from these protests? In which way can we move beyond a consensus politics that 
appropriate all differences under universal economic and moral laws? What is the 
alternative to the politics of cosmopolitanism? How to contest a growing right-wing 
populism accompanied with the ideology of nationalism? Are we to seize neoliberalism 
and shape the course of events ourselves by restoring the legitimacy of institutions and the 
state, or do we let new realities be developed against our will? And, equally important, 
how might art contribute to the constitution of a politics, to a mise-en-scène that gives rise 
to alternative ways of living together? 
This last question is the central concern in this PhD. To answer this question, I 
consider political philosophy to be a particularly inspiring discipline. The endeavour to 
move beyond a politics of consensus and economentality prompted some thinkers to 
envisage alternative models of democracy that aligned themselves with the horizontal and 
vertical natures of protest movements. Political philosophers Michael Hardt and Antonio 
Negri envisaged the horizontal politics of absolute democracy. For them the power of a 
political subject, which is a self-organising and inconclusive multitude, exists beyond 
representation. They see representation to be facilitated by the subjugating sovereignty of 
the state — either the prince, the nation, or the people.  The multitude provides solution 55
for the current politics; it stands for a unitary global network of civil societies (NGOs in 
particular) tied to transnational institutions that transcendent the boundaries of the nation 
state.  As this view argues that the multitude is not constructed by a sovereign — as the 56
notion of the people implies — but self-organised, civil society stands for a vital force, for 
the needs of life itself, for the ‘bio-power’. The post-hegemonic politics of withdrawal 
from the state, which advocate immediate power of the multitude, are also argued by post-
operaists, such as Paolo Virno  and Giorgio Agamben , and the critics of discourse 57 58
theory and hegemony, such as Benjamin Arditi . 59
In contrast, Mouffe envisages democracy in terms of agonistic pluralism.  In her 60
view — which she shares with Laclau — the popular will is to be exercised within the 
institutions of representative democracy in order to transform them in such a way so that 
  Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri, Empire (Harvard University Press, 2000), 103-104. 55
  Ibid., 310. 56
   Paolo Virno, A Grammar of the Multitude (New York: Semiotext(e), 2004).57
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Kiopkiolis and Giorgos Katsambekis (Ashgate, 2014). 
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they allow for the agonistic confrontation between differential positions. This means that 
the initial network of autonomous struggles, which operate as the self-organised 
multitude, has to be discursively articulated at a particular moment in the people, in a 
common counter-hegemonic horizon of representation. If ‘the state must always be 
rediscovered’, as a pragmatist thinker John Dewey suggested,  then it is to the people to 61
undertake this task. Besides, Mouffe emphasises the importance of the state and its 
institutions. Drawing upon writer Elias Canetti, she stresses that a vote between members 
of the parliament is an act of agonistic battle. In contrast, when the state institutions are 
destroyed, then, there is no possibility for an agonistic battle. The consequence is that 
agonism, a battle between adversaries, turns into antagonism, a conflict between 
enemies.  The quasi-vertical, hegemonic strategies of engagement with the state are also 62
examined by Oliver Marchart , Yannis Stavrakakis , and Paulina Tambakaki , among 63 64 65
others.  
It is this political philosophy that I employ in this research, seeking to unfold the 
artistic strategies of engagement that the contesting (performing) arts imply. Before 
unfolding these artistic strategies, I would first like to describe how political philosophers 
have inspired theatre and performance studies in the past. As it will become obvious, the 
horizontal, the post-hegemonic perspective has been adapted much more than the vertical, 
the hegemonic perspective. It is this articulation of relations between vertical and 
horizontal perspectives that I am concerned with, considering their co-structural logic.  
political discourses in performance theory 
Despite different ways of seeing the relationship between democracy and the state, 
philosophers of both the horizontal and quasi-vertical politics share a view that art plays 
an important role in constructing societies and that art may invigorate democracy in 
plural, multi-ethnic and multinational terms. Accordingly, there is an increasing interest 
among art philosophers to examine the relationship between art and politics with respect 
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to the ongoing politico-philosophical discourses. Their main concern is to explore how art 
practices and art institutions mobilise people to contest the dominant neoliberal political 
order: How may art contribute to overall movements and initiatives that stand against the 
politics of global neoliberalism and those of nationalism? How can art uphold a 
controversy that would mobilise people to engage in a struggle for alternative ways of 
living together and, thus, contribute to the transformation of dominant politics and the 
strengthening of democracy? The question that arises by extension is: What is the role of 
performance practices, institutions and theories in these processes?  
These questions, that are at the forefront of many performance and dance studies in 
Europe and the USA, are also of concern in this PhD.  For this dissertation, in particular, 66
are significant contributions to the research on the relationship between performance and 
politics made by Peggy Phelan, Randy Martin, André Lepecki, Hans-Thies Lehmann, 
Bojana Cvejić, Bojana Kunst and Erika Fischer-Lichte. The research on the relationship 
between performance and politics made by these authors suggests two politico-
philosophical discourses in performance theory. Each of them in a different way envisages 
the possibilities of performance to challenge existing politics and incite alternative ways 
of living together. I propose to call the first approach the post-representational. It is 
closely connected to performance theories developed by Lehmann, Cvejić, Kunst and 
Fischer-Lichte. I will call another trajectory the representational. It is tied to the 
performance theories developed by Phelan, Martin and Lepecki. I have distinguished 
these differential trajectories in performance theory on philosophical and political 
grounds.    
a) The post-representational discourse proceeds from an immanent philosophy 
(Spinoza, Deleuze) and the horizontal politics of absolute democracy (Hardt, Negri, 
Virno, Agamben, Lazaratto). It advocates the strategies of transgressing, undermining, or 
avoiding the engagement with representational art, which is considered to be appropriated 
by hegemonic institutions and deprived from the political dimension. Consequently, this 
venture entails transgressing, undermining, or avoiding the limits established by 
representational art; the limits that sustain a dualism of positions between mind and 
matter, subject and object, or between the passive audience and the active performers. The 
advocates of these strategies foresee the solution for overcoming this dualism precisely by 
 Once we have acknowledged that art always has a political dimension, it becomes impossible to list all the 66
authors who explored the relationship between politics and performing arts. I will therefore limit the record 
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mentioned in this dissertation. Some of the recent books are: Baz Kershaw, The Radical in Performance 
(London, New York: Routledge, 1999); Jon McKenzie, Heike Roms, C.J.W-L.Wee (eds.), Contesting 
Performance, Global Sites of Research (Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009); Alan Read, Theatre, 
Intimacy & Engagement. The Last Human Venue (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009); Sara Brady, 
Performance, Politics, and the War on Terror (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012); Gerald Siegmund and 
Stefan Holscher (eds.), Dance, Politics & Co-immunity (Zürich, Berlin: Diaphanes, 2013); Tony Fischer and 
Eve Katsouraki (eds.), Performing Antagonism (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2017). 
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employing the strategies of disengagement with representational art and the limits that it 
implies. What is at stake in their theories, is the possibility of a direct access to the being 
of the object. This possibility is a result of the subject’s desire for being-in-itself that 
provides an immediate, a pre-discursive access to the being of the object — to the real of 
the object that differs from its reality. The immediate character of these strategies 
conceives of art in terms of either affects or procedures. When art is conceived in terms of 
affects, performance becomes an affective field which replaces ‘the object of art’ with ‘the 
event’. When art is conceived in terms of procedures, artistic creation becomes 
expressive, durational and truthful ‘proceduralism’, rather than ‘the object of art’. 
Herewith, the post-representational trajectory suggests the production of a never-receding 
abundance of new, self-organising and autonomous concepts that emerge from events and 
procedures, independently of representations and socio-political meanings that they 
symbolise.  
Lehmann is one of the most influential advocates of the post-representational 
approach to performing arts and the key reference point in the international debate on the 
ongoing theatre and performance practice. Lehmann’s significant thesis is that new 
technology requires a shift from dramatic theatre dominated by a text-based and mimetic 
representation of conflict, to new media, immanently de-structured processional event that 
is ‘more presence than representation’.  His thoughts on the ways presentation in theatre 67
may open up a multi-perspectival form of perceiving, led him to develop a theory of 
transgression which stands for the affective experience of life that oversteps all sense, 
morals, or the limits of the self.  On similar politico-philosophical grounds Fischer-68
Lichte developed a theory of oscillation. She advocates the process of oscillation between 
representation and presence capable of enabling transformation.  Accordingly, she writes 69
that ‘[t]he physical articulations which are seen, heard, smelled, or sensed by other 
spectators or actors in turn generate perceptible behaviour patterns and actions in those 
who perceive them so forth.’  The spectator thus becomes a participant in the 70
performative event, not being able to foresee the difference between mind and matter, 
subject and object, and the audience and the performers. For her part, Cvejić scrutinises 
the role of performance in terms of a continuous process of posing and producing 
problems.  She conceives of problems as objects of ideas that are resolved in thought that 71
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gives rise to expressive concepts. Each expressive concept is an agreement in adequation 
that ‘supposes the equivalence and parallelism of the two dissimilar things, for instance 
[...] bodily movement and the thought of a movement’.  The break of the body-72
movement synthesis undermines or replaces representation. By these means, Cvejić puts 
the focus on endless and limitless procedures of expression and deliberation.  As far as 73
Kunst is concerned, she denounces representation by introducing a temporal dimension of 
duration. Meeting in duration avoids the capitalist techniques of production that brought 
about the acceleration of time, adding economic value to temporality. As a durational 
procedure, meeting opens up a space for potentiality of closeness;  it is capable of 74
profaning a specific relationship with movement, by means of waiting and laziness.   75
b) With the insights into the post-representational theoretical approaches to the 
artistic strategies of transgressing, undermining, and avoiding, I will develop a thesis 
about the representational discourse in performance theory which anticipates that which 
is not represented. This thesis draws upon the representational trajectory (Phelan, Martin 
and Lepecki) that evolves from the quasi-transcendental philosophy (Derrida, 
Wittgenstein) and that resonates the quasi-vertical politics of democracy (Laclau, Mouffe, 
Stavrakakis).  
The first thing to be pointed out is that I share the view with Phelan, Martin and 
Lepecki, that we cannot do away with representation. I agree with Phelan who associates 
withdrawal from representation with silence, with the position assigned to women in a 
patriarchal society.  Her argument that the task of art is to interfere with representation 76
hegemonized, regulated and controlled by men, in order to unmark the metaphor of 
gender, is perfectly relevant.  I sympathise with Martin who suggests that neither the 77
audience, nor the performers construct totalising entities. His view suggests that the 
unregistered in representation mobilises the participation of the audience, by enabling the 
audience to critically expand the understanding of the political beyond its conventional 
register in representation, and, more importantly, to contest it as such.  Also, I find 78
Lepecki’s theory, which stands at the philosophical crossroad between the immanentist 
and transcendental philosophical trajectories, very inspiring. I agree with Lepecki that 
performance should be envisaged in terms of the politics of engagement. His theory 
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suggests that the politics of engagement may open up a possibility for the multiplying 
operations of vision.  The consequence of this practice is the rise and the actualisation of 79
the unthinkable subjectivities, bodies, identities and spaces.  80
Although I do not share the view with the thinkers of the post-representational 
trajectory that the political dimension of performance consists in transgressing 
(Lehmann), undermining (Cvejić), avoiding (Kunst) or transforming (Fischer-Lichte) 
representations by means of sheer presence, that is exclusively by affects and procedures, 
I do agree with the thinkers of the representational trajectory to a point. I do not think that 
the political dimension of performance consist only in marking identities that are visible 
unmarked as Phelan suggests (this view does not relegate identities from the realm of 
politics), nor only in mobilising participation in representation in order to contest it as 
Martin proposes (this view neglects the possibility of discursively constituting or 
articulating alternatives). Neither do I think that the politics of engagement envisaged as a 
true ‘co-extensive affective field of compossibilisation of political purpose and action’, as 
Lepecki suggest,   is sufficient to grasp the political dimension of performance 81
(compossibilisation entails a compossibility of things possible in themselves and truth 
procedures as in Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz’s , Gilles Deleuze’s , and Alain Badiou’s 82 83
theories ; neither of them renders a political dimension, since they fall in the domain of 84
event).  
Given these points, I would like to suggest an alternative view on the ways 
performance might contest the hegemony of the neoliberal consensus politics and 
economentality, and contribute to the constitution of democratic politics that give rise to 
alternative modes of living together. In the view that I advocate, immediate access to the 
being of objects — to the real, is denounced, and a universal unifying principle, such as 
pre-discursive objectivity, is abandoned. The access to the being is enabled only through 
the operation of mediation — that is through discourse formation. Drawing upon 
Wittgenstein, discourse formation is envisaged as a particular system of relations between 
language and actions within which language is entwined.  More importantly, as Laclau 85
and Mouffe suggested, discourse formation implies that initial immediacy has always to 
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be replaced by discursive mediation.  This means that ‘the being’ is always articulated 86
within a particular discursive context, and that discursive constructions constantly exclude 
alternative relational possibilities.  This is why a subject’s desire is now directed towards 87
other possible discursive formations of the being situated outside the delimited discursive 
context and symbolic framework — towards the lack-of-being, that is, the lack-of-
subject’s-being. The acknowledgement of the lack, as Stavrakakis pointed out, precludes 
the idealisation of abundance.  In fact, the belief in positivity, or never-receding 88
abundance, becomes continuously contaminated by negativity, or the irradicable lack. On 
this point, the relationship between the desire for abundance and the lack is seen in co-
constitutive and paradoxical terms. The paradox emphasises hegemonic and conflictual 
aspects between discourse and its outside.  This approach calls neither for transgression, 89
nor for avoidance of existing limits — limits between included and excluded, the subject 
and the object, or between the audience and the performers — but rather for the 
continuous practice of redrawing the limits between them.  This approach is a move 90
beyond dualism, as it does not aim at presenting the being of the object, but observes how 
and why the being of the object is discursively articulated and what are the consequences 
of articulating the objects of art as such.  
The practice of redrawing the limits between the paradoxically different positions 
calls for the rearticulation of their relations by means of hegemony and conflict. I am 
suggesting that rearticulation implies the continuous operation of sublimation of one into 
another position: of the immediate affective impulses of pleasure stimulated by existing 
discourses, into the symbolically represented cultural values. It is precisely the inscription 
of the affective, or the real, within this system of symbolic relations that stands for — 
what I call — the practice of representation.  Within the representational trajectory, the 91
political dimension of art is a contesting and constitutive force to the extent that it engages 
with the hegemonic symbolic constructions and mobilises their rearticulation. This way, 
the artistic strategies of engagement disclose the political dimension of art by opening up 
the possibility for challenging, contesting and radically rearticulating hegemonic 
discourses that dominate institution that is art (museology, curatorial practices, politics of 
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Thomassen (Manchester, New York: Manchester University Press, 2014), 185-202. 
 I discuss the co-constitutive relationship between abundance and lack in chapter 2. 89
 I discuss the practice of redrawing the limits in chapter 4. 90
 I discuss the operations of sublimation and articulation in more details in the following chapters, and 91
particularly in chapters 4 and 6. 
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programming, different artistic practices and techniques, dramaturgy, choreography, 
concepts, names, and so on), and that are sedimented in dominant representations. Within 
the framework of the constitutive and contesting artistic practices, the goal of the artistic 
strategies of engagement is to disarticulate existing discourses and to articulate a 
(counter)hegemony of alternative discourses and representations on a symbolic level.  
On this point, I advocate that in contrast to the one sided view which privileges an 
affective and/or procedural approach to art — the one that we find in theorists who draw 
upon the immanentist philosophy and the horizontal politics of absolute democracy — we 
need both: affects and discourses, procedures and substances, immediacy and mediation, 
and horizontality and verticality. This approach, which supports the demonstrable above 
the reasonable, requires a movement away from the autonomous, self-foundational, and 
inconclusive conceptions of art towards their radical relational aspect. In this encounter, 
discourse becomes a condition for affects and counter-discourse, while substances become 
conditions for procedures and counter-substances. Consequently, representation in art 
becomes a condition for ruptures and counter-representations. When drama is envisaged 
within the co-constitutional framework, it ceases to be a mere matter of the plot, of the 
closed system relating the conflict between the characters represented on the stage, and it 
becomes a matter of the relationship between the audience and the performers. This 
approach does not call for transgression or avoidance of all limits between the audience 
and the performers, but rather for the continuous operation of redrawing the limits 
between them.  Within this framework, drama, or a conflict of positions, or a tension 92
between positions, enables the possibility of the audience to evaluate and call into 
question the concreteness of (performed) representations that arise from inequality and 
conflict. The audience’s critical view of representation is then what mobilises them to take 
action inside and outside theatre, turning their immediate affects into concrete demands. 
Envisaged in this way, representation in performance may point at the self-assertive and 
constitutive political project of decision making, which requires the contest against the 
hegemony of consensual politics and economentality sedimented in dominant 
representations and politics. Accordingly, the order of politics that antagonise societies on 
racial, religious, or gender grounds, may be disarticulated and articulated into an agonistic 
one. It is by these means that art, including performance, may contest the hegemony of 
neoliberal politics and representational norms and contribute to the constitution of 
counter-hegemonic politics, suggesting alternative ways of identification among the 
people, beyond a pre-established perspective on subjectivities in terms of class- , gender- , 
or race- based identities.  In fact, by choreographing agonism, performance practices 93
may support the return of agonistic struggles in the realm of politics.  
   This hypothesis is developed in chapter 4. 92
   On alternative subjectivities and communities, see chapter 5. 93
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structure of dissertation   
In the first chapter, I trace the philosophical origins that underline the radical 
democratic projects of absolute democracy and agonistic democracy.  To begin with, I 94
will distinguish two disparate trajectories within contemporary continental philosophical 
thought: immanence and quasi-transcendence. The immanentist trajectory is developed in 
the philosophy of Gilles Deleuze.  It influenced anti-foundational thinkers such as 95
Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri and, ergo, the political project of absolute democracy. 
The quasi-transcendental trajectory is developed in the philosophy of Jacques Derrida.  96
It influenced the post-foundational politico-philosophical thought of thinkers such as 
Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe and, consequently, Mouffe’s political project of 
agonistic democracy. Drawing upon Laclau’s and Mouffe’s quasi-transcendental 
philosophical approach to politics — which is accountable of the ever-present exteriority 
and constructed around discourse, antagonism, and hegemony — this chapter explores the 
political dimension of art in terms of a discursive, contesting and counter-hegemonic 
practice. Within this context, I will distinguish the contesting performance practices that 
challenge dominant politics from the complying performance practices that sustain a 
political status-quo. With the insight into Arkadi Zaides’ performance Archive (2015), my 
aim is to probe choreography in relation to the sphere of contestation such that it may be 
understood to contribute to the transformation of politics and society as a whole. 
Performance is hence envisaged as the agonistic practice of encounters and contingent 
objectifications.  
The second chapter unfolds a debate between the philosophical trajectories of 
immanence (Deleuze) and quasi-transcendence (Derrida) in psychoanalytic and politico-
philosophical terms.  Drawing upon political philosophers Oliver Marchart and Yannis 97
Stavrakakis, the trajectory of immanence is conceived within the framework of a positive 
ontological imaginary of abundance (desire for being in-itself) giving rise to political 
philosophers Michael Hardt’s and Antonio Negri’s political model of absolute democracy, 
  This chapter has been published in a slightly different version: Goran Petrović Lotina, “The Political 94
Dimension of Dance: Mouffe’s Theory of Agonism and Choreography,” in Performing Antagonism, Theatre, 
Performance & Radical Democracy, eds. Tony Fischer and Eve Katsouraki (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 
2017), 251 - 272. 
   See for instance: Gilles Deleuze, Pure Immanence. Essays on A Life, trans. Anne Boyman (New York: Zone 95
Books, 2001); Gilles Deleuze,  Difference and Repetition, trans. Paul Patton (London: Bloomsbury, [1968] 
2004).
  See for instance: Jacques Derrida, Margins of Philosophy, trans. Alan Bass (Chicago: The University of 96
Chicago Press, 1984); Jacques Derrida, Aporias, trans. Thomas Dutoit (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 
1993); Jacques Derrida, Writing and Difference (London: Routledge, [1967] 2005). 
  This chapter has been published in a different version: Goran Petrović Lotina, “The Agonistic Objectification. 97
Choreography as a Play Between Abundance and Lack”, in Performance Research, Vol 21, Issue 4 (London: 
Routledge 2016): 34-40.
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whereas the trajectory of quasi-transcendence is envisaged within the framework of a 
negative ontological imaginary of lack (desire for the lack of-being) giving rise to political 
philosopher Chantal Mouffe’s political model of agonistic democracy. My goal is to show 
that unlike the ontological imaginary of abundance that gives priority to the phenomenon 
of positivity, the ontological imaginary of lack anticipates a co-constitutive relationship 
between abundance and lack, precisely because the dimension of negativity precludes 
both the idealisation of abundance and the idealisation of lack. The suggested co-
constitutive and agonistic type of relationship between the paradoxically differential 
positions, such as lack and abundance, becomes a condition for challenging a dualist view 
on societies and the possibility for the rearticulation of the relations between these 
positions within the global socio-cosmic community in plural terms. Drawing upon 
Bojana Cvejić’s performance philosophy, it will become apparent that the phenomenon of 
positivity implies adequation or parallelism of the abundance of oppositional positions 
giving rise to a politics of absolute harmony, whereas the phenomenon of negativity 
implies tensions between paradoxically differential positions giving rise to a politics of 
agonism. This is significant, because agonism opens up the space for polemics. As we will 
see, polemics are constitutive to the works of art. The insight into Mette Edvardsen’s 
choreographies, concerned with the presence and absence of objects, that is with the 
representation and its exteriority, gives rise to this argument.  
The suggested co-constitutive and agonistic type of relations between the 
paradoxically differential positions, such as lack and abundance, in the third chapter 
becomes a tool to challenge philosopher Jacques Rancière’s one-sided political model of 
communal anarchism, which advocates politics of disorder above the politics of order. As 
we will see, for Rancière the democratic principle of the power of everybody (that he 
situates within the realm of politics) may exist autonomously from the representation 
appropriated by the coercive principle of the state (which presents the order of the police). 
In contrast, for Mouffe, there is no power of the popular will (designated as the political) 
without the moment of representation which functions as the hegemonic principle of the 
state (which she designates as the order of politics). This is why Mouffe envisages 
democracy in terms of hegemonic struggle, while Rancière conceives of it in terms of 
communal anarchism. And, whereas the former implies a politics of order, the latter 
suggests a politics of disorder. The distinction made between Rancière’s and Mouffe’s 
theories indicates different ways of conceiving the political in performance theory. From 
the point of view of the theory of hegemony, the role of art cannot be seen any more 
exclusively as le partage du sensible, or mise-en-sense. Rather, it is seen as the moment of 
articulation of the mise-en-sense in a symbolic framework, that is in the mise-en-scène. 
This thesis is supported in an encounter with Marlene Monteiro Freitas’ performance 
Bacantes - Prelúdio Para Uma Purga (Bacchantes – Prelude to a Purge), which observes 
society as constructed at the point of intersection of the disorderly Dionysian ideals and 
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the orderly Apollonian ideals, that is at the point of intersection of mise-en-sense and 
mise-en-scène.  
In the fourth chapter, I analyse in which ways the different philosophical, 
political and psychoanalytic trajectories — immanence and quasi-transcendence, 
absolute democracy and agonistic democracy, being-in-itself and lack-of-being 
— affect the understanding of the political dimension of performance practice.  To begin 98
with, it is important to distinguish the post-representational discourse in performance 
theories from the representational discourse. Theatre scholar Hans-Thies Lehmann is the 
most influential advocate of the post-representational approach to performance practice. 
For him, modernity succeeded to expel the political dimension from dramatic 
representation associated with conflict. This is why, what he calls ‘the political gesture’ 
stands for tragic experience enabled by transgression, by overstepping all moral, ethical or 
political limits.  For the postdramatic and post-representational approach to theatre, the 99
political dimension manifests in the immediate experience of reality through affects. I will 
claim that the privileging of transgression and affects through sheer presence in 
performance philosophy precludes the possibility of constructing alternative politics and 
representations. In contrast, I intend to demonstrate that the political dimension of theatre 
lies in a dramatic representation precisely because it is associated with conflict. In the 
view that I advocate, conflict is not a mere matter of the plot, of the closed system relating 
polemics and antagonisms between the characters on the stage, but a dramatic form of 
engagement of the audience with the performance. Drama enables the choreography of 
articulation of the audience’s affects into representation. What I will be calling the 
representational approach to theatre is a condition for the articulation of the audience 
envisaged as passive onlookers into active citizenship. 
The fifth chapter explains how the theoretical standpoints in performance theory 
developed around the post-representational and representational trajectories influence 
discourses about the production of alternative subjectivities and communities.  Post-100
operaists focus on the post-fordist techniques of production and the workers’ resistance to 
the capitalist quest for acceleration of modes of production. On these grounds, 
performance scholar Bojana Kunst advocates strategies of avoidance of existing politics 
and representational forms. In her theory, alternative subjectivities and communities 
evolve from the temporal dimension of duration — waiting and less work. Nevertheless, 
  This chapter will be published in a different version: Goran Petrović Lotina, “The Return of Drama. Protests, 98
Politics and Political Discourses in Performance Theory,” in Cultural Critic (Minneapolis: University of 
Minnesota Press, 2018).
 Hans-Thies Lehmann, “A Future for Tragedy? Remarks on the Political and the Postdramatic,” in 99
Postdramatic Theatre and the Political, eds. Karen Jurs-Munby, Jerome Carroll and Steve Giles (London: 
Bloomsbury, 2013), 93-95. 
  This chapter will be published in a slightly different version: Goran Petrović Lotina, “Performing Alternative 100
Collectives,”in Performing Ethos (Bristol: Intelect, 2017).
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the studies of the political scientists, Robert O’Brien, Anne Marie Goetz, Jan Aart Scholte 
and Marc Williams, show that the engagement of social movements with the multilateral 
economic institutions brings forth the significance of the post-fordist techniques of 
domination in constructing societies.  The accountability of both post-fordist coercive 101
techniques, those of production and those of domination, will allow me to widen Kunst’s 
framework for resistance. I will introduce the strategies of struggle of different collectives 
against capitalism through engagement. This approach enables a shift from the pre-
established perspective on subjectivities in terms of class- , gender- , or race- based 
identities, towards the relational forms of identifications. Drawing upon political 
philosophers Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe, I will demonstrate that the relational 
forms of identification enable performances to articulate subjectivities, communities and 
politics in alternative, co-constitutive terms that are much more relevant for the plural 
society. In order to explore how performance contributes to these operations, I take Rimini 
Protokoll’s perfomance 100% Brussels as an example. 
Throughout different chapters of this dissertation I have stressed that the operation 
of articulation implies a sublimation of antagonism into agonism, or initial affectivity into 
representation. Once we have examined how agonism may change our perception of 
objects (Chapter 2), human bodies (Chapter 3), relations between the audience and the 
performances (Chapter 4), and collectivity (Chapter 5), we are able to observe the 
articulation of affects into representation through the practice of choreographing 
performances, that is, through the relationship between the choreographer and the 
performers. In concluding this dissertation, I will demonstrate why the artistic strategies 
of engagement in performance practice require the articulation of affects into 
representation. In order to approach this topic, I will return to the notion of 
compossibilisation that Lepecki introduced to performance studies. In Lepecki’s theory 
artistic politics of engagement imply a creation of ‘a true affective-political field’ of 
compossibilisation.  Tracing the philosophical origins of ‘truth procedures’ and of 102
‘compossibilisation’, mainly drawing upon the philosophies of Gottfried Wilhelm 
Leibniz  and Gilles Deleuze , I will develop a critique of a view that conceives 103 104
performance as a true affective field of compossibilisation. My goal is to demonstrate that 
the artistic strategies of engagement and the contesting political dimension of performance 
  O’Brien, Robert, Anne Marie Goetz, Jan Aart Scholte and Marc Williams, Contesting Global Governance. 101
Multilateral Economic Institutions and Global Social Movements (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2003). 
 André Lepecki, “From Partaking to Initiating”, 31; André Lepecki, Singularities. Dance in the Age of 102
Performance. (London and New York: Routledge, 2016).
 Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz, New Essays on Human Understanding, trans. and eds. Peter Remnant and 103
Jonathan Bennett (Cambridge, New York, Melbourne: Cambridge University Press, 1996). 
 Gilles Deleuze, The Logic os Sense, ed. Constantin V. Boundas, trans. Mark Lester (New York: Columbia 104
University Press, 1990). 
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require a view of performances in terms of performative practices that articulate affects 
into representations, thus giving priority to opinion formation over truth procedures. In 
addition, this chapter opens up new questions about choreographing agonism to be further 
explored.  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1 
The Political Dimension of Performance Practices  1
This chapter explores the political dimension of performance, focussing on the 
concept of agonism as it is conceived by political philosopher Chantal Mouffe. Contrary 
to other models of agonism, Mouffe’s work is constructed around a definition of agonism 
that implies a certain degree of antagonism that can never be eliminated. This view 
explains that agonism (a we/they relation in which the two sides are adversaries) is always 
threatened by antagonism (a we/they relation in which the two sides are enemies). Given 
that ‘the task of democracy is to transform antagonism into agonism’,  I will argue that 2
Mouffe’s agonistic model of democratic politics enables the possibility of understanding 
how art, and performance in particular, is able to contest and transform the dominant 
neoliberal politics — their hegemonized institutions, sedimented social practices, and 
determined representations, which mobilise antagonistic relations. Specifically, once we 
have acknowledged that antagonism is inherent to every social construction, we can begin 
to understand how the articulatory power of performance is manifested within the context 
of counter-hegemonic struggle. I argue that it is precisely in the engagement with political 
struggle between complying forces (those that support hegemonic order) and contesting 
forces (those that counter dominant hegemony), that the dynamic, transformative and 
creative power of performance is disclosed.   
In order to support this argument, I will first turn to the quasi-transcendental 
philosophical trajectory developed by the French philosopher, Jacques Derrida, before 
then turning to examine post-foundational politico-philosophical thought, which 
emphasises the indispensable moment of exclusion in the construction of any social 
practice, and the dimension of the impossibility of absolute foundation or grounding. This 
is of particular relevance to Mouffe’s agonistic model of democratic politics which 
proposes the disarticulation and transformation of dominant socio-political discourses 
around we/they relations. For Mouffe, democratic politics begins by acknowledging — 
rather than suppressing — antagonistic relations within the practice of hegemony. Insight 
into Mouffe’s political theory provides the basis for grasping the political dimension of art 
and, moreover, will permit an understanding of it in terms of counter-hegemonic struggle. 
   This chapter has been published in a different version: Goran Petrović Lotina, “The Political Dimension of 1
Dance: Mouffe's Theory of Agonism and Choreography,” in Performing Antagonism, Theatre, Performance 
& Radical Democracy, eds. Tony Fischer and Eve Katsouraki (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2017), 251-272.
 Chantal Mouffe, On the Political (London, New York: Routledge, 2005), 20. 2
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In the final section, I envisage performance practice from these philosophical and political 
standpoints with the aim of defining choreography in relation to the sphere of contestation 
such that it may be understood to contribute to the transformation of democracy and 
society as a whole. In this regard, what I will be calling agonistic encounters and 
contingent objectifications in performance practice will be the articulation of partial and 
evanescent systems of relations allowing different realities to be materialised and 
articulated in the same space. 
The post-foundational turn: Mouffe and the radicalisation of democracy  
One can distinguish, broadly, two distinct trajectories within contemporary 
continental philosophical thought. On the one hand, there is the quasi-transcendental 
trajectory developed in the philosophy of Jacques Derrida, who has influenced the post-
foundational politico-philosophical thought of thinkers such as Ernesto Laclau and 
Chantal Mouffe. On the other hand, there are those thinkers influenced by Baruch 
Spinoza’s and Gilles Deleuze’s ontological trajectory of immanence (Michael Hardt, 
Antonio Negri, Paolo Virno and Roberto Esposito, among others). Where these 
trajectories diverge is in terms of their respective relations to metaphysics, specifically 
over the question of existence and the nature of existence itself. For Deleuze, the task of 
philosophy is to construct metaphysics — which renders what he terms the ‘pure plane of 
immanence’, envisaged as the existence of a smooth space without constitutive division. 
For Derrida, by contrast, the task of philosophy is to overcome metaphysics — which 
renders the horizon of transcendence, a movement of the ‘outside’ that striates the smooth 
space. Deleuze’s concept of immanence suggests that the construction of differences is 
possible but restricts them exclusively to the dimension of metaphysics. Derrida — who 
like Deleuze, knows that there is no outside to metaphysics — understands metaphysics as 
a structural closure, such that the project of overcoming it is impossible. Nevertheless, for 
Derrida, as Daniel Smith has pointed out, it is exactly ‘this very impossibility that 
conditions the possibility of deconstructing the philosophical tradition from within’.  3
Pointing to the aporetic and constitutive relation of the categories of possible and 
impossible, or immanence and transcendence, this theoretical approach renders Derrida’s 
philosophical trajectory quasi-transcendental.   4
 Daniel Smith, “Deleuze and Derrida, Immanence and Transcendence: Two Directions in Recent French 3
Thought,” in Between Deleuze and Derrida, eds. Paul Paton and John Protevi (London, New York: 
Continuum, 2004), 48.
 To be sure, Derrida never described himself as a philosopher of transcendence. Derrida situated his own work 4
at the margins of philosophy. With this in mind, I have designated Derrida as a philosopher of quasi-
transcendence, whose theory may be placed at the limits of immanence and transcendence, or at the point of 
their intersection.  
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A closer look at the relation between the trajectories of immanence and quasi-
transcendence shows that these different approaches to metaphysics result from two 
different ways of defining difference. For Deleuze difference refers to the difference 
between being and beings and difference of being in itself [l'Être avec soi dans la 
différence].  Hence, in Deleuze, difference is always part of metaphysics. His approach 5
explains that the reactivation of virtualities and creation are possible only within 
metaphysics and that these operations are capable of transforming metaphysics anew. 
Thus, for Deleuze ‘difference must be articulation and connection in itself [...] a 
differenciation of difference’ and not representation.  The ‘in-itself difference’ is situated 6
in becoming, in ‘a life’, out of which subjects and objects are actualised. Given these 
points, difference is contained within the plane of absolute immanence that is more real 
than reality — hence ‘virtuality': a disembodied abstraction, a canon of laws independent 
of the state of affairs and thus of meaning and representation. By contrast, Derrida 
considers difference as something that is always excluded from metaphysics, something 
which is not part of it, and so constantly disrupts and destabilizes metaphysics from the 
outside. As such, difference may never be conceptually grasped in its totality but only 
precariously represented through a performative and discursive operation. Thus, for 
Derrida — what he terms — différence is a relation that transcends metaphysics and the 
ontological difference between Being and beings.  This exterior to the metaphysical 7
tradition, which constantly threatens the closure of metaphysics, conditions its very 
possibility and thus makes ‘exteriority’ a quasi-transcendental and constitutive part of 
metaphysics itself.  
The quasi-transcendental insistence on exteriority leads post-foundational thinkers 
— such as Laclau and Mouffe — to call for the de-essentialization of the classical 
metaphysical figures of foundation such as ground, universality, and totality, and not their 
recuperation on immanent grounds. They stress the need not to withdraw from these 
figures, but to engage with them in order to continuously contest and weaken their 
ontological status from within. The political implications of such an approach become 
clear once we see that this way of addressing the problem and nature of existence compels 
us to acknowledge that every social construction is precarious and contingent.  Political 
theorist Oliver Marchart has described post-foundationalism as thus resting on an 
undecidable terrain, in the eternal tension between ground and abyss, between attempts at 
 Gilles Deleuze, Différence et Repetition (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1968), 297. 5
 Gilles Deleuze,  Difference and Repetition, trans. Paul Patton (London: Bloomsbury [1968] 2004), 117.6
 Further on difference in Derrida see: Jacques Derrida, Margins of Philosophy, trans. Alan Bass (The 7
University of Chicago Press, 1984), 67. 
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foundation and the inevitable failure of such efforts.  Expanding Marchart’s thought, we 8
may say that the frontier between these differential arrangements, between ground and 
abyss, may never be overcome — only expanded at the expense of another choice. It is 
this unavoidable tension between differential positions that acknowledges paradox as 
constitutive of any social construction. In sustaining paradoxical tensions within the space 
of undecidability consisting of different choices and in introducing a moment of decision 
in favour of a certain choice, post-foundationalism recognises hegemony and antagonism 
as inherent to society. It shows that every identity, object and relation may always be 
otherwise, yet, not absolutely erased. Thus, post-foundationalism strives to challenge the 
homogenising and totalising conceptualisations of ontological paradigms that seek to 
sustain the social and political status quo, in order to re/construct or re/articulate societies 
and politics in alternative ways.  
This argument is particularly important to the development of post-Marxist 
political theory. In Hegemony and Socialist Strategy, Laclau’s and Mouffe’s critique of 
essentialism, liberal theories of rationalism and individualism, evolved from a theory of 
discourse analysis. Deepening Michel Foucault’s concept of ‘discursive formation’, they 
defined discourse, not only as a combination of speech and writing, but as a system of 
linguistic and extralinguistic relations, accountable of ‘institutions, rituals and practices 
through which a discursive formation is structured’.  This is to say that every social 9
configuration is meaningful and only symbolically constructed within a system of 
differences. In fact, distinguishing ‘discourse as a system of differential entities’ from ‘the 
field of discursivity’,  discourse becomes an ensemble of differential entities materialised 10
through a language game — consisting not only of language, but also, as philosopher 
Ludwig Wittgenstein suggests, of the actions with which language is entwined.  Such 11
language games relate one entity to another and strive to achieve totality and domination 
over the ‘field of discursivity'. However, Laclau and Mouffe cancel the completeness of 
the relational logic of these entities by affirming that ‘a discursive totality never exists in 
the form of a simply given and delimited positivity’.  On the contrary, the discursive 12
totality can ‘exist [only] as a partial limitation of a “surplus of meaning”’.  It is a type of 13
 See Oliver Marchart, Post-Foundational Thought: Political Difference in Nancy, Lefort, Badiou, & Laclau 8
(Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2007). 
 Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe, Hegemony and Socialist Strategy, Towards a Radical Democratic 9
Politics (London, New York: Verso, [1985] 2001), 109.
   Ibid., 111. 10
  Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, [1953] 1986), 5. 11
 Laclau and Mouffe, Hegemony, 110. 12
 Ibid., 111.13
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a fusion, of a concrete unity that requires overdetermination and a plurality of meanings.  14
Overdetermination enables us to see that any social unity is a symbolic unity — a unity 
constituted on a nominal level — conditioned by that which it excludes.  From this, we 15
should understand that the various entities that form the field of discursivity may always 
threaten a discursive totality. This means that no single principle, no determination in the 
last instance for defining society in terms of totality — for example, the role played by 
class in Antonio Gramsci or the logic of reproduction in Louis Althusser — may fix the 
whole field of differential entities. Each fixation of totality can only ever be a result of an 
unstable and partial limitation enclosed in what Laclau and Mouffe call nodal points. 
Nodal points relate to privileged discursive points. They aim at partially fixing particular 
discourses in order to ‘arrest the flow of differences’.  16
Nodal points demonstrate that every social construction is a reflection of a partial 
limitation in relation to that which exceeds the discursive configuration. The production of 
limits point out that all social constructions are organised by the same principle of 
exclusion. For example, the identities ‘poor’, ‘gay’, or ‘immigrant’ become symbolically 
subordinated and excluded in relation to different discourses depending on whether they 
are discourses that prioritise class over gender or gender over race, and so on. And it is by 
means of revealing the differences that permeate social practices that an excluded social 
group struggles to rearticulate the very terms of symbolic legitimacy by threatening and 
destabilizing the dominant social order and its limits — stimulating ruptures within the 
social fabric of totality. The relational logic between these differential positions, between 
the symbolic order and its surplus, between interiority and exteriority, implies not only 
ruptures and conflicts, but also, what Mouffe calls, the drawing of limits between 
conflicting positions.  When limits expand they do so to the detriment of other possible 17
symbolisations, but they are never able to entirely overcome each other. It is for this 
reason that Mouffe’s and Laclau’s discourse approach to the construction of the social 
  Ibid., 97.14
 Overdetermination is the concept borrowed from linguistics and psychoanalysis. In these disciplines, it has 15
an objective dialectical connotation relating content. Overdetermination is the key concept in Sigmund 
Freud’s psychoanalysis. In his theory, overdetermination points at the unity of multiply factors and complex 
structures — including those that are not visible and not articulated — in various aspects of social life. 
Drawing upon Freud, Louis Althusser conceived of overdetermination as an accumulation of contradictions 
in a ruptured unity. See: Sigmund Freud, The Interpretation of Dreams, trans. James Strachey (New York: 
Basic Books, [1900] 2010); Louis Althusser, “Contradiction and Overdetermination,” in For Marx, trans. 
Ben Brewster (London: Verso, [1969] 1996), 87-128.
  Laclau and Mouffe criticize Althusser's ‘determination in the last instance by the economy’ that unifies the 16
social in the space of rationalist paradigm; they propose, instead, the notion of ‘nodal points’ derived from 
Lacan’s concept of points de capiton. Nodal points are constructed through hegemonic practices — practices 
of articulation. Laclau and Mouffe, Hegemony, 112-113. 
  Envisaged by Mouffe, the political logic always require the drawing of limits between the conflicting 17
positions, between ‘us’ and ‘them’. See: Chantal Mouffe, The Democratic Paradox (London and New York: 
Verso, 2009), 36-59.
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implies a politics that, by drawing limits, acknowledges antagonism and hegemony to be 
inherent to society.  
Laclau and Mouffe distinguished hegemony and antagonism as key concepts in 
defining the nature of the political.  About hegemony they wrote: ‘One can see 18
hegemony as a theory of the decision, taken in an undecidable terrain.’  Informed by the 19
dimension of radical negativity , hegemony manifests itself in the possibility of 20
excluding other choices and, thus, acknowledges the ever-present possibility of 
antagonism between paradoxically differential positions: ‘Antagonisms are not objective 
relations, but relations that reveal the limits of all objectivity. Society is constructed 
around these limits, and they are antagonistic limits.’  With respect to antagonism, every 21
social order or ‘objectivity’ is a partial and contingent construction. Drawing upon 
political theorist Carl Schmitt, Mouffe acknowledges the ever-present possibility of 
antagonism within the social realm and formulates her agonistic model of democratic 
politics. Agonistic democracy implies a politics that allows for a choice between 
conflicting relations, between paradoxically different logics while criticising rationalist 
and individualist politics of consensus, totality, and harmony, which aim to do away with 
conflicts. Insofar as the conflict between ‘us’ and ‘them’ may never be rationally 
overcome, the crucial question of Mouffe’s democratic politics is: How to organise human 
relations in a way that is adequate to the plurality of positions that constitute the social 
realm? How to transform and articulate the antagonistic relations that exist between ‘us’ 
and ‘them’ in an agonistic configuration? 
These questions imply — by extension — the need for the radicalisation of 
  Laclau’s and Mouffe’s theory of hegemony begins with tracing the genealogy of the notion of ‘hegemony’, 18
observed as a response to a crisis of a ‘normal’ historical development that entails dualism. Beginning with 
Rosa Luxemburg, and moving through the theories developed by Marxists, such as Karl Johann Kautsky, 
Georgi Plekhanov, Antonio Labriola, Eduard Bernstain, Georges Eugène Sorel, Leon Trotsky, Vladimir Ilyich 
Lenin, Antonio Gramsci, and Louis Althusser, Laclau and Mouffe explained how the notion of hegemony 
gradually evolved. From designating a contingent intervention in Russian Social Democracy, and contingent 
concrete situation within Leninism, the notion of hegemony started to designate ‘the very unity existing in a 
concrete social formation’ in Gramsci's theory. What their analysis shows is that each of these extensions of 
the term ‘hegemony’ implies a ‘logic of the contingent’ and the category of ‘historical necessity’. Further on, 
their analysis shows that contingency operates through ‘spontaneism’ as a logic of the symbol, while 
necessity operates through fixation as a logic of literality that eliminates any contingent variation. Laclau and 
Mouffe showed that when spontaneism is a contingent reverse to necessity, then the relationship between 
these two logics appears as dualist, because it merges indeterminable and determinable as positive opposites. 
To suggest a movement to pluralism they stress the importance of radical negativity through the introduction 
of the notion of antagonism. On the genealogy of hegemony, see: Laclau and Mouffe, Hegemony, 7-46; For 
understanding the theory of spontaneism — evolving from Rosa Luxemburg’s writing about ‘spontaneous 
rising of the masses’ — see: Rosa Luxemburg, The Mass Strike. The Political Party and the Trade Unions, 
trans. by Patrick Lavin (Marxist Educational Society of Detroit, 1999), https://www.marxists.org/archive/
luxemburg/1906/mass-strike/ch03.htm. 
 Laclau and Mouffe, Hegemony, xi.19
  More on radical negativity in chapter 2. 20
 Laclau and Mouffe, Hegemony, xiv.21
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democracy. According to Mouffe, to radicalise democracy is to offer a critique of the 
dominant discourses of liberalism that are characterised by individualism and rationalism. 
In The Democratic Paradox (2009), she explains that the aim is to challenge the 
hegemony of the liberal tradition of freedom — which stands for the rule of law, the 
defence of human rights and respect for individual liberty, to the detriment of the 
democratic tradition of equality — which stands for the popular sovereignty.  Within the 22
liberal tradition, she distinguishes two paradigms: the instrumental rationality of the so-
called ‘aggregative’ model of liberal democracy — which is moved by economic interests, 
and the communicative rationality of the ‘deliberative’ model of liberal democracy — 
which is defined by morality. These two liberal politico-philosophical regimes are 
constituted on an a priori ability to discern the excluded, the other, which is designated by 
‘they’, as the enemy, whose ‘constitutive’ role, in order to be recognised, has to be 
subsumed to the universal economic or moral laws these regimes already prescribed. Both 
models, therefore, endeavour to establish a homogeneous, univocal and non-conflictual 
society, by achieving a consensus on the existence of universal economic regulations or 
human rights (as natural regulations and rights to be respected). However, by recognising 
and subordinating the other as the enemy (as a threat to universal economic principles and 
human rights) modern liberal democracy entails destructive, antagonistic contradictions, 
precisely by leaving ‘no choice’ to the people. What is necessary, in order to transform the 
antagonistic effects of liberalism — today formulated in neoliberalism — according to 
Mouffe, is to reinstitute the democratic conception of equality and the political 
constitution of a ‘demos’, and to rearticulate relations between liberalism and democracy.  
Mouffe explains that the relation between these two political traditions may be 
rearticulated by the acknowledgement of radical negativity at the level of the ontological. 
This demands a recognition that conflict and struggle are ineradicable from the society. 
Therefore, the goal is not to rationally overcome conflictual we/they relations, but to 
constitute them in different ways. According to Mouffe, such an ontological approach 
enables a reconfiguration of antagonistic social relations (struggle between enemies) in an 
agonistic discourse (struggle between adversaries). For this to happen, it is necessary to 
provide the institutional framework for the principle of the sovereignty of the people 
characterised by agonistic struggle between adversaries. For sure, adversaries fight against 
each other over the interpretation of their principles in hegemonic terms, ‘but they do not 
put into question the legitimacy of their opponent’s right to fight for the victory of their 
position’.  In other words, the opponent’s right is not to be subjugated and subsumed to 23
universal economic interests or moral laws; disparate demands should rather be 
confronted and debated. It is precisely the acknowledgement of the confrontation between 
 Mouffe, The Democratic Paradox, 2-3. 22
 Chantal Mouffe, Agonistics, Thinking the World Politically (London, New York: Verso, 2013), 7.23
!7
adversarial positions — which mobilises passions and affects among people and provides 
active citizenship — that distinguishes ‘agonistic pluralism’ from the aggregative and 
deliberative approaches in democratic political theory.  
Agonistic pluralism points at the agonistic articulation of the struggle between 
paradoxically different positions through democratic institutions. To clarify this new 
perspective Mouffe makes an important discursive distinction between politics and the 
political. In On the Political (2005) she writes: 
by ‘the political’ I mean the dimension of antagonism which I take to be 
constitutive of human societies, while by ‘politics’ I mean the set of 
practices and institutions through which an order is created, organizing 
human coexistence in the context of conflictuality provided by the 
political.  24
Borrowing Heidegger’s vocabulary, Mouffe explains ‘politics’ and ‘the political’ in ontic-
ontological terms. The ontological concerns ‘the very way in which society is instituted’, 
whereas the ontic level has to do with the ‘manifold practices of conventional politics’.  25
By situating antagonism at the level of the ontological, Mouffe identifies the space of 
counter-hegemonic struggle as being made possible by the dimension of the political. This 
view acknowledges that antagonism is inherent to society, that it presents an ever-present 
possibility, and that it cannot be eradicated. As such, antagonism conditions the possibility 
of a domestication of conflicts within the field of politics in an agonistic configuration. 
Nevertheless, the constitution of society in agonistic terms does not simply render a 
concrete resolution for a conflict which originates at the ontological level. Rather, 
agonism is a proximate solution to conflict and is always threatened by antagonism. As 
such, agonism, which situates politics at the level of the ontic, is a precarious and 
contingent practice. This explains why society can never be established as fixed totality, 
but only as contingent order of human collectives whose conditions of existence are 
always to be threatened by conflicting forces. Recognising this existential condition, 
Mouffe’s agonistic approach to politics provides both a theoretically dynamic model of 
social relations and a practical radicalisation of democracy.  
In concluding this section on Mouffe’s political-philosophy of agonism — which, 
however, I will return to many times throughout this dissertation — it is necessary to 
emphasise that moments of decision play an important role for the agonistic model of 
democratic politics. This indicates that the confrontation between conflicting alternatives 
of the liberal-democratic values and we/they relations entails decisions that require 
 Mouffe, On the Political, 9. 24
 Ibid., 8-9. 25
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making a choice beyond moral categories of good and bad. Mouffe explains that ‘a 
decision in favour of some alternative is always at the detriment of another one’, thus 
situating undecidability at the core of politics.  ‘Undecidability which is at work in the 26
construction of any form of objectivity’, acknowledges that the conflict between different 
choices cannot be bypassed, and prevents any form of essentialization and totality.  It is 27
precisely undecidability — the impossibility of deciding between paradoxical choices, 
thus pointing to the contingent character of decisional acts — that distinguishes Mouffe’s 
project of democracy from other theorists identified with agonism.  Within Mouffe’s 28
theoretical approach to agonism, hegemonic forces and agonistic relations are ineradicable 
from society.  This is where the argument for the pluralism of positions resides.  29
Art and agonism  
The agonistic project of democratic politics recognises inextricable relations 
between art and politics. Contrary to liberalism, which considers the relation between art 
and politics in clearly delimited, unchallenged spheres, confined within an immanent and 
univocal field, an agonistic model of democratic politics introduces the ontological 
dimension of ‘the political’ offering another perspective on their relation. Accordingly, in 
Agonistics Mouffe writes:  
I do not see the relation between art and politics in terms of two separately 
constituted fields, art on one side and politics on the other, between which 
a relation would need to be established. There is an aesthetic dimension in 
the political and there is a political dimension in art. This is why I consider 
that it is not useful to make a distinction between political and non-
political art. From the point of view of the theory of hegemony, artistic 
practices play a role in the constitution and maintenance of a given 
symbolic order, or in its challenging, and this is why they necessarily have 
 Mouffe,  Democratic Paradox,  136.26
 Ibid., 135. 27
 Mouffe’s agonism is different from the theory of agonism that is to be find in William Connolly, Bonnie 28
Honig and James Tully, who also draw on the work of thinkers such as Hannah Arendt, Friedrich Nietzsche, 
Michel Foucault and Carl Schmitt. 
 Hence, the distinction between Hannah Arendt and Chantal Mouffe. For Arendt pluralism is a shift from 29
rational truth to opinion, to doxa. It relates ‘the world of universal interdependence’ in which all positions 
and opinions are impartial and interdependent. We could say that Arendt’s pluralism is associative project, 
agonism without antagonism, while Mouffe’s pluralism is dissociative project, agonism always threatened by 
antagonism. I return to this difference in more details in chapter 6. On Hannah Arendt, see: Hannah Arendt, 
Between Past and Future. Six Exercises in Political Thought (London: Penguin Books, 2006). 
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a political dimension.   30
For Mouffe, the significance of the agonistic model of democratic politics for artistic 
practices lies in their inherent political dimension, manifested in the way they can either 
support or challenge the symbolic order underpinning social relations. The operation of 
challenging the symbolic order entails a struggle and contest against the discourses 
appropriated by the dominant politics of neoliberalism. It is, then, with regard to the 
struggle for the symbolisation of different social relations, which may invigorate 
democracy, that we can distinguish the contesting dimension of artistic practices from 
those whose role is merely one of compliance. And, it is with this distinction that the 
importance of hegemony and antagonism emerges for understanding the political 
dimension of artistic practices: it helps us to recognise the pragmatic role of art and the 
consequences it may have on the audience. Only when the consequences of art are 
analysed are we able to see that artistic practices are capable of either sustaining or 
contesting dominant politics, sedimented social practices and fixed representations 
embedded in neoliberal politics. 
To grasp this point more fully, we shall take a closer look at the connections 
between art and discourse, insofar as it provides the two key notions for defining art in 
relation to the political — the notions of antagonism and hegemony. To say that every 
artistic practice is produced by means of symbolisation is to acknowledge that objects of 
art — just like different collectives, cultures, and identities — are discursively 
constructed. This operation demands an understanding of discourse not as a mere 
representation of the social or the historical that encompasses only practices of speaking, 
writing, and communicating, but as something constitutive of the social and of histories 
that encompasses all dimensions of social reality. In other words, discourse does not 
reflect the mentality of rationalising the ‘being’ of an object at the level of universal 
conceptual form (this would be idealism or realism); it rather reflects the material 
character of every social construction and indicates that the very being of objects is itself a 
discursive production — not an ‘essence’. The question that arises out of the discursive 
approach to the understanding of objects will then be — not what the objects of art are — 
but rather how and why they are produced as well as what are the consequences of 
structuring the objects of art as such?  
This way of approaching the problem of the object demands the abandonment of 
the thought/reality dualism which reduces and rationalises the being of the object — that 
is its existence — to the level of abstract concepts. Within this context, in order to stress 
the inconsistency of any rationalist conception of ‘objective totality’, Laclau and Mouffe 
introduce the idea of ‘relational totality’ that affirms the material character of every 
    Mouffe, Agonistics, 91. 30
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discursive structure.  Deepening both Marx’s materialism which showed that the 31
meaning of any object is a result of radical exchange and relationalism of things and 
Wittgenstein’s concept of the language-game ‘consisting of language and the actions into 
which it is woven’,  Laclau and Mouffe define a discursive configuration in terms of 32
relational sequences between linguistic phenomena and institutions, social practices, and 
rituals, through which discourse is structured.  Hence, discourse is a system of social 33
relations within which objects are symbolically articulated, or constituted. To move away 
from rationalism is, then, to point out the material properties of every object, that is, to 
show the relational, historical, contingent and symbolically constructed character of 
objects. 
In recognising that objects acquire the attribute of materiality we are then able to 
acknowledge that an everyday object is understood as an object of art only when it is 
inscribed in a system of relations that structures and articulates it within the social practice 
of art. For example, a stone is an object of art only to the extent that it establishes a system 
of relations with the institution of art; otherwise, when we throw it, the stone is a 
projectile used in a game. This example shows that the meaning of the object depends on 
the context of its actual ‘use’, which inscribes it within a system of relations comprised of 
differential entities that articulate a particular discursive totality. Provided that the 
meaning of the object is constructed within a particular context, that is, a particular system 
of relations — society is never able to fix or fully articulate the variety of possible 
positions of the object under the logic of a single principle. A discursive configuration 
reveals, in other words, that the meaning of the object lies in the performative operation 
that articulates relations between differential entities within a particular delimited context 
that it sustains or contests. In regard to articulation, the meaning of an object is no longer 
separated as a conceptually discrete element or as empirically given. On the contrary, the 
meaning of every object is a consequence of the articulatory practice. It is constructed on 
a nominal level, in discursive and relational sequences, implying polemics between 
different opinions.  Relational totality — that we have previously designated as a 34
symbolic overdetermination — is then the property of associated entities; it entails the 
process of discursive configuration, which only partially fixes, or rather, stabilises the 
meaning of the object within a particular context by an act of decision that excludes other 
  Laclau and Mouffe remind us that objective totality may be defined in terms of ‘the essentialism of the 31
totality’ — which aims to establish harmony between differential elements, as we find in Spinoza, and in 
terms of ‘the essentialism of the elements’ — whose goal is to secure their independence, as in Leibnitz. 
Laclau and Mouffe, Hegemony, 103. 
   Wittgenstein, Investigations, 5.32
   Laclau and Mouffe, Hegemony,  109. 33
  On opinion formation, see chapter 6.34
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relational choices.   35
For this reason, hegemony, which manifests itself precisely in the moment of 
decision, implies that the meaning of an object is conditioned by the range of discourses 
that a particular relational configuration excludes. Accordingly, every work of art, just as 
every object, is constructed by the limits established between differential positions — 
between interiority and exteriority of the object, or between its totality and its surplus — 
which prevent its full foundation or absolute objectivity. Once it is recognised that the 
production of limits cancels the existence of objective relations, we have to acknowledge 
that the construction of the object of art is an effect of unstable and paradoxical relations 
between differential entities that may never be overcome. It is, then, with regard to the 
moments of decision and exclusion that all limits to objectivity are paradoxical and a 
manifestation of antagonism. On the one hand, this view explains why different societies 
are incapable of fully articulating and fixing the being of objects; on the other hand, it 
shows that the stability of the object may always be threatened by its constitutive exterior. 
For instance, the system of fixed relations among differential entities reflects the way 
institutions, such as museums, art galleries, theatres, art funds, and artists themselves, 
seek to fasten the being of an object through the work of art in a particular representation 
and thereby delimit its reality. Conversely, recourse to the object’s exteriority makes it 
possible to challenge established limits by showing the relational, historical, contingent, 
constructed and repetitive character of those actions by which cultural institutions have 
determined the ‘being’ of objects through the work of art. This view explains that every 
institution or social practice, just like every work of art, is a precarious and contingent 
construction and that it can always be challenged from its constitutive outside.  
At this point, we shall envisage art in terms of Mouffe’s distinction between politics 
and the political. This is how Mouffe defines politics: ‘by ‘politics’ I mean the set of 
practices and institutions through which an order is created, organizing human coexistence 
in the context of conflictuality provided by the political’.  Politics belongs to the ontic 36
level, which has to do with the ‘manifold practices of conventional politics’.  Translated 37
in art terms, ‘politics’ indicates a representational aspect of art — art as social practice. 
Representation is a relational and discursive configuration of differential constitutive 
elements of art (formal, social, geo-political, economic, and so on), articulated in a 
particular contingent construction. It is a source of affects that belong to the level of ‘the 
  Writing about the meaning of art art critique and philosopher Arthur Danto stresses the significance of the 35
meaning of art in general, and painting in particular, in relation to its context. He writes: ‘The work draws 
meaning from the body of work within which it is placed, and this makes clear the degree to which the place 
of painting today is the exhibition, which provides the context in which the work alone is to be judged and 
appreciated’. Arthur Danto, After the End of Art. Contemporary Art and the Pale of History (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1997), 169. 
   Mouffe, On the Political, 9. 36
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political’. By ‘the political’, Mouffe writes, ‘I mean the dimension of antagonism which I 
take to be constitutive of human societies’.   The political is placed on the ontological 38
level that concerns ‘the very way in which society is instituted’.  In art terms, ‘the 39
political’ indicates an affective aspect of art — art as a process of articulation of affects 
into representation. The process of articulation of affects into representations requires a 
passionate affective identification that gives rise to particular discourses, that is opinions, 
polemics, agreements and self-assertive actions, by excluding alternative relational 
configurations. In a nutshell, the political in art indicates a conflict of positions. 
Once we envisaged art in this way, we are allowed to suggest that art always 
possesses a political dimension. And, while some art discloses the political dimension by 
complying with existing politics, another art discloses the political dimension by 
contesting them. Complying artistic practices reproduce the hegemony of current politics 
by virtue of what Franco Farinelli calls ‘geometrical objectification’ — the objectification 
which reduces the observer’s gaze to a ‘vanishing point’ and, thus, smooths divergences 
between subject and object.  In other words, complying artistic practices mobilise affects 40
that reproduce dominant politics. In contrast, contesting artistic practices challenge the 
consistency established between subject and object by striating the space they share 
through the intervention of outside stimuli. In fact, they mobilise affects that give rise to 
alternative politics. According to this distinction — which stresses a co-constitutive 
relationship between affects and representations, or procedures and practices  — two 41
obvious conclusions do necessarily follow: (1) art may be identified with hegemonic 
politics and the forces of compliance that intend to fix particular discourses in absolute 
totalities; (2) art may reveal its contesting and conflictual dimension, placing itself within 
the context of counter-hegemonic practices and struggle that strives to unfix established 
totalities. The principle of contestation hence manifests by the operation of fixity/unfixity, 
or articulation and disarticulation, in which ontic content assumes ontological function. 
Important to realise is that through processes of repetition any counter-hegemonic 
or critical gesture may itself become sedimented, fixed and instrumentalised by 
hegemonic politics. As political philosopher Yannis Stavrakakis points out, ‘something 
that starts as a non-conformist radical intervention often ends up being gradually absorbed 
by the art system and the dominant hegemonic order, partially transforming its status at 
 Ibid., 9.38
   Ibid.,39
 With geometrical objectification Farinelli refers to the ‘birth of modernity’ grounded in Florentine linear 40
perspective. Franco Farinelli, “Subject, Space, Object: The Birth of Modernity,” in Mathematizing Space, 
The Object of Geometry from Antiquity to the Early Modern Age, ed. Vincenzo De Risi (Basel: Birkhauser, 
2015), 143-156. 
  On the distinction between practices and procedures, see chapters 2 and 6. 41
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the same time’.  This is why art, within the context of counter-hegemony, should be seen 42
as a continuous contest and struggle against discourses appropriated and manipulated by 
hegemonic politics, and social practices and forms of representation they have fixed. 
Against a politics that govern affects and passions, counter-hegemonic and contesting 
artistic practices provide a terrain for confrontation to this operation and, consequently, for 
constitution of politics and societies in alternative ways. If art objects are sources of 
affects, then the relation between art and politics does not conceive of the artist as an 
apolitical solipsist, but as an active participant in the struggle against hegemonic politics. 
The role of the artist is, thus, to plunge into objects we are all observing, in order to 
expose antagonism and hegemony as being inherent to the construction of any objectivity. 
By this, the artist may mobilise particular affects and encourage self-assertive political 
actions among the audience. From this point, we cab start thinking how art may contribute 
to the processes of disarticulation of dominant politics, and their rearticulation in an 
alternative way. 
choreographing agonism 
I have argued that in order to grasp the political dimension of any artistic practice, 
it is necessary to introduce a discursive approach to the analysis of art. I suggested that 
this can be achieved by pursuing insights found in Mouffe’s agonistic model of 
democratic politics which emphasises discursive configuration, antagonism and 
hegemony to be constitutive to any social construction. Mouffe has demonstrated that 
reality is discursively constructed as a system of linguistic and extralinguistic relations 
that entail the construction of ant/agonistic limits and moments of exclusion. As we have 
seen, the place of the excluded is situated at the level of the ontological, from which it 
challenges the stability of hegemonic politics — institutions, social practices and 
representations. Therefore, I suggested that art may comply with politics — insofar as it 
supports hegemonic politics and sets of discourse and practices that those politics 
prescribe; and that art may contest politics — insofar as it challenges existing politics 
through the form of a counter-hegemonic struggle, which reveals contingency to be 
inherent to any objectification. This way of approaching art provides the framework for 
the argument that I want to advance in this final section, about the relation between 
performance and politics as well as about the political dimension of performance 
practices. In order to embrace two key concepts for defining the political — hegemony 
and antagonism — I will now turn attention to the construction of discourses in relation to 
performance practice.  
   Yannis Stavrakakis, “Challenges of Re-politicization. Mouffe’s Agonism and Artistic Practices,” Third Text, 42
Vol. 26,  Issue 5 (2012): 554.
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To show how performance practice constructs diverse and compelling 
communities, performance scholar Judith Hamera observes that performance is always 
produced in relation to discourse: ‘all performance, including dance, is enmeshed with 
language, in reading, writing, rhetoric, and in voice’.  We can agree with Hamera that 43
steps and positions have names, that movements always tell stories and are taught through 
stories, and that metaphor may be used to communicate how a movement looks or feels.  44
We can also agree with Hamera that press kits and reviews are part of performance; they 
communicate ideas and help performance companies to survive.  Here, names, stories, 45
metaphors and reviews, acknowledge the mental capacity of spectators to rationalise the 
object of art at the level of concept. Nevertheless, this view reduces discourse to the realm 
of linguistics. It fails to account for the extralinguistic, for the institutions and practices 
through which discourse is formed. In this view, discourse is a mere presentation of 
performance as a social practice of choreographing bodily movements without 
questioning the nature of that social practice itself. In order to grasp the political 
dimension of performance practice it is necessary to conceive of discourse in terms of 
relations that encompass all dimensions of social reality. In such a context, discourse 
stands not only for the practices of writing, speaking and communicating, that is, of 
presenting the elements of performance as an aesthetic practice; it also stands for the 
system of relations materialised through language games, through body language and 
actions with which body language is entwined, that is, representing the moments of 
performance in relation to the other and the system within which it is inscribed. The 
operation of representation points at the process of construction of performances through 
encounter and processes of symbolisation that that encounter implies.  46
The representational approach to performance implies that the body is entangled 
with various social practices, activities and initiatives in a particular chain — a wide 
network of relations discursively constituted by different actors who share an interest in 
bringing to recognition particular needs. In other words, the representational approach to 
performance points at the affective identification and shared quest for naming, the shared 
quest for the symbolisation of particular needs with concrete demands. In this view, 
performance does not relate any more to a conceptual practice occupied with the form 
rationally deduced from the sheer presence of performers and objects, but to a 
performative practice of articulation concerned with the ways sociocosmic relations are 
materialised through the process of symbolisation and corporeally constituted, valued, 
  Judith Hamera, Dancing Communities. Performance, Difference and Connection in the Global City (London, 43
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viewed and exchanged. Envisaged in this way, representation in performance stands for a 
choreography that may appropriate elements from different artistic genres and different 
genres of the performing arts (dance, theatre, mime, opera, concert, video, drawing, 
among others) as well as of various social practices (dance, sport, aerobics, promenading, 
jumping, boxing, working, and so on) and discourses (economic, political, cultural, moral, 
ethical, archeological, mathematical, or any other discourse). In this view, the emphasis is 
not any more on the ontic manifestation of performance, on its form, but rather on its 
ontological dimension, on the encounter with the other that the performance practice 
implies. And, inasmuch as encounter, as we shall soon see, may invoke antagonism and 
hegemony propelled by the principle of exclusion, it instantly enables the understanding 
of how performance may sustain existing, or construct different communities.   47
The material properties of every social construction involved in the performative 
operation articulate a particular discursive relation between different objects or a different 
range of movements. On this basis, an act of everyday movement or any social practice is 
understood as performance only when it is inscribed within the system of relations that 
structure and articulate it as a social practice of performance. For instance, brushing teeth 
becomes performance executed by Allan Kaprow in his own bathroom, without the 
presence of the audience, in the 1950s.  Pedestrian activities, acrobatics, workers march, 48
sports and games, became performance in Yvonne Rainer’s choreography, during the 
1960s and 1970s.  The knife game, also known as ‘five finger fillet’ — in which a knife 49
has to be stabbed between the fingers of a palm placed on the table — becomes a 
rhythmic performance, or a ‘rhythmic exercise’, in Marina Abramović’s Rhythm 0 
(1973).  Likewise, a series of quotidian gestures such as leaning head on hand, running 50
fingers through hair, baring and covering shoulders, among others, were utilised and 
connected in the system of mechanical movements in Rosas Danst Rosas (1983) 
   On the ways performance practice may contribute to the constitution of different communities see chapter 5. 47
   Looking back at his own performances, happenings, from the 1950s, Allan Kaprow in Performing Life 48
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and Life, ed. Jeff Kelley (Berkeley, Los Angeles, London: University of California Press, 1993), 195.
  For instance, pedestrian movement becomes performance in Yvonne Rainer’s Ordinary Dance from 1962. 49
Then, in The Mind is a Muscle from 1968, ‘[a] film of feet gently kicking a ball is projected onto a hanging 
screen’. In a group pedestrian protest Street Action from 1970, Rainer incorporated the‘M-Walk’ movement 
from the march of the alienated workers in Fritz Lang’s film Metropolis (1927). About Rainer see: Catherine 
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(Beograd: Muzej savremene umetnosti, 1983), 9. 
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choreographed by Anne Teresa De Keersmaeker.  In dbddbb (2015) Daniel Linehan 51
departs from protest movements and marches to explore both group solidarity and 
individual autonomy within the choreographed space. When in El Conde de Torrefiel’s 
performance Guerrilla (2016) more than sixty participants dance for forty minutes on 
loud techno music, a syllabus-free dance becomes a choreography.  As these examples 52
show, performances ‘use’ bodily movements associated with different social practices, 
inscribe them into a particular system of relations, and articulate, or rather, embody within 
the context of choreography.  
If, as Heidegger proposed, ‘the motion is a property of the res corporea’, then the 
bodily movement must be conceived as ‘a mere change of location’.  Thus, the body 53
changes itself by being moved in a certain way. Understood in this way, choreography is a 
decisive symbolic ordering of bodies, which stabilises a temporal performative movement 
in space.  Being structured through the act of decision that spatially organises the range 54
of temporal movements choreography may comply with the existing politics, practices, 
techniques and representations, or contest them so as to constitute them in different ways. 
Accordingly, choreography is a manifestation of hegemony. It implies the act of taking a 
decision on an undecidable terrain. Whether it complies with existing politics or contests 
them, from the point of view of the theory of hegemony, choreography nevertheless 
possesses a political dimension. Andrew Hewitt’s assertion that choreography is ‘a way of 
thinking about the relationship between aesthetics to politics’ is perfectly justified; as is 
his claim that choreography cannot be ‘set in the opposition to the category of “the 
political”’.  55
Hewitt’s suggestion that choreography may be thought in relation to politics 
provides a framework for the argument that I want to make about the inherent political 
dimension of performance within the context of counter-hegemonic struggles. To say that 
choreography stabilises a temporal performative movement in space, is to define 
choreography as a hegemonic system of differential corporeal movements, distinct from 
the range of temporal moves that it excludes. For instance, the rigid ballet technique that 
  In Rosas danst Rosas quotidian gestures connected into mechanical repetitive movements point at the power 51
of production processes over every aspect of human lives. 
  Once everyday movements, gestures or actions are put within the framework of art, then they are dramatised. 52
This is why I call for a return of the discourse on drama in performance studies. See chapter 4. 
   Martin Heidegger, Being and Time (New York: Harper Perennial Modern Thought, [1962] 2008), 124. 53
  As maintained by Laclau, space is a structure discursively constructed as a system of contingent relations that 54
exteriorise other possible relational configurations. And, since it depends on the exterior, space is thus always 
traversed by a mere possibility, which stands for a form of temporality, and which renders a dimension of 
dislocation. In Laclau’s terms, dislocation is the condition of both possibility and impossibility of total 
spatialisation. This is to say, that every structure implies a spatialisation of time, while time continuously 
dislocates space. I discuss the dimensions of time and space in more details in chapter 5. 
  Andrew Hewitt, Social Choreography. Ideology as Performance in Dance and Everyday Movement (Duke 55
University Press, 2005), 11. 
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maintains physical mastery over dancing bodies by means of strict methods (alignment, 
turnout, posture, toe pointing, and so on) is grounded in the exclusion of movements that 
relate any other social practice from choreography (street-dance, sports, games, stand-ups, 
protest marches, just wars, still-acts, and so on). In a similar way, what dance scholar 
Andrè Lepecki calls the still-act in the performances of Steve Paxton (Magnesium 1972), 
Vera Mantero (a mysterious Thing said e.e. cummings 1996) and Jérome Bel (The Last 
Performance 1998, Jérome Bel 1995), rests on the exclusion of uninterrupted and abstract 
movements of ballet and modern dance from choreography.  Likewise, when movements 56
of aggression function as a choreographing system, as in Arkadi Zaides’ performance 
Archive (2014), then every other aspects of social moves are excluded. As these examples 
demonstrate, choreography may be embodied in a stable representation only in relation to 
the surplus moves that it excludes. And, insofar as they are constitutive for choreography, 
the excluded physical moves may always disrupt the system of established corporeal 
movements.  
  The disrupting potential of a range of physical moves that are excluded is 
manifested in the variety of impromptu acts inclined to destabilise and disarticulate 
systems of corporeal movements sedimented in choreographic representation by means of 
dance techniques. By impromptu bodily acts I mean the embodiment of any corporeal 
move in choreography that occurs as a result of the struggle of the bodies involved in the 
recognition of particular needs that have been excluded by hegemonic politics and 
representational norms, or have been subordinated to different discourses that, for 
example, prioritise religion over gender, gender over class, or class over ethnicity, and so 
on. Under these circumstances, the counter-hegemonic choreographed movement is the 
embodiment of any impromptu bodily act in representation. As such, it mobilises affects, 
triggered by acts of struggle against various universal social, cultural, economic or moral 
laws. The counter-hegemonic choreography aims at contesting existing modes of 
representation, and articulating and constituting different ones, much more relevant for the 
plural, multicultural and migrating societies. In other words, counter-hegemony redraws 
the limits and challenges the constructed, historical and contingent character of any 
   Still-act is a mode of performing first proposed by an anthropologist Nadia Seremetakis. I envisaged it as a 56
contingent and temporary configuration of bodies that gives rise to a meaning of performance within a 
particular context at a given moment. It is important to stress, as Derrida pointed out, that ‘no context can 
determine the meaning to the point of exhaustiveness’. In contrast, to claim that still-act is ‘dance’s 
exhaustion’, as dance scholar André Lepecki asserts, would be to argue that the reality of dance as a social 
practice is exhausted and thus to idealise still-act as an ultimate political form of dance. Parallels to this 
thought could be drawn from the visual arts. In visual arts, as an art critic and philosopher Arthur Danto 
pointed out, the monochrome, such as Kazimir Malevich’s Black Square (1915), would stand for the internal 
exhaustion of the possibilities of painting, if the painting would not be analysed within the context that gives 
rise to the meaning of the painting. On context see: Jacques Derrida, Aporias, trans. Thomas Dutoit 
(Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1993), 9. On exhausting dance see: André Lepecki, Exhausting Dance. 
Performance and the Politics of Movement (New York, London: Routledge, 2006), 16. On monochrome 
painting and non-exhaustion, see: Arthur Danto, After the End of Art. Contemporary Art and the Pale of 
History (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1997), 170. 
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representation.  
This type of a choreographic practice — envisaged as a decisive symbolic ordering 
of bodies, redrawing the limits of representation and rearticulating discursive formations 
by means of impromptu bodily acts — is at work in Arkadi Zaides’ performance Archive. 
Let’s for a moment observe Archive in more details. In 2007, the Israeli Information 
Centre for Human Rights B’Tselem launched the Camera Project. The goal of the Camera 
Project was to distribute cameras to Palestinians in severe conflict zones of the West 
Bank, in order to document Israeli acts of violation against them. Zaides, Israeli himself, 
reviewed about 4500 hours of these video recordings and made a selection of clips that 
served as a starting point for his choreography that reflects on this archive of the Israeli-
Palestinian conflictual relations. In Archive, performed for the fist time in 2014, the 
selected clips are projected on a big screen hanging above the stage. Zaides takes place 
close to the screen, in order to be able to look at the videos together with the audience. He 
then performs, for an hour, by extracting a range of physical moves and vocal gestures 
from the video recordings taken by Palestinians to document acts of violation of their 
rights under the Israeli occupation. With a remote controller in one hand, he manipulates 
the video; he plays the clips, stops them, rewinds some scenes and plays them again. This 
enables Zaides to focus on particular moves and vocal gestures and to perform them on 
stage. By the end of the performance, all the moves and gestures extracted from the video 
clips are connected and articulated in a choreography that in a particular way embodies 
the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, and, more precisely, represents the hegemonizing power of 
Israelis over Palestinians. In this choreography Zaides embodies the physical actions 
(pointing a gun, throwing a stone, scattering sheep or shattering olive trees) and 
accompanying vocal cues (shouts, taunts or jeers) that Israeli soldiers and settlers in the 
West Bank resort to in various situations of deterring Palestinians. His main goal is to put 
on stage and into question the gestures of aggression that are sedimented in his own 
community, yet remain absent from a broad public debate.   57
The significance of this performance lies in the choreographic practice as a decisive 
symbolic ordering of conflicting bodies, introducing the movements of aggression as a 
choreographing system. The archive of human movements of aggression as a 
representation of conflictual relations mobilises passions among the audience that as 
‘affective forces’ may question the hegemonic politics and contribute to their 
transformation.  The potential of archive is hence to articulates affects into concrete 58
   Arkadi Zaides, Interviewed by author, personal interview (Skype, 20 May 2017). 57
  Mouffe writes that passions ‘refer to the various affective forces which are at the origin of collective forms of 58
identifications’. In: Mouffe, On the Political, 24. 
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demands of a counter-hegemonic discourse that requires political change.  This counter-59
hegemonic discourse then points at the right to physical integrity. Stressing the 
significance of the right to physical integrity performance scholar Sandra Noeth observes 
that we need ‘to concern ourselves with our own processes and policies of setting up 
boundaries and creating territories’.   Accordingly, the critical view of Archive is what 60
mobilises the qualitative properties of the social — intelligence, imagination and active 
participation.  It is in this context that the conflictual relations introduced through the 61
choreography of movements of aggression cease to be a mere matter of the plot, of the 
closed system relating to drama represented on the stage, and become a matter of the 
relationship between the audience and the performance.  Within this context, the 62
audience is affected by the movements of aggression represented both within a video 
archive and as a choreographing system. The audience is thus invited to engage with the 
performance and to envisage how bodies can co-move through the different choreographic 
scores of living; how they can organise relations in a way that is adequate to the plurality 
of positions that constitute and striate social space; and, how they can articulate 
antagonistic relations constructed along the lines that separates ‘us’ from ‘them’ as 
enemies, in an agonistic configuration constituted along the lines that separate ‘us’ from 
‘them’ as adversaries. It is here that the political dimension of performance ceases to be 
only a sort of thinking through the relations of power, and becomes a demand for acting 
upon these relations in order to change them, as performance scholar Joe Kelleher 
suggest.  63
This way of approaching the audience implies the acknowledgement of the moves 
that are arrested, excluded, suppressed, silenced, or undermined by dominant politics. It 
also implies a mobilisation of the audience towards a struggle for the rearticulation of the 
very terms of symbolic legitimacy, by contaminating and destabilising the dominant social 
order and, by redrawing the limits established by hegemonic politics. It is probably this 
sort of participation of the audience in performance that performance scholar Randy 
Martin had in his mind when he wrote that the operation of contestation should be 
  In this context, the dancing body, even when performing the archive of human movements of aggression, ‘is 59
not only the medium of protest … it is the carrier of the signs and symbols of protest’, as performance 
scholar Gabriele Klein suggests. In: Gabriele Klein, “The (Micro-) Politics of Social Choreography 
Aesthetics and Political Strategies of Protest and Participation,” in Dance, Politics & Co-immunity, eds. 
Gerald Siegmund and Stefan Hölscher (Berlin, Zürich: Diaphanes, 2013), 197. 
  Sandra Noeth, “Intact Bodies: Slow Violence, Gestures of Touch, and the Integrity of the Body,” in Bodies of 60
Evidence, eds. Sandra North and Peter Mills (Stockholm: Stockholm University of Arts, 2016), 23. 
  Bojana Kunst envisages movement as a qualitative disturbance which enables ‘a constant alteration of the 61
forces of life, temporal dynamics and materiality of space’. Bojana Kunst, “Working Out Contemporaneity 
Dance and Post-Fordism,” in Dance Politics and Co-immunity, eds. Gerald Siegmunt and Stefan Hölscher 
(Berlin, Zürich: Diaphanes, 2013), 70. 
  On the return of drama, see chapter 4. 62
   Joe Kelleher, Theatre & Politics (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009), 29. 63
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envisaged as a matter of mobilisation of participation which ‘rests with the possibility of 
theorising it as a more than simply attendance at the event […] as struggles over the 
context and configuration of an alternative public space’.  Envisaged within this 64
framework, a constitution of counter-hegemonic spaces is a consequence of a self-
assertive and constitutive political project of action, which intends to contest the 
hegemony of politics sedimented in established representations.  
In Archive, the need for the constitution of resisting and struggling bodies in a 
counter-hegemonic discourse of relations that would be capable of challenging existing 
politics, is amplified by their absence, by placing the oppressed behind the camera and by 
inviting the audience to take their place. (One should think about the effect of this 
performance on the audience in different geo-political contexts.) Archive brings to the fore 
the fact that the moment of exclusion is inherent to societies and that every limit to 
objectivity, including performances, is threatened by antagonism. Antagonism evokes the 
ever-present possibility of conflict between complying and contesting forces. While 
complying forces have a tendency to fix bodies and moves in the smooth space structured 
by the politics of harmony and absolute immanence, and thus do away with conflicts and 
alterity, the contesting forces, which mobilise impromptu bodily acts, aim to striate the 
space without constitutive division and to open up a debate about the ways society may be 
constructed in different terms, along the differential positions and conflictual lines.   65
Given these points, the significance of the contesting potential of the impromptu 
bodily moves, embodying resistance, struggle and mobilisation of qualitative properties of 
the audience, resides in striating the smooth space of ‘pure immanence’ that relegates 
differences, by opening up the space for a plurality of positions. By definition, the striated 
space is a space of (un)decidability; it enables the coexistence of paradoxically different 
systems of relations and movements rather than the silencing of different choices through 
antagonistic acts. It is by disarticulating antagonistic relations between ‘the determined 
system of differential corporeal movements’ and ‘the rage of excluded impromptu 
physical moves’ — transforming them into agonistic and plural configurations — that 
performance ultimately may invigorates democracy. As is apparent in the choreographic 
work of Zaides, the contesting dimension of performance is manifested throughout the 
struggle of the performer’s body for the recognition of discourses and moves that embody 
ethical, political, and cultural values different than those values sustained by hegemonic 
   Randy Martin, Critical Moves (Durham: Duke University Press, 1998), 47. 64
   Christel Stalpaert refers to this kind of society in terms of ‘acculturated community’ that allows different 65
cultural identities to live together. Writing about the emigratory experience of the dance collective Les 
Slovaks, Stalpaert suggests that their dance technique, formed under various geo-political, educational, and 
cultural influences, may embody acculturation as a complex corporeal archive. Christel Stalpaert, 
“Performing the Emigratory Experience: Encountering Relational Identities in Dance Performances” (paper 
presented at the conference Post-Migration in Performance: Representation, Policy and Education, Sabanci 
University, Istanbul, June 8-9, 2013). 
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politics and social practices. It is the body as a bounded system that, as anthropologist 
Mary Douglas wrote, ‘can represent any boundaries which are threatened or precarious’.  66
This is why the political project of agonistic democracy, in the manner developed 
by Mouffe, is such an asset for performance theory. It enables us to grasp the counter-
hegemonic or contestable performance practices and allows us to envisage performance 
practice in many different ways; not only within the framework of the theory of 
immanence — in terms of the actualisation of the multiplicity of abstract concepts 
deduced from bodily movement, but also within the framework of the theory of quasi-
transcendence — concerning the performative practice which embodies the struggle 
between various discourses and representations.  Such contesting performance practices 67
open up the space for what Mouffe calls an agonistic encounter of performers and the 
public; an agonistic encounter of separate entities located in the same space.  These 68
agonistic choreographic practices produce a form of contingent objectification. 
Contingent objectification in performance stands for the contingent character of bodily 
articulations which only partially stabilise a specific decisive configuration of movements 
in choreography at the given moment. It is discursively constructed as a partial and 
contestable system of relations that may always be articulated otherwise.  
With regard to agonistic encounters and agonistic objectifications, performance 
practices can be envisaged as choreo-political performances that challenge the ways in 
which reality, nature, objects and practices are articulated and contribute to their 
(re)constitution in alternative ways.  By recognising that antagonism threatens any social 69
construction, choreo-political performances propose alternative ways of envisaging the 
systems of living together: the ways we encounter the world and the ways we objectify it. 
They open up the space for the agonistic polemic around social, political and cultural 
discourses that structure different identities, social practices, representations and 
institutions. Without polemic — that is to say, without the acknowledgement of agonism 
  Mary Douglas, Purity and Danger. An Analysis of the Concept of Pollution and Taboo (London: Routledge, 66
1966), 115. 
   This distinction is elaborated in chapter 2. 67
   Chantal Mouffe, “Marcelo Evelin. Dance as an Agonistic Encounter,” in Time We Share: Reflection on and 68
through Performing Arts, eds. Daniel Blanga-Gubbay and Lars Kwakkenbos (Brussels: 
Kunstenfestivaldesarts & Mercatorfonds. 2015), 246-254.
 My definition of the notion of choreo-political differs from André Lepecki’s. Drawing upon Rancière’s 69
distinction between the order of police and the order of political, Lepecki writes that the movement is 
political when it endlessly confronts police in order to open up a gap for the new modes of existence. 
Drawing upon Mouffe’s distinction between the order of politics and the realm of the political, I define 
choreo-political as contest and struggle against dominant politics and as a possibility for (re)constituting 
politics in different ways, thus implying the moment of partial fixation or stabilisation in representation. On 
the notion of choreo-political in Lepecki’s theory see: Andrè Lepecki, ‘Choreopolice and Choreopolitics: or 
the task of the dancer’, TDR: The Drama Review, Vol. 57, No. 4 (2013): 13-27. I discuss Lepecki’s theory in 
more details in chapter 6. 
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— there is no political dimension in performance or in art more generally. It is only by 
embracing the dimension of agonism, I would suggest, that a counter-hegemonic politics 
can emerge within choreographic practices — transforming performance into a practice 
capable of challenging existing forms of identification while aiming at the agonistic 
constitution of new collectives.  Struggle against the antagonistic and destructive 70
consequences of the neoliberal politics of globalisation  appears as the only possible form 
of unity.   71
  On the ways performances can contribute to the construction of alternative collectives, see chapter 5. 70
 This point is elaborated in chapter 5. 71
!23
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2 
Contingent Objectification  72
This chapter unfolds a debate between the philosophical trajectories of immanence 
(Deleuze) and quasi-transcendence (Derrida) in the psychoanalytic and politico-
philosophical terms. Drawing upon political philosophers Oliver Marchart and Yannis 
Stavrakakis, the trajectory of immanence is conceived within the framework of a positive 
ontological imaginary of abundance (desire for being in-itself) giving rise to political 
philosophers Michael Hardt’s and Antonio Negri’s political model of absolute democracy, 
whereas the trajectory of quasi-transcendence is envisaged within the framework of a 
negative ontological imaginary of lack (desire for the lack of-being) giving rise to political 
philosopher Chantal Mouffe’s political model of agonistic democracy. My goal is to show 
that unlike the ontological imaginary of abundance that gives priority to the phenomenon 
of positivity, the ontological imaginary of lack anticipates a co-constitutive relationship 
between abundance and lack, precisely because the dimension of negativity precludes 
both the idealisation of abundance and the idealisation of lack. The suggested co-
constitutive and agonistic type of relationship between the paradoxically differential 
positions, such as lack and abundance, becomes a condition for challenging a dualist view 
on societies and the possibility for the rearticulation of the relations between these 
positions within the global socio-cosmic community in plural terms. Drawing upon 
Bojana Cvejić’s performance philosophy, it will become apparent that the phenomenon of 
positivity implies adequation or parallelism of the abundance of oppositional positions 
giving rise to a politics of absolute harmony, whereas the phenomenon of negativity 
implies tensions between the paradoxically differential positions, giving rise to a politics 
of agonism. This is significant, because agonism opens up the space for polemics.  
To begin with, I will observe the co-constitutive relationship between abundance 
and lack through the linguistic interplay between presence and absence of objects in the 
performances Black (2011), No Title (2014) and We to Be (2015) by the Brussels based 
Norwegian choreographer and performer Mette Edvardsen. Tensions between the 
paradoxically different positions in Edvardsen’s performances are envisaged as 
performative and articulating practices that enable the unfolding of what I call the artistic 
strategies of engagement. Drawing upon sociologist Antoine Hennion, I will demonstrated 
that the artistic strategies of engagement stress the significance of conceiving the works of 
  The point of departure of this chapter is my article: Goran Petrović Lotina, “The Agonistic Objectification: 72
Choreography as a Play Between Abundance and Lack.” Performance Research, 21: 4 (2016): 34-40.
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art in terms of objects. This view on art suggests that objects have existence, while the 
being of objects — as political philosophers Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe observed 
— is only discursively constructed, through language and practices through which 
language is articulated. It is in this context that we can observe discourses and polemics to 
be constitutive to the works of art.  
Choreography as a language-game in Mette Edvardsen’s performances   
Since her early performances, Edvardsen has been interested in exploring how 
bodies and objects are constructed in time and space. In her thirty minutes long solo 
performance Private Collection, which premiered in 2002,  Edvardsen interacts with 73
objects — such as two wooden chairs, one indoor plant, a plastic bottle, a short wooden 
board, a take-away coffee cup, and her own clothes — in front of a white wall. In the 
middle of the wall, three lines are drawn with a black chalk in such a way so that their 
composition simulates a corner of a room. During the performance Edvardsen interacts 
with the objects in different ways. For instance, she uses her body to measure the distance 
between the two chairs; to experience their weight, she holds the chairs in her hands while 
lying with her back on the floor; to enclasp the shape of a chair, she lies on it with her 
stomach placed against the seat while touching the ground with her knees and the palms 
of her hands. Edvardsen lays the chairs aside, lifts them up, and, in fact, arranges them in 
different ways. At the certain moment, she walks slowly in front of the white wall, 
balancing the plant placed on the wooden board that she carries on her head. At another 
moment, she dresses the chairs in her own clothes, by putting her socks and trousers on 
the front legs of one chair and her shirt on the back of another chair. Suddenly, she lies on 
the floor and places a bottle on her stomach. During the performance, different objects, 
such as the coffee cup, the wooden board, the bottle and the chairs are arranged and 
rearranged in different ways so that they together always create ‘new’ objects. At the end 
of the performance, all the objects are assembled in a kind of a hybrid structure, placed in 
the corner of the ‘room’.   74
Writing about Private Collection, Edvardsen explains: ‘I am interested in the nature 
of things, such as gravitation, weight, balance, stability, shape, and volume, and how we 
organise things which by classifying, collecting, and order relate the object in time and 
   Private Collection premiered in 2002 in Nadine, Brussels laboratory for trans-disciplinary art.73
 Mette Edvardsen, Video: Private Collection, accessed on February 4, 2016, video link: https://vimeo.com/74
35913523. 
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space’.  Edvardsen observes that objects have ‘a chameleon like quality’.  Therefore, to 75 76
reflect on this quality, she occupies with the presence and absence of objects. This pursuit 
lead Edvardsen to create in 2006, a fifty-five minutes long performance Opening. Already 
in Opening Edvarsen explores her own body at the verge of absence and presence.  Her 77
actions of walking, talking or falling on the stage, are considered of equal value as the 
isolated effects produced by space, sound, text, music, light, and curtains, ‘performing’ on 
their own.  As Edvardsen leaves and enters the stage many times, forty minutes after the 78
beginning another performer, Nienke Reehorst, replaces the action of ‘opening’ a 
performance without making this replacement immediately visible to the audience.  
The outmost idea underlining both Private Collection and Opening, that bring forth 
the instability of every construction — both identities and objects — is the activation of 
the audience’s desires and affects towards the creation of different realities, or, as 
Edvardsen put it, ‘other views and readings, to look and look again’.  Following this 79
idea, in her later performances, Edvardsen began to investigate the ways language 
contributes to this operation. As she explains, her goal became to explore how reality 
exists in language and how language extends reality into space.  We could suggests that 80
Edvardsen began to examine the possibilities and limits of language to materialise the 
being of objects through choreography and, by these means, to mobilise particular affects 
among the audience. Her trilogy consisting of the performances Black, No Title and We to 
Be demonstrate this endeavour.  
Black is a twenty-five minutes long solo, which premiered in 2011.  In Black 81
Edvardsen appears on the stage alone, wearing jeans and a simple blouse.  The only tools 82
  Mette Edvardsen, website, Private Collection, accessed February 4, 2016, 75
     http://www.metteedvardsen.be/projects/pc.html. 
  Ibid., 76
  The first version of Opening premiered in the art centre Vooruit, in Ghent, in 2005, and was a part of the 77
programme organised by Les Ballets C. de la B. The running time of the first version of Opening was 20 
minutes and it was performed by Edvardsen. The second version of Opening premiered in Kaaitstudio’s in 
Brussels, in 2006. Here, a second performer, Nienke Reehorst, appeared after about 40 minutes of the 
performance, replacing Edvardsen and performing the last 15 minutes on her own. Sources: Mette 
Edvardsen, interview by the author, September 19, 2017; Mette Edvardse, website, Opening, accessed 
September 19, 2017. http://www.metteedvardsen.be/projects/op.html.
 Mette Edvardsen, video: Opening, accessed September 19, 2017, https://vimeo.com/35107862.78
 Mette Edvardse, website, Opening, accessed September 19, 2017, 79
    http://www.metteedvardsen.be/projects/op.html. 
  Mette Edvardsen, interview by the author, Brussels, August 26, 2014. 80
  Black premiered during Performatik Festival, in Kaaistudio’s in Brussels.81
  Mette Edvardsen, video: Black, accessed September 14, 2017, https://vimeo.com/27096736. 82
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she uses to construct objects, as well as space and time, are language and her body.  She 83
brings objects to presence by calling their names. The name of each object is repeated 
eight times in succession — for instance, table, table, table, table, table, table, table, table; 
chair, chair, chair, chair, chair, chair, chair, chair; lamp, lamp, lamp, lamp, lamp, lamp, 
lamp, lamp; floor, floor, floor, floor, floor, floor, floor, floor, and so on. The rhythmic 
alteration of the names of objects as different as table, chair, lamp, light, floor, window, 
and door, constructs the space of performance. All objects that thus create this ‘room’— 
that Edvardsen measures with her steps: one, one, one, one, one, one, one, one; two, two, 
two, two, two, two, two, two; three, three, three, three, three, three, three, three — are 
brought to attention in their absence, either by pointing to them, looking at them, or by 
mimicking their presence by bodily movements. This is how the pattern of names — 
created by the different arrangements of stressed and unstressed syllables in what 
resembles an accentual verse, and by the differences in the timing, duration, or stress of 
consecutive notes — entwined with various every-day actions that Edvardsen performs in 
the ‘room’, produces the meanings of objects and the performance as a whole. For 
instance, water gets spilled on the floor, a dog walks around, leaves fall off a plant, fresh 
air is let in by opening the doors, some material is printed and work is done at the desk; 
Edvardsen sits, cleans, pets the dog, waters the plant, walks across the room, wonders in 
her daily routine, and thinks, thinks, thinks, thinks, thinks, thinks, thinks, thinks... And 
when the night falls, Edvardsen lies on the floor, or — we can imagine — in a bed; the 
tempo of pronunciation of objects, thoughts and actions, slows down, only to gradually 
speed up again, keeping her awake. And once she says black, only once, the imagined 
darkness fills in the stage and the audience knows that the performance has come to an 
end.   
No Title is approximately forty minutes long solo which premiered in 2014. 
Edvardsen appears on stage casually dressed, and makes objects absent by negating their 
presence, that is, excluding objects that are already present, or that she brought to 
presence (some of them) in the previous performance Black.  With her eyes closed, she 84
verbally enumerates objects one by one as gone, now, without repeating their names. It is 
mainly the verb ‘gone’ that patterns the performance. All objects, subjects, movements, 
numbers and sensations, such as beginning, walls, other walls, ceiling, floor, table, chair, 
  In Edvardsen’s performances, time is always structured in relation to space. Writing on her performance Or 83
Else Nobody Will Know, which premiered in 2007, in the art centre STUK in Leuven, in Belgium, Edvardsen 
notes: ‘I conceive time not as duration but as exposure, where things can appear, become visible, gain 
meanings and capacities.’ Similarly, regarding her performance Every Now and Then, which premiered in 
2009, in the art centre Vooruit, in Ghent, the description of the performance explains: In ‘“every now and 
then” Mette Edvardsen and Philippe Beloul invite the audience to read a book as a performance. The idea is 
to create a space and a time inside a book, like a piece in a theatre’. See: Mette Edvardsen, website, Or Else 
Nobody Will Know, accessed September 14, 2017, http://www.metteedvardsen.be/projects/oenwk.html; Mette 
Edvardsen, website, Every Now and Then, accessed September 16, 2017, http://www.metteedvardsen.be/
projects/enat.html.
  No Title premiered in Kaaistudio’s Brussels. 84
!28
dog, plant, but also shadows, arm, hidden cables, green emergency exit lights, mountain, 
clouds, negations, David Bowie, the 1960s, paint, the distinction between writing and 
drawing and thinking and doing, as well as the ‘distinction itself’, are all gone. Even when 
she draws a line with a piece of chalk on the floor, thus splitting the stage in two, she calls 
the line gone. The name of the performance “No Title” implies that also the title is gone.   
In Edvardsen’s performance We to Be, which premiered in 2015, the performer is 
gone too. Edvardsen is absent from the stage. What is present, however, is the darkness of 
the space, the empty stage filled only with words, with language.  Edvardsen’s idea was 85
to ‘make a piece where everything was happening through language’.  This language is 86
uttered by Edvardsen the performer now seated in the middle of the audience. Over fifty 
minutes, Edvardsen reads a book, consisting of five scenes, an intermission and a brief 
‘part two’.  The situations of experiencing objects, characters, sounds, spaces and 87
situations in darkness (such as, a sound of a shoe dropped by a father, a spot that turns to 
be a hole in the floor, the silences between the speaking, the trees in a dark forest) — or, 
in a dream (such as the one in which the car that Edvardsen was driving sunk in the water) 
— are only uttered, by the director of the performance, a performer, and a prompter, all 
characters played by Edvardsen. None of the characters speaks in present. The director 
speaks from the future (of what will be), the performer from the past (of what has 
happened), while the prompter from the future perfect (from what will have happened). 
The light follows the dramaturgy that evolves in the book. Whereas the house lights fade 
out during the first fifteen minutes of the performance, and fade in during the last fifteen 
minutes, stage lights appear discretely, only to slightly open up the thick dark space of the 
stage, ‘to shape the darkness’. The construction of objects, subjects and narratives, is left 
almost entirely to the audience; to the silent listeners’ imagination, desires and memories. 
The three tenses of the play, which escape the present, mobilise the audience’s 
imagination precisely by avoiding to tell the audience in which way to act, and what and 
how to see. Reading about acting in silence, Edvardsen, as the prompter, tells:  
The silences, of forgetting or remembering will have sounded very similar 
from where I will have been sitting. The spaces of doubt, the small shifts in 
attention, changes of intonation, delays, hesitations, … The darkness will not 
have meant much for me. The silences will have been decisive.   88
 We to Be premiered during We Love Radio festival in the art centre BUDA in Kortrijk, Belgium. 85
 Mette Edvardsen, interview by the author, September 19, 2017. 86
 Mette Edvardsen, We to Be (Brussels: Mette Edvardsen, 2015). In 2016, Edvardsen was awarded the National 87
Ibsen Award for the book We to Be. 
 Ibid., 16.88
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The decisive silence does not matter only for the prompter and the audience in BUDA 
Kortrijk. We to Be is simultaneously broadcasted on radio. We can imagine a wider 
audience, absent from the theatre yet sitting in their homes, or cars, or elsewhere, taking 
part in the performance by simply listening and imagining, playing along the game at the 
verge of silence and utterance, past and future, and presence and absence.  
In Edvardsen’s trilogy, the linguistic play between presence and absence of objects, 
between attempts at grounding the totality of an object and the repeated failure of this 
endeavour, mobilises the qualitative properties of the audience: intelligence, imagination 
and participation. Its goal is to impel the audience to acknowledges that objects are always 
constructed through language; that they are not stable entities; that they are always partial 
and subject to change.  Edvardsen stresses this in Black, by uttering in succession each 89
word of the followings sentences eight times: ‘Things do not change, they can not, I 
change my mind, words and things change place’. And also: ‘things that change place 
often blur the shape quite distinct, but obscured by dust. Shapes and thickness of dust 
reveal the thing removed’. With this poetic statement, Edvardsen points out that objects, 
as things, have existence, but that they are never given as such.  This implies that we can 90
not grasp the essence of objects, except through discourse.  The discursive construction 91
of this ‘essence’ is what we call the being of objects. This is, as Laclau and Mouffe 
observed, the most essential possibility of objects.  In fact, every objects is always 92
discursively constructed — articulated in and through what Wittgenstein in his 
Philosophical Investigations (1953) designated as language-games: games that unfold in 
language and actions into which language is woven.  Besides, pointing to the fact that 93
different human acts may have different consequences on the ways people articulate 
objects, Edvardsen entices the audience to recognise that the meaning of objects is always 
context-dependent. In fact, the meaning of objects is always articulated within a specific 
discursive configuration and it may always be articulated otherwise. For instance, we can 
think of a spherical object being a ball in a tennis match, a globe in a geography 
  Analysing ritual dance in Africa, linguist and performance theorist Leda Martins demonstrates that voice is 89
also always symbolically constructed. Leda Martins, Rite, Performance and Knowledge: Memory Times. 
Paper presented at the IFTR conference, University of Sao Paulo, Brazil, 10 July 2017. 
 Here,‘thing' stands for an universal connotation (e.g. a spherical object), and ‘object’ for its particularisation 90
achieved through the performative operation of naming (e.g. a spherical object as a ball or as a globe). 
  The essence of the object is identical to what ancient philosophers Aristotle and Plato called matter. 91
  Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe, “Post-Marxism Without Apologies,”  New Left Review, 166 (1987): 85.92
  Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, trans. Gertrude Elizabeth Margaret Anscombe (Oxford: 93
Basil Blackwell, [1953]1986).  
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classroom, and, an object of aesthetic contemplation in theatre.  The conditionality of the 94
meaning of objects by context shows that objects are precarious, contingent and 
contestable constructions. The process of de/construction of objects that we encounter in 
Edvardsen’s performances is what I call the operation of articulation of the being of 
objects. The operation of articulation inscribes an absent object in the system of relations 
and structures its presence as representation.  By drawing a line between the 95
representation of an object and its exteriority, between the object and its existence, 
between light that makes an object visible and darkness that makes it disappear, that is 
between presence and absence of objects, Edvardsen’s performances show that 
controversy and tension are inherent in any objectification.  96
abundance and lack: positivity and negativity  
The political dimension of art, which is manifested in the continuous process of 
discursive articulation of absence into presence, that is, through tension and contest 
between representation and its exteriority — that we encounter in Edvardsen’s 
performances — calls to attention the distinction between two dominant trajectories in the 
contemporary continental philosophical thought: the trajectory of immanence, which is 
grounded in the theory of Gilles Deleuze, and the trajectory of quasi-transcendence, which 
is informed by the theory of Jacques Derrida. These two trajectories, which also dominate 
in art theory, suggest different views on the relationship between presence and absence.  
As previously indicated in Chapter 1 — and what I am summarising here for the 
purpose of the argument — the trajectories of immanence and quasi-transcendence 
diverge in terms of their respective relations to metaphysics. For Deleuze, the task of 
philosophy is to construct a metaphysics that establishes the plane of immanence. For 
Derrida the task of philosophy is to overcome metaphysics that enables the horizon of 
transcendence. Whereas the former examines existence within the smooth space without 
constitutive division, the latter explores it within the striated space affected from the 
  Performance scholar Victoria Pérez Royo writes that one always has to decide in which direction to throw the 94
ball. Therefore, she suggests, ‘the ball generates decision and action’; it is not only an object, but also an 
agent, a subject and a quasi-object. In: Victoria Pérez Royo, “Knowledge and Collective Praxis,” in Dance 
[and] Theory, eds. Gabriele Brandstetter and Gabriele Klein (Bielefeld: Transcript, 2013), 57. 
  On representational performance practice see chapter 4. 95
  André Lepecki offers an alternative view on Edvardsen’s performance No Title. He does not engage with the 96
discursive approach to performance in order to raise political questions, but with darkness and, wider, with 
certain blackness that is associated with darkness. Drawing upon Deleuze, Lepecki perceives darkness as 
singularity, as full potentiality which invokes freedom. Within this framework, No Title ceases to be an object 
and becomes a self-abstraction; a movement in the world of mind which creates ‘affective-political blindness’ 
or dispossession. See: André Lepecki, Singularities. Dance in the Age of Performance (London, New York: 
Routledge, 2016), 55-84. 
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outside. In this sense, as a philosopher Daniel Smith pointed out, Deleuze’s concept of 
immanence suggests that the construction of differences is possible exclusively within the 
realm of metaphysics.  For his part, Derrida, like Deleuze, understands metaphysics as a 97
structural closure. But, although Derrida acknowledges that the project of overcoming 
metaphysics is impossible, Smith suggests, he finds precisely in the impossibility of 
overcoming metaphysics the condition for the possibility of deconstructing the 
philosophical tradition from within.  Such an emphasis on the relational context of the 98
categories of the possible and the impossible, closure and openness, interiority and 
exteriority, lends Derrida’s theoretical approach a quasi-transcendental trajectory.  
The distinction between the trajectories of immanence and quasi-transcendence is 
echoed in political theorists Lars Tønder’s and Lasse Thomassen’s distinction between the 
two dominant politico-philosophical ways of conceptualising radical democracy: the 
ontological imaginary of abundance, which stands for the philosophical tradition of 
immanence, and the ontological imaginary of lack, which stands for the philosophical 
tradition of quasi-transcendence. Although these two ontological positions share the idea 
of radical difference and criticise universalism and identity, Tønder and Thomassen 
identify significant differences between them: ‘whether the political analysis should start 
from the level of signification or from networks of embodied matter’ and whether politics 
should be constituted as never-receding pluralism or hegemonic constellations.  In 99
addition, we can suggest the difference between these two ontologies in terms of a) a 
pluralism of adequate or parallel positions, being characteristic of the ontological 
imaginary of abundance, and b) a pluralism of relational positions, being characteristic of 
the ontological imaginary of lack. The distinction that I have just proposed, opens up a 
possibility for discerning a) the political dimension of performance that manifests through 
the adequation or parallelism of opposites, of presence and absence, from b) the political 
dimension of performance that manifests through the radical relationalism of paradoxical 
positions, of presence and absence. To unpack this hypothesis, I will now turn to political 
theorists Oliver Marchart and Yannis Stavrakakis.  
Oliver Marchart suggests that the ontological imaginary of abundance — which 
emanates from Deleuze’s theory of immanence, coincides with the primacy of desire over 
lack, and that the ontological imaginary of lack — which emanates from Derrida’s theory 
  Daniel Smith, “Deleuze and Derrida, Immanence and Transcendence: Two Directions in Recent French 97
Thought,” in Between Deleuze and Derrida, eds. Paul Paton and John Protevi (London, New York: 
Continuum, 2004), 50. 
  Ibid., 60.98
 Lars Tønder and Lasse Thomassen, “Rethinking radical democracy between abundance and lack,” in Radical 99
Democracy. Politics Between Abundance and Lack,  eds. Lars Tønder and Lasse Thomassen (Manchester, 
New York: Manchester University Press, 2014), 2. 
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of quasi-transcendence, is a category of primacy of lack over desire.  In other words, 100
whereas within the ontological imaginary of abundance ‘lack’ refers to a positivity of the 
subject’s desire for being-in-itself, within the ontological imaginary of lack ‘desire’ refers 
to the lack-of-being in the subject, that is, the other situated outside the subject that 
renders a productive negativity. If we accept Marchart’s thesis, which suggests that the 
phenomenon of positivity conceives of abundance and lack as reversals,  then we need 101
to acknowledge that, in contrast, the phenomenon of negativity implies a tension between 
them. From the point of view of the political analysis, this distinction is significant. When 
abundance and lack are seen as reversals, or as opposites, then any polemic is precluded 
and people become deprived from the possibility of choice. Indeed, to the extend that 
positivity constitutes a reversal of terms, then, as Marchart writes, ‘it will not be possible 
to decide, on the level of argumentation, which phenomenon is prior: lack or abundance. 
One will simply have to take sides between two apparently incompatible paradigms.’  102
Within this framework, abundance and lack are parallel positions; they are, to use 
Deleuze’s term l'adéquation, adequate or parallel to each other.   103
Departing from Marchart’s view on the phenomenon of positivity that underlines 
Deleuze’s theory of immanence, we can suggest that the phenomenon of negativity, that 
underlines Derrida’s theory of quasi-transcendence, refers to an articulatory moment that 
conceives a paradoxical relation between abundance and lack, that is between absence and 
presence. In contrast to the phenomenon of positivity, which implies the adequation of 
opposing positions and hence a withdrawal of abundance from lack, the phenomenon of 
negativity is manifested through the radical relationalism between paradoxically different 
positions of abundance and lack, and, hence, the co-engagement of one with another. This 
is so because negativity, as Derrida indicated, points at a difference from itself or at a 
difference with itself; it admits that there is ‘other than oneself’.  For that matter, the 104
lack, or the other, as the condition of possibility of abundance is at once the conditions of 
its impossibility.  Consequently, we can agree with Marchart that whereas the 105
phenomenon of positivity might be envisaged as the ‘immanent overflow of presence 
  Oliver Marchart, “The Absence at the Heart of Presence: Radical Democracy and the “Ontology of Lack”,” 100
in Radical Democracy. Politics Between Abundance and Lack, eds. Lars Tønder and Lasse Thomassen 
(Manchester, New York: Manchester University Press, 2014), 26.
 Ibid., 101
 Ibid., 102
 On l’adéquation see for instance: Gilles Deleuze, Différence et Répétition (Paris: Presses Universitaires de 103
France, [1968] 1993). 
 Jacques Derrida, Aporias, trans. Thomas Dutoit (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1993), 10. 104
 Ibid., 15. 105
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from presence’,  the phenomenon of negativity might be envisaged as presence defined 106
by a constitutive absence.  Or, to put it differently, whereas the former stands for the 107
pure presence of the being in-itself, the later represents the lack-of-being. It is within this 
framework that the phenomenon of negativity implies tensions.  
Next to the ontological imaginary of abundance and the ontological imaginary of 
lack, Marchart restored Derrida’s notion of différence in order to introduce an alternative 
ontological imaginary — the ontological imaginary of difference. The ontological 
imaginary of difference is manifested in the possibility of preceding absence and 
presence. Quoting Derrida’s definition of play, Marchart stresses that différence ‘is always 
play of absence and presence, but if it is to be though radically, play must be conceived of 
before the alternative of presence and absence’.  Accordingly, Marchart writes that the 108
constant play between presence and absence ‘simply renders impossible the attainment of 
either full presence (totality [or abundance]) or full absence (radical lack)’.  This 109
implies, as Derrida pointed out, that ‘being must be conceived as presence or absence on 
the basis of the possibility of play and not the other way around.’   110
At this point, the quasi-transcendental ontological imaginary of lack integrates the 
constitutive play of abundance and lack as relational categories in terms of articulation, 
precisely by connecting Derrida’s notion of radical negativity and Jacques Lacan’s 
psychoanalytic notion of lack. According to Lacan, the symbolic law in which lack is 
constituted has its roots in the imaginary paths by which desire succeeds in identifying 
itself with ‘want-to-be’, with the other. Lacan explains that desire as a manifestation of 
‘an interval that demand hollows within itself, in as much as the subject, in articulating the 
signifying chain, brings to light the want-to-be, together with the appeal to receive the 
complement from the Other, if the Other, the locus of speech, is also the locus of this want 
to be, or lack’.  Both subject and the other are hence designated by a constitutive lack in 111
which desire appears. Accordingly, ‘being in itself [is] no more than that which is lacking 
for the realisation of knowledge’.  We could suggest that the indispensable lack-of-being 112
constitutes the ontological horizon of the subject’s desire for being-in-itself and enables its 
articulation on the symbolic level.  
Writing about the relationship between abundance and lack, Stavrakakis point out 
 Marchart, “The Absence,” 27.106
 Ibid., 26.107
  Jacques Derrida, Writing and Difference, trans. Alain Bass (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 108
1987), 292., quoted in Oliver Marchart, “The Absence,” 26. 
 Marchart, “The Absence,” 26. 109
  Derrida, Writing and Difference, 292.110
  Jacques Lacan,  Écrits: a selection, trans. Alan Sheridan (London: Routledge, [1966] 2003), 200. 111
 Ibid., 226. 112
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that ‘although in Lacanian theory desire is never seen as an unlimited energy flowing ex 
nihilo […] that does not mean that Lacanians neglect the elements of excess and 
abundance. On the contrary, the constitutive play between lack and abundance is internal 
to Lacanian theory, only it never serves the idealisation of desire and abundance, precisely 
because of the ontological status of lack and negativity’.  Given these points we can see 113
how in contrast to the ontological imaginary of abundance, in which desire is directed 
towards the being-in-itself suggesting the adequation of beings-in-themselves and a 
possibility of simply taking side between the two incompatible positions, the ontological 
imaginary of lack, in which desire is directed towards the lack-of-being, towards the other, 
points at the relational and conflictual aspect of the differential positions of abundance 
and lack. Whereas the ontological imaginary of abundance and the phenomenon of 
positivity give rise to a politics of harmony between presence and absence that are 
withdrawing from each other — they are in-themselves, the ontological imaginary of lack 
and the phenomenon of negativity give rise to a politics of tension and polemics between 
presence and absence — they are engaging one with another.   114
withdrawal or engagement?  
The different ways of understanding the nature of existence that these two 
ontologies imply — the positive ontological imaginary of abundance which evolves as a 
lineage of the politico-philosophical trajectory of immanence giving rise to the politics of 
withdrawal, and the negative ontological imaginary of lack which evolves as a lineage of 
the politico-philosophical trajectory of quasi-transcendence giving rise to the strategies of 
engagement — produce different ways of conceiving the political dimension of art. 
Whereas the former, as we will briefly see, conceives of the political in terms of the 
conceptual practice, the latter conceives of the political in terms of the performative 
practice. By drawing attention to the different ways of conceiving the political, I intend to 
grasp the political dimension underlying Edvardsen’s performances: the ways they 
construct reality and challenge and affect the audience’s spectatorial codes in order to 
change their viewing habits. 
On the one hand, there is a performance theory committed to explore the 
 Yannis Stavrakakis, “Negativity and democratic politics: radical democracy beyond reoccupation and 113
conformism,” in Radical Democracy. Politics Between Abundance and Lack, eds. Lars Tønder and Lasse 
Thomassen (Manchester, New York: Manchester University Press, 2014), 187. 
  Inspired by the critique of the Enlightenment positivism, which takes issue with the production of true facts 114
through empirical observations, performance scholar Christel Stalpaert envisages artists who practice a 
political ecology as ‘eco-diplomats of dissensus’. Artists as eco-diplomats of dissensus resort to 
undecidability in order to provide the space of disagreement or dissensus. In: Christel Stalpaert, “This Body 
is in Danger! On Ecology, Protest, and Artistic Activism“, Didaskalia (2017). I would like to express my 
gratitude to Prof. Dr. Stalpaert for the possibility to read this text before to be published. 
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relationship between art and politics proceeding from Deleuze’s philosophical trajectory 
of immanence  and theories developed by his followers, such as Antonio Negri and 115
Michael Hardt,  Paolo Virno,  and Jean-Luc Nancy . Borrowing a vocabulary of 116 117 118
these thinkers, performance scholars, such as Hans-Thies Lehmann,  Bojana Cvejić,  119 120
Bojana Kunst,  and André Lepecki,  among others, support a view on ontology as the 121 122
life-philosophical belief in positivity, or in a never-receding abundance of the multitude’s 
demands.  Unlike the people, the multitude is self-organised.  Therefore, instead of 123 124
providing an arena for a struggle of the people against the state, the ontological imaginary 
of abundance enables the actualisation of the multitude’s demands in the political project 
that Hardt and Negri envisaged as absolute democracy,  in which the state disappears.  125 126
Embedded in Deleuze’s concept of the virtual, absolute democracy advocates the idea that 
 See: Gilles Deleuze, Pure Immanence. Essays on A Life (New York: Zone Books, [1995] 2001). 115
  See: Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri, Empire (Cambridge, London: Harvard University Press, 2001). 116
  See: Paolo Virno, A Grammar of the Multitude (New York: Semiotext(e), 2004).117
  See: Jean-Luc Nancy, Being Singular Plural (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2000).118
  See: Hans-Thies Lehman, Postdramatic Theatre, trans. Karen Jürs-Munby (Abingdon: Routlege, 2006). I 119
discuss Lehmann’s theory in chapter 4. 
 See: Bojana Cvejić, Choreographing Problems. I briefly discuss Cvejić’s theory bellow.120
  See: Bojana Kunst, Artist at Work (Winchester, Washington: Zero Books, 2015). I discuss Kunst’s theory in 121
chapter 5. 
 See: Lepecki, Singularities. I discuss Lepecki’s theory in chapter 6. 122
  Paolo Virno draws attention to the seventeen century philosophical controversies between Thomas Hobbe’s 123
notion of the people and Baruh Spinoza’s notion of the multitude, in which the notion of the multitude ‘lost a 
battle’. He explains the distinction between these two competing notions in the following way: ‘the multitudo 
indicates a plurality which persists as such in the public scene, in collective action, in the handling of 
communal affairs, without converging into a One’, whereas the notion of the people ‘is strictly correlated to 
the existence of the State’, having one will. Virno asks if it isn’t time to revive the notion of the multitude 
nowadays. In respond to Virno, I would raise another question: Isn’t it time to revive the notion of the 
people? On Virno, see: Virno, Multitude, 21-22.
  Hardt and Negri, Empire, 411.124
  See: Hardt and Negri, Empire. 125
 Historian Dipesh Chakrabartry criticises Hardt’s and Negri’s model of absolute democracy from the 126
viewpoint of postcolonial studies. For Hardt and Negri, he observes, the global capital creates a global non-
place. Accordingly, the struggle against the capital becomes the struggle against all forms of attachment to 
particular places. This is why Chakrabartry envisaged absolute democracy as a theory of globalisation that 
celebrates contemporary forms of placelessness that argue absolute mobility. The politics of non-places, 
Chakrabartry points out, neglects the significance of ‘localist positions’. It ‘naturalises’ them, that is, it 
colonises them. In: Dipesh Chakrabartry, Provincializing Europe. Postcolonial Thought and Historical 
Difference (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000). 
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our reality is the real, a self-organising multitude or ‘singular multiplicity’.  The central 127
premise of this politico-philosophical approach is concerned with a pure structural closure 
envisaged as a smooth space without constitutive division  that absorbs everything so 128
that — as Negri put it — ‘all that which is political is biopolitical’.  Its task is to create a 129
multiplicity of adequate and inconclusive concepts coexisting in harmony, by way of 
extracting events from beings and things.  Hence, by way of supporting the 130
presupposition that the role of philosophy is not a discursive practice of naming involved 
with the state of affairs — which implies the question of the lack-of-being, tension and 
conflict, but a continuous production of new concepts — which implies the question of a 
continuous becoming of being-in-itself, the philosophers of immanence undermine the 
significance of representation for the dynamic democratic political processes.  To put it 131
differently, the philosophical trajectory of immanence does not advocate the engagement 
with the state of affairs (i.e. the existing art institutions framed by dominant politics), as it 
is only — as Deleuze and Guattari would put it — effectuated within it; it is a pure 
event.  It produces concepts apart of their social meaning, hence precluding the 132
possibility of conflict and tension.   133
On the other hand, the post-foundational thinkers, such as Ernesto Laclau and 
Chantal Mouffe, are inspired by the philosophical trajectory of quasi-transcendence, that 
 Borrowing Deleuze’s vocabulary, Hardt and Negri write that ‘the multitude is a multiplicity, a plane of 127
singularities’. Nevertheless, the notion of ’singular multiplicity’ is proposed by Jean-Luc Nancy to designate 
the origin of the world. He writes: “what we receive (rather than what we perceive) with singularities is the 
discreet passage of other origins of the world … it is an affirmation of the world, and we know that the world 
has no other origin than this singular multiplicity.” Singular multiplicity conceives of the world as a 
multiplicity of ‘indiscernible singularities’, of the multitude. I discuss Deleuze’s notions of singularity and 
indiscernible in chapter 6. On singular multiplicity, see: Hardt and Negri, Empire, 103; Jean-Luc Nancy, 
Being Singular Plural (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2000), 9. 
  On Hardt’s and Negri's critique of striation, see: Hardt and Negri, Empire, 332. 128
  Foucault’s concept ‘bio-politics’ designates the form of governmentality developed by neoliberalism, which 129
aims at erasing the political dimension from societies. Foucault defines governmentally as ‘an ensemble 
formed by institutions, procedures, analyses and reflections, the calculations and tactics that allow the 
exercise of this very specific albeit complex form of power, which has as its target populations, as its 
principal form of knowledge, political economy, and as its essentially technical means apparatuses of 
security.’ This is why bio-politics is criticised in the present context. The quote in the text relates: Antonio 
Negri, Time for a Revolution (London, New York: Bloomsbury, 2003), 231. On governmentality in the 
footnote, see: Michael Foucault, ‘Governmentality,’ in The Foucault Effect: Studies in Governmentality, eds. 
Graham Burchell, Colin Gordon and Peter Miller (Oxford: Blackwell, 1991), 102. 
  On concepts, see: Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari, What is Philosophy? (New York: Columbia University 130
Press, 1984);
 On the state of affairs and representation, see: Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari, What is Philosophy? (New 131
York: Columbia University Press, 1984); Gilles Deleuze, The Logic os Sense, ed. Constantin V. Boundas, 
trans. Mark Lester (New York: Columbia University Press, 1990). 
 Deleuze and Guattari, Philosophy?, 21. 132
  I observed how immanence reflects in Lehmann’s, Kunst’s and Lepecki’s performance theories in separate 133
chapters. See reference notes: 119, 121, and 122.
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gives rise to an ontology based on radical negativity and structural lack.  Out of this, the 134
discourse on agonistic democracy emerges.  Inspired by Derrida’s concept of negativity 135
and Lacan’s psychoanalytic notion of lack, these thinkers assert that our reality is 
discursively constructed, as a system of social relations defined by language and 
institutions and practices within which language is formed.  The central premise of this 136
philosophical approach is concerned with the impossibility of language to ground the real 
in stable representations. This is why every representation is designated by a constitutive 
lack or negativity; it articulates a meaning that is not associated with the invention of 
abstract concepts present in-themselves, but with the performative operation of naming 
the absence, that is, the lack-of-being.  On the one hand, this approach explains, as 137
Laclau and Mouffe pointed out drawing upon Wittgenstein, that our reality — all objects 
and our identities — is discursively constructed, through a chain constituted of language 
and diversity of institutions and practices within which language is articulated.  138
Accordingly, any social construction must be envisaged as always already inscribed 
within the state of affairs and constructed on the symbolic level. On the other hand, this 
approach explains that the differential discursive relations that construct identities and 
objects can not be fully articulated on the level of institutions and practices. This is why a 
discourse approach implies a moment of exclusion and, hence, an ever-present possibility 
of conflict or antagonism. In order to challenge a discourse sedimented on the level of 
institutions and practices there must be a moment of overdetermination among the 
excluded, which takes place on the symbolic level. Overdetermination emphasises the 
discursive construction of the people and the need for the people’s demands to be always 
represented. Precisely the antagonistic, or contesting relation between the represented and 
its excluded — its surplus that escapes representation, points to a continuous play or 
conflict between presence and absence, abundance and lack, in fact, between immanence 
and transcendence. This view on societies implies that we need institutions to establish an 
order — that is to transform antagonism into agonism, and that the state may not be 
abandoned before the institutions are changed.   139
The distinction between these two dominant politico-philosophical traditions allows 
us to suggest that the political discourse on absolute democracy that implies the politics of 
  See: Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe, Hegemony and Socialist Strategy, Towards a Radical Democratic 134
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withdrawal from the established institutions and representations they have constructed, 
may not provide a proper horizon for art theory to grasp the political dimension of artistic 
practices. Within the context of the philosophical trajectory of immanence, which 
embraces positivism of the ontological imaginary of abundance, the realm of art is 
reduced to the infinite potential filed of virtualities; to an impersonal, mechanic intensity 
of elements beyond meaning, out of which a reality of works of art is conceptually 
actualised.  Within this context, the political is to be understood as that which 140
overcomes or transgresses the difference between subject and object by means of 
adéquation.  Consequently, the political manifests in an immediate access to the 141
abundance of beings-in-themselves, diminishing the importance of representation.   142
Performance scholar and philosopher Bojana Cvejić is steady in this approach. She 
departs from the method of posing problems in order to undermine the image of thought 
that synthesises subject and object in representation.  Cvejić draws upon Deleuze’s 143
theory of ideas, problems and concepts, which conceives of problems as objects of ideas 
that are resolved in thought that gives rise to concepts which, at the same time, are 
constitutive to problems. Accordingly, the process of choreographing problems is 
accountable for making, performing and attending expressive concepts, such as part-
bodies, part-machines, movement-sensations, power-motion, crisis-motion, and 
resonance, among others.  Expressive concepts are then observed in relation to 144
Deleuze’s interpretation of Spinoza’s principle of adequation (l’adéquation). On the one 
hand, this approach implies that ‘concepts are specific to the modes in which they are 
expressed’.  Therefore, each expressive concept can be accountable for either making 145
(part-bodies), performing (becoming-molecular), or attending (resonance).  On the other 146
hand, this approach implies that each expressive concept (in either making, performing, or 
attending), the problem it refers to, and something of the performance it includes, is an 
agreement in adequation which ‘supposes the equivalence and parallelism of the two 
dissimilar things, for instance [...] bodily movement and the thought of a movement’.  147
Therefore, the objects of ideas that are resolved in thought, which gives rise to expressive 
 To be sure, Bojana Kunst criticises the moment of ‘actualisation’. More about her theory, in chapter 5. 140
 On Lehmann’s theory of transgression, see chapter 4. 141
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concepts, are adequate. Quoting Spinoza, Cvejić stresses that an idea is adequate ‘insofar 
as it is considered in itself, without relation to an object’.  According to Spinoza, idea 148
‘has all the properties, or intrinsic denominations of a true idea’.  The consequence is 149
that expressive concepts stand for an in-itself true idea of performance in making, 
performing and attending, which only partially actualises bodies and movements in a 
choreographic performance. 
If we accept, as philosopher Martin Heidegger suggests, that ‘the “in-itself” can by 
no means be ontologically clarified’,  and, as cultural theorist and philosopher Stuart 150
Hall proposes, that a structurally transparent ‘expressive totality’ stands for the 
simplification of social relations to the level of determination by economism,  then, 151
within the context of absolute democracy, the political dimension of art, which we 
observed in relation to adequation, becomes a disembodied abstraction, a polity of laws 
and principles mediated by the set of practices and institutions which determine the reality 
of things.  What is, accordingly, called the political aspect of performance is, in fact, 152
already a-political; reduced to an essentialist politics which strives to create the ideal 
society through the positivist principle of subsumption of all differences by an abstract 
conceptual denominator. Within this view, presence and absence are simply reversals.  
On the other hand, the discourse on agonism advocates the politics of engagement, 
or, rather, the strategies of engagement  with the existing institutions, social practices 153
and representational norms that are discursively constituted. Within the context of the 
philosophical trajectory of quasi-transcendence that embraces a negativity of the 
ontological imaginary of lack, the role of art becomes to challenge the system of social 
relations which discursively articulates the being of objects in stable representations by 
excluding other relational possibilities. In fact, through the engagement of the excluded 
with existing representations, art gives rise to a polemics that opens up a possibility of 
contesting the ways in which ‘being’ is already symbolically constructed. It is here that art 
becomes identified in relation to the other that stands for the lack-of-being. Within this 
context, the political dimension of performance is a performative practice that calls for a 
continuous process of dis/articulation of the real through symbolic representation. As 
 Benedict De Spinoza, Ethics, trans. E. Curley (London: Penguins, 1996), IID4, quoted in Cvejić, 148
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such, it designates an active and articulating dimension. Accordingly, performance is 
capable to challenge existing politics by revealing limits to any absolute objectivity that is 
determined by economics through institutions and social practices. By these means, 
performance contributes to the constitution of the societies in alternative ways. Within this 
view, presence and absence are constitutive and operate through a continuous tension.  
abstractions or objects? 
Previously, I made a distinction between the two philosophical trajectories that 
dominate the continental philosophical thought — the trajectory of immanence and the 
trajectory of quasi-transcendence, and between the two different views on ontology that 
they imply — the positive ontological imaginary of abundance and the negative 
ontological imaginary of lack. My first goal was to demonstrate what projects of radical 
democracy they give rise. I briefly outlined the projects of absolute democracy — which 
implies an adequation and abundance of positions, giving rise to the politics of 
withdrawal, and agonistic democracy — which implies a tension between presence and 
absence, giving rise to the strategies of engagement. My second goal was to demonstrate 
the consequences that these politico-philosophical projects have on art theory determined 
to examine the relationship between art and politics. First, I showed that the logic of 
adequation entails a conceptual operation which implies an abstract common feature, that 
is, the transcendental category of the virtual out of which the being is actualised through 
the in-itself becoming. Second, I showed that the logic of tension entails a performative 
operation which consists in showing the historical, contingent and constructed character 
of the being of objects in relation to the lack-of-being. And, inasmuch as the conceptual 
operation implies immediate access to the being of objects, the performative operation 
implies mediation, by means of symbolic overdetermination.  Now, I would like to 154
explore the distinction between abstraction and performativity in more details in order to 
stress why the works of art are to be considered as objects.   
The distinction between abstraction and performativity, may be seen as a 
distinction between a politics of withdrawal of one from another position (either 
abundance or lack) and politics of co-engagement of positions (abundance and lack). And 
whereas the former implies an abstract conceptual invention, the later implies a concrete 
performative innovation. A sociologist Antoine Hennion observed the conceptual practice 
of abstraction as a result of economics. Exploring the relationship between art and 
  On distinction between the conceptual and performative operations, see chapter 6. 154
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politics, Hennion writes that ‘all art is politics, but the art itself is no longer political’.  155
To justify this thesis, Hennion asserts that an economic approach reduces art to politics, to 
the union of supply and demand, incapable of evaluating the quality of artistic creation. 
What the economic approach to art in fact produces is ‘a speculative rarefication of the 
glory of the few’, a few artists, gallerists and collectors.  It is by these means that 156
economics reduces the objects of art to abstractions, by covering over the reason for art, 
that is the motive for action that produces art and that reveals its social and political 
function.  It must be stressed that Hennion’s theory does not neglect the power of 157
economics in structuring social relations. Hennion’s critique of economics, similarly to 
Hall’s critique, is rather a critique of economism as a theoretical approach that dominates 
theory of art;  the approach that we called, after political theorist Timothy Mitchell, 158
economentality.  In order to move beyond economentality, that is the objectless 159
activities of economy and economism that transform art into abstractions and lures, 
Hennion suggest that we need to turn to pragmatism. 
In The Public and its Problems (1927), John Dewey, a leading proponent of the 
American school of thought known as pragmatism, departs from ‘the objective fact that 
human acts have consequences upon others, that some of these consequences are 
perceived, and that their perception leads to subsequent effort to control action so as to 
secure some consequences and avoid others’.  More importantly, the consequences of 160
acts upon others, including those who are not directly affected by them, entail a 
responsive human behaviour which, for example, should provoke an action of nurture and 
care, rather than an action of ignorance and negligence. This is how the consequences of 
acts mobilised by different associations always take on a particular social value. With this 
in mind, we can see that the measure of social values, that is ethico-political values, lies in 
the consequences that the values of particular associations have upon other associations. 
Within this context, Dewey asserts that the main facts of political action are ‘facts of 
human behaviour accessible to human observation’.   161
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With this in mind, we can agree with Hennion that pragmatism, ‘renounces the 
untouchable dogma of the dualist opposition between facts and values’.  In the 162
pragmatist’s view, the relationship between facts and values prevails over their isolated 
beings, so that objects of art become always ‘objects for…’.  Hennion’s assertion 163
implies, as I will point out in various contexts, that the question of art critique should not 
be focused on what the objects of art are. Instead, the task of art critique should be to 
explore why and how the objects of art are constructed, as well as what are the 
consequences of constituting the objects of art as such.  In other words, the art critique, 164
including performance, should seek the reasons for constructing objects — including 
those of art — as such and the methods that underline their construction. When we 
approach objects of art from the pragmatist perspective, we are able to expose techniques 
and calculations that construct them, stressing the importance of ethico-political values 
that they have upon the audience. By these means, art critique ceases to analyse art as a 
conceptual practice of abstraction, and starts addressing art on a nominal level, as a 
performative practice.  
At this point, Wittgenstein’s writing on naming becomes significant for the analysis 
of art in terms of performativity in general, and in terms of Edvardsen’s performance in 
particular. Wittgenstein wrote that the whole is a language-game, ‘consisting of language 
and the actions into which it is woven’;  this is to say that, ‘in the practice of the use of 165
language one party calls out the words, the other acts on them’.  Drawing upon 166
Wittgenstein, Laclau and Mouffe — whose political theory evolves as a lineage of the 
ontological imaginary of lack and the quasi-transcendental philosophy, arguing strategies 
of engagement — defined discursive formation in terms of the linguistic phenomena and 
institutions, social practices, and rituals, through which discourse is structured.  167
Accordingly, discursive formation makes apparent that material properties of every object 
lie in the performative operation that articulates a particular relation between differential 
entities. The performative operation entails the structuring of the totality of the object in a 
chain that operates as the system of symbolic relations secured and represented by 
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institutions and social practices.  In this regard, an everyday object is understood as an 168
object of art only when it is situated within the system of relations that structure and 
articulate it within the social practice of art. Hence, objects, just like subjects, are always 
represented. Consequently, all performed actions and language-games are not properties 
of objects nor of subjects; they are properties of politics, institutions, rituals and various 
social practices.  For example, a ball is an object of art only to the extent that it 169
establishes a system of relations with the institution of art. In a similar way, an everyday 
movement is understood as choreography only when it is inscribed within the specific 
system of relations that structure and articulate it as a social practice of performance. 
Seeing that, variety of dance techniques and choreographies immediately come to mind.  
These examples explain that the meaning of the object depends on the context of the 
actual ‘use’ of the object, which inscribes it in the system of relations with differential 
entities and articulates it in a particular totality.  Once it is recognised that the totality of 170
the object is nominally and contextually constructed as a system of relations, we have to 
acknowledge that society will never be able to fix or fully articulate differential positions 
of objects. No context, as Derrida pointed out, ‘can determine the meaning to the point of 
exhaustiveness’.  Accordingly — by recalling Gramsci’s writing on the objectivity of the 171
real — the relational totality should be seen as a partial fixation of the various past 
relations between differential entities, or associations, rearticulated within a particular 
historical context.  This implies that there is no pure object or pure form of art, and that 172
the meaning of each object is conditioned by other possible systems of positions between 
differential entities that this particular discursive fixation, or rather stabilisation, excludes. 
In this regard, each object is constructed precisely by the principle of exclusion which 
entails tension, contest and conflict between interiority and exteriority, totality and its 
surplus, that is, between immanence and transcendence, abundance and lack, or presence 
and absence. 
Once we have envisaged objects of art in terms of a performative practice, we can 
admit that every social practice, including performing arts, is constructed through 
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language and actions. This means, as Laclau and Mouffe observed, that objects have 
existence, and that their being is only discursively constructed.  The discourse approach 173
to performance enables — what could be called after art critic and philosopher Arthur 
Danto — a post-eschatological pluralism of its possibilities and forms.  This is to say 174
that performances, just like different social practices, may be constituted in a pluralism of 
ways, but never exhausted and overcome.  It is so, because forms of life enable humans 175
to only ever grasp the world through language, in limited ways. In fact, humans can think 
about the world as an abstract idea, because they can never grasp it in its totality. But, the 
world itself is an object as real as a rock. It stands for the system of autonomous yet 
interrelated entities, human or not.  
Philosopher Timothy Morton proposes a view on the entities, such as oil fields, 
nuclear material, uranium, long lasting products of human manufacture such as plastic 
bags, or styrofoam, not only as objects, but as hyperobjects. He writes that hyperobjects 
‘are “hyper” in relation to some other entity, whether they are directly manufactured by 
humans or not’.  For this reason, we can not do away with objects. The ways objects are, 176
and the ways they are constructed and relationships between them are established, may 
only be discursively rearticulated and articulated in different ways. It is this ‘object 
oriented ontology’ that permits debate, or, as Hennion proposes, polemic about the objects 
of art; polemic which reveals the reason for art, capable of contesting its economic 
dimension, and economism as a theoretical approach to the analysis of art. Within the 
context of the political logic of polemic, contest and struggle that performance practices 
are to be envisaged as objects of art. To sum, whereas objects imply a concrete autonomy 
of the objects’ existence, their dismissal implies the power of economy to abstract any 
entity.  
opposition or paradox?    
Pointing at the discursive construction of everyday objects and the indispensable 
moment of exclusion that it entails, Edvardsen’s choreography mobilises the public to 
recognise that objects have existence, that they are hence autonomous and that they can 
never be grasped in their totality. Once we have acknowledged that humans construct 
objects through language and different actions, we can recognise that objects stand for 
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discursive, precarious, contingent and contestable constructions. When in Black 
Edvardsen rhythmically repeats the name of each object eight times in succession — 
table, table, table, table, table, table, table, table; chair, chair, chair, chair, chair, chair, 
chair, chair; bottle, bottle, bottle, bottle, bottle, bottle, bottle, bottle — and simulates their 
presence by her bodily movements — by lifting her arm, simulating sitting, touching a 
table, or opening the door — she opens up the space for the audience to imagine each of 
called objects in the multiplicity of forms, relating different contexts in which they 
encountered them and articulated them. In No Title, the operation of disarticulation of 
objects is supported by Edvardsen’s presence on the stage and carried through negation, 
through that which is said to be gone, that which is absent and lacks. As Edvardsen utters 
during the perfomance: ‘a door, opening and closing — gone; the ceiling — gone; 
shadows moving in silence — gone; emergency exit lights — gone’, etc. The need for the 
disarticulation of objects and their articulation in different ways in We to Be is pushed to 
the most essential possibility of objects — to language. In fact, everything in performance 
happens only through language, in the absence of objects and the performer. By these 
choreographic tactics that embrace the linguistic play between presence and absence 
Edvardsen activates the qualitative properties of the audience, such as intelligence, 
imagination and participation. In fact, Edvardsen’s performances, relying to a great extend 
on the activation of the audiences’ memory through language, increase the awareness that 
each object is historical and of partial construction, discursively brought to presence in 
relation to the context of its particular historical use. As Gramsci put it, unless one 
recognises that without people and without the development of civilisation there is no 
relations, and no reality, and, in fact, no thinking about reality, it would be impossible to 
understand historical processes.  Given that, the role of a choreographer may also be to 177
connect and expose the plural nature of objects, constructed across and together with 
different spaces and times,  in order to open up a horizon for collective identifications 178
based on the instability of representations, on the contingent character of objects.   179
When objects are constructed from the metaphysical projection of mitigated 
totalities, as in the immanentist politico-philosophical approach, we find ourselves within 
the realm of idealism or realism which rationalises and determines relations in abstract 
terms, in terms of universal concepts, promising a complete unity of differential and 
opposing totalities coexisting in a harmonious society. In contrast to essentialism, 
however, the quasi-transcendental politico-philosophical approach to reality recognises 
that the plural arrangements instead — as Derrida’s theory implies — haunt the one in the 
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other;  they are partial and contingent objectifications which are constitutive of each 180
other rather than parallel, autonomous, and oppositional totalities. At this point, the 
insuperable tension between absence and presence, included and excluded, full and 
partial, or abundance and lack, reveals that paradox is, in fact, constitutive of all social 
relations and constructions. Contrary to a dialectics of opposition and contradiction which 
aim to establish harmony between differential arrangements within a smooth space shared 
by adequate entities, a theory that acknowledges social paradox, by defining the 
precariousness and contingency of any social construction, aims at acknowledging the 
irresolvable tension and conflict between them. 
Thus, overcoming objective relations — relations between conceptual objects and 
relations between ‘real’ objects — Edvardsen’s performances, such as Black, No Title, and 
We to Be, open up the space for envisaging objects in terms of contingent objectification. 
Contingent objectification is a partial articulation of the being of objects that determine a 
specific configuration of an object at the particular moment. It allows many paradoxically 
different realities to materialise in the shared space — the striated space of constitutive 
division. It is, therefore, with regard to the acknowledgement of the plurality of 
differential positions existing in contest that we may speak about the political dimension 
of artistic practices. The specificity of the political dimension of art, and performance in 
particular, lies in the possibility to (re)construct the audience, and more generally, the 
people beyond the strict lines of separation, by constantly redrawing the limits between 
them.   181
Given all these points, the contesting political dimension of artistic practices may be 
understood as the view on reality in terms of tension, or drama:  as the continuous play 182
and contest between the ontology of abundance and the ontology of lack, between the 
presence of objects and their absence, or between attempts at the ultimate grounding of 
the being of objects and of revealing their historical, contingent and constructed nature. A 
critical reflection on antagonism, which ‘creates the gap between these two 
dimensions’,  and the way of understanding human values and principles in terms of 183
contingent objectification should, in my view, be central to everything that goes on in art. 
It is by challenging existing and articulating social relations in alternative configurations 
that art may mobilise people to construct different realities and, thus, invigorate 
democracy. 
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3 
Reconstructing the Bodies  184
In order to overcome the post-political condition — which in the realm of politics 
blurs differences between the left and right political parties and, in the realm of art, 
differences between art and commodity, leaving us without choice — some thinkers 
envisaged alternative political projects to neoliberalism. Jacques Rancière envisaged the 
model of communal anarchism; a politics of disorder and dissensus, without any type of 
mastery. Chantal Mouffe envisaged the model of agonistic pluralism; a politics of order 
and conflictual consensus, regulated by hegemony and decisional acts. After drawing a 
distinction between Rancière’s and Mouffe’s theories, I will observe their different 
consequences for envisaging the the relationship between art and politics. To begin with, I 
will draw attention to Peter Bürger’s survey of the mutual conditionality of the bourgeois 
art and the vanguard movements in art. This observation will enable a distinction between 
the artistic strategies of rupture and the artistic strategies of engagement, pointing at the 
different consequences that they have on conceiving the political dimension of art. Finally, 
I will show that from the point of view of the artistic strategies of engagement, the 
relationship between the abject and intelligible bodies is a matter of decision, that enables 
a move beyond  class -, gender -, or race - based identities, towards the relational forms of 
identifications.  
To perceive the body with regard to agonism and acts of decision, is to 
acknowledge, drawing upon Judith Butler, that the body is not constructed in an 
oppositional relation between the intelligible and the abject body.  For if a relationship 185
of opposition aims at homogenising differential poles, it sustains intelligibility and leaves 
no possibility for a choice. On the contrary, it could be suggested that the body is 
constructed in a dialectic that entails a paradoxical relation between the intelligible body 
and the abject body. This approach explains that the abject body is a paradoxically 
different, an excluded body, the limit of possibility and, yet, a condition of the intelligible 
body. The abject body is thus a constitutive outside to the intelligible body; it ruptures the 
intelligible and opens up possibilities for modes of life that have no intelligible place. This 
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view suggests that the body is constructed at the point of intersection of intelligible and 
abject bodies. Insofar as the paradoxical bond between the differential bodies compels us 
to acknowledge their inherently conflictual relation it, at once, compels us to think of their 
mutual conditionality that manifests through decisive acts. Given these points, precisely 
the paradoxical relations and contingent acts of decision confront Butler’s assertion that 
gender may not be challenged by decision.    186
disorder and order:  Rancière and Mouffe 
When examining the relation between art and politics, contemporary performance 
scholars mainly draw upon Rancière’s and Mouffe’s political projects of democracy. 
Rancière and Mouffe share a view on democracy up to the point. Closely related are their 
emphasis on language, power, disagreement, conflict, struggle and collective aspect of 
democracy. What Rancière defines in terms of disagreement and power and what Mouffe 
defines in terms of antagonism and hegemony, are constitutive of the social realm. 
Nevertheless, whereas for Rancière the democratic principle of the power of everybody 
(that he situates within the realm of politics), may exist autonomously from the 
representation absorbed by the principle of the State (which presents the order of the 
police), for Mouffe there is no power of the popular will (located within the realm of the 
political) without the moment of representation which functions as the hegemonic 
principle of the State (designated in terms of politics). For Mouffe, politics is a condition 
and a vehicle for the power of popular will, of those who Rancière defines in terms of 
‘those who have no part’. With regard to Mouffe’s project of democracy, the political 
becomes constructed at the point of intersection of the popular will and the state. 
Rancière’s and Mouffe’s perspectives on democracy differ precisely at this point. While 
Rancière’s distinction between the principle of democracy and the principle of the state 
forecloses the possibility of politics to engage with the police order, the reciprocal 
relationship between democracy and the state, suggested by Mouffe, allows for an 
engagement with existing politics. Their different proposals of democracy require a much 
more nuanced explanation, before we can observe their different consequences on art.  
1) In The Politics of Aesthetics Rancière (2006) explained that domination and 
servitude, whose objective is to impose one meaning and to establish a single reality, are 
part of the ontological distribution.  To that effect, Rancière dismisses the engagement 187
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with the state as an ontological foundation of domination and hierarchy and, instead, 
advocates an egalitarian, contingent, and anarchistic politics, a politics of ‘disorder’, 
without mastery and without any type of consensus. At this point, Bram Ieven observes 
how for Rancière politics and ontology are mutually exclusive.  What, in fact, Rancière 188
suggests is that an ontological distribution historicised the forms of visibility, which 
presuppose equality, into a dogmatic regimes of perception and ineligibility, into a 
representative regime. Then, to disagree with the representative regime that dogmatised 
forms of visibility is to dehistoricise it, by putting in action a presupposed equality 
between different systems of perception and ineligibility; it is to activate egalitarianism. 
This endeavour demands the activation of the transcendental moments of disagreement 
within the ontologically established dogmatic regimes of perception and ineligibility in a 
form of a rupture; in a form of an event which breaks it and undos it into a plurality of 
positions that persist in clash rather than being retained by the ontologically reductionist 
practices. The goal becomes to create a system in which one regime does not abolish 
another, but rather in which ‘several regimes coexist and intermingle’.  The consequence 189
of this tactic is the constitution of a politics of ‘disorder'; the politics without mastery and 
without any type of consensus — in one word, the politics of dissensus.  
As can be seen, Rancière avoids the principle of the state being identified with the 
ontological foundation of domination and the logic of representation that lead to 
oligarchy. In contrast, he advocates that power cannot be institutionalised, but only 
practiced.  Such a view of power suggests a non-oligarchic approach to societies. To 190
clarify this view, in Introducing Disagreement (2004), Rancière first emphasised language 
as a common anthropological property which allows everyone to participate in common 
affairs. One of the significant characteristics of language is that it assumes disagreement, a 
quarrel, raised by those who are excluded from the common affairs over that which is 
symbolised as common. And, precisely those who are excluded stand for a surplus to 
social groups, that is, political subjects as supernumerary collectives which initiate a 
quarrel and disrupt the common which he defines as ‘the counting of community’s parts 
and the relations of inclusion and exclusion which define that count’.  Rancière names 191
the way of counting community’s parts the police, and the moments of disruption of that 
count by the uncounted politics. Accordingly, the role of politics becomes to disrupt the 
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hierarchical divisions between counted and uncounted, common and partial, or visible and 
invisible, regulated by the order of police. This is how politics stage within the realm of 
police that which was uncounted and excluded, by disrupting the ensemble of its counted 
‘parts, places and functions’. In this context, Rancière writes that ‘democracy is the 
disrupting of all logics that purport to found domination on some entitlement to 
dominate’.   192
By explaining that disagreement, or quarrel, is constitutive of politics and that it 
may disrupt the order of hierarchy regulated by police, Rancière explained a conflictual 
and dissensual potential of politics. However, what he left unclear is how a disagreement, 
that raises from the order of politics, may engage with the police so that it challenges the 
existing regime of representation and hence, invigorates democracy. In fact, we are not 
sure how a conflict between politics and the police may be rearticulated once politics 
disrupts the police order and stages itself within it. In other words, Rancière’s egalitarian 
political project does not really allow those who disagree, ‘who have no part’, to engage 
with the police and transform it by breaking networks it established. It rather aims to 
dismiss it as the consequence of the ontological distribution of power and servitude and 
establish anarchism. This approach entices us to envisage Rancière’s politics as the 
politics of withdrawal from the police, from ‘the forces of law and order’,  rather than as 193
the politics of engagement with it.   194
Rancière’s perspective on politics had been criticised from different points of view. 
Political and media scholar Jodi Dean addressed Rancière’s critic of law. Dean warns that 
Rancière’s critic of the spread of law as the main cause of depoliticisation — of the post-
political condition we live in — serves a neoliberal argument against the governmental 
oversight and an argument for privatisation. Pointing at the collapse of regulations in the 
financial sector, the importance of forms of public/private partnerships, and necessity of 
private surveillance for precluding terrorism, she writes that Rancière’s dismissal of law, 
administration and expertise ‘cannot serve as a basis for a critique of the neoliberal state’s 
abolition of oversight and neglect of basic governance ... it is also incompatible with the 
acknowledgement of the widespread scepticism toward science and expertise and the 
concomitant cultivation and embrace of amateur, ordinary, and common opinion’.  195
Drawing upon philosopher Slavoj Žižek, Dean describes this attitude as a decline in 
symbolic efficiency. The order of law, she reminds us, still may protect certain liberties in 
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common or public spaces.  For his part, philosopher Alain Badiou stresses that a 196
perspective on politics without order refuses to acknowledge that every political process is 
an organised process of militants against the hegemony of the parliamentary state; 
otherwise there are no militants and no hegemony to disagree with.  Once this is 197
acknowledged, it becomes apparent that the anarchistic perspective on societies fails to 
recognise that the demands of the militants, of those who are uncounted and who disagree 
with the system, will not be heard without representatives in the parliament who might 
defend them.   198
Another problem in Rancière’s argument stands in relation to his assertion that 
forms of power although ever-present, do not always imply politics. He writes that ‘politic 
occurs only when political subjects initiate a quarrel over the perceptible givens of 
common life’.  A similar assertion by Rancière led political scholar Paulina Tambakaki 199
to define his concept of politics as episodic, introducing doubt that politics as such may 
appear at all.  Accordingly she writes: ‘while democracy has succumbed to the 200
consensus system, the dissensual politics which could perhaps revitalise it is not there, and 
more importantly, it might never be there’.  By these means Tambakaki explains that by 201
ascribing a rarity to politics, Rancière canceled out a radical potential of dissensus he 
previously introduced. What in fact Tambakaki shows is that Rancière’s impossibility to 
explain the ineradicability of conflict and its staging within the police order fails into the 
trap of arbitrariness.   202
2) In contrast to Rancière, Mouffe’s different concept of democracy, which 
introduces the moment of the political and inscribes it at the level of the ontological, 
opens up a possibility for understanding how disagreement and conflict may be 
domesticated and how they may invigorate a dynamic democratic politics through the 
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strategies of engagement.  
As we have observed, by doing away with the state as an ontological foundation of 
domination and hierarchy, that is with the forces of law and order, Rancière suggests that 
the ‘harmonious’ society is possible. Mouffe’s position is overtly different. She situates 
disagreement at the level of the political, acknowledging its ontological dimension. For 
Mouffe the ontological ‘concerns the very way in which society is symbolically 
instituted’.  This means that every social relation — our realities and identities — is 203
meaningful and constructed through the processes of symbolisation. On the one hand, 
symbolisation implies the constitution of the symbolised; on the other hand, it implies the 
exclusion of that which escapes symbolisation. The excluded is constitutive to the 
symbolised, yet paradoxically different from it. As its constitutive outside and its 
condition of possibility, the excluded struggles to rearticulate the very terms of symbolic 
legitimacy by threatening the symbolised; as its paradoxically different, it precludes a 
possibility of a reconciliation with the symbolised. The indispensable phase of exchange 
between the symbolised and its paradoxically different pole, explains that the process of 
symbolisation entails an ever-present disagreement, or, to use Mouffe’s term, an ever-
present conflict. Accordingly, symbolisation entails that all social practices are given 
through the system of hegemonic relations in the form of conflict between the symbolised 
and its constitutive outside. In this regard, conflict appears to be inherent to social realm 
and, thus, resides at the level of the ontological. This is to say that conflicts are 
ineradicable from societies and that the politics — an ensemble of hegemonic discourses, 
practices, and institutions — is always threatened by its exteriority.  
In this context, Mouffe observed the social realm in terms of ‘politics’ and ‘the 
political’. Borrowing Heidegger’s vocabulary, she explains that ‘the political’ refers to the 
ontological level, while ‘politics’ refer to the ontic level. In On the Political (2005) she 
writes:  
by “the political” I mean the dimension of antagonism which I take to be 
constitutive of human societies, while by “politics” I refer to the set of 
practices and institutions through which an order is created, organising human 
coexistence in the context of conflicts provided by the political.  204
Perceived in relation to Mouffe’s the political / politics configuration of societies, we may 
say that the operation of symbolisation implies conflict in terms of an antagonism. 
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Accordingly, antagonism is situated at the level of the (onto)political which continuously 
disrupts and disarticulates politics constituted of institutions and practices that aim at 
regulating social order. Nevertheless, politics stands for a proximal solution for the 
antagonistic relations; the order of politics rearticulates antagonistic relations into 
agonistic configurations, into —  what Mouffe calls — a ‘conflictual consensus’ that, in 
fact, may never overcome conflictual relations between paradoxically differential 
positions.  This means that agonism is always traversed by antagonism. Seen within this 205
framework, ‘politics’ refers to the level of the ontic.  
Therefore, in contrast to Rancière’s egalitarian politico-philosophical approach, 
Mouffe’s ontic-ontological theoretical trajectory suggests that the social realm is not 
constituted simply of the plurality of different and paradoxical associations — be it 
ethical, gender, or cultural — that emerge outside the state on the level of the political and 
that disrupt law and order regulated by institutions. Rather, it stresses that different 
associations of people always require an order established on an ontic level, on the level 
of the state. From this we understand that the role of the state is to provide a temporary 
and proximal unity for the multiplicity of demands advocated by differential associations. 
As a pragmatist thinker Dewey indicated, back in 1927, ‘the state is the organization of 
the public effected through officials for the protection of the interests shared by its 
members’.  As long as certain interests have particular consequences upon the other, 206
upon those who are not directly engaged in them, the state has to regulate those 
consequences. This is so because, as Dewey pointed out, ‘regulation can not be effected 
by the primary groupings themselves’.  The significance of Dewey’s assertion lies in 207
abandoning the belief that anarchism might relegate all the evils and construct a 
‘voluntary fraternal organisation’.   208
This view suggests that the role of the state within the liberal democratic society 
becomes to regulate conflictual relations between differential associations of the people. 
As Mouffe explains, what is important for the politics, for the set of institutions and 
practices organised on the level of the state, is ‘that conflict does not take the form of an 
“antagonism” (struggle between enemies) but the form of an “agonism” (struggle between 
adversaries)’.  However, since the constitution of agonistic relations brings proximity to 209
antagonistic conflictual situations, rather than an absolute resolution of them, the 
possibility of antagonism never perishes. This is in line with Dewey thought that the state 
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has to be re-made, ‘as soon as its form is stabilized’.  Only by means of remaking or 210
reconstructing, the state may domesticate demands advocated by different associations 
(people of colour, women, LGBTQIA, immigrants, poor, workers...). Such a view on the 
state, by extension, implies that every order is a contingent and temporary hegemonic 
order, threatened by the excluded and subject to change. In other words, a hegemonic 
order appears as a condition for counter-hegemony which does not only rupture the 
established institutions, but continuously engages with them, aiming to rearticulate law 
and order in alternative ways. Given these points, we can conclude that Mouffe’s politics 
of agonism does not start with the strategies of withdrawal from the state and does not opt 
for disorder; it rather begins with the mobilisation of the people to change the state and 
establish an alternative order.  
An important characteristic of hegemony manifests in the moments of decision. 
They are signalled in the indispensable phase of drawing the limits that the continuous 
processes of exclusion imply. In the plural field of choices, decisions have to be made so 
that a particular symbolic order becomes instituted and a particular unity proposed in a 
name.  Since they are always taken at the detriment of another choice, decisions point at 211
the aspect of undecidability within the act of deciding. Undecidability entails the presence 
of paradoxically different choices as plural, coexisting and relational positions. For this 
reason, each decisional act constitutes a proximal solution for the ongoing disagreement, a 
temporary stabilisation of antagonism, and an institutionalisation of the hegemony of one 
of possible choices. In fact, a choice that is made stands for a particular symbolic 
delimitation and articulation of equality (of choices) and liberty (to choose) that render 
democratic principles. In this context, what remains outside an established order, for its 
part, continuously challenges and disrupts the symbolic hegemony (the chosen) aiming to 
establish an alternative one. By these means, the excluded assumes an aspect of an ever-
present possibility of conflict within the symbolised, and an ever-present potentiality to 
radicalise and rearticulate the symbolically instituted order from within. We can see from 
this how, on the one hand, Mouffe’s model of agonistic democracy identifies an ever-
persisting possibility of conflict within the social realm; a conflict between different 
plural, equally compelling choices, that persist in a struggle for hegemony. It is in this 
sense that agonism does not entail a sudden and an episodic event, nor arbitrariness. On 
the other hand, Mouffe’s agonistic model of democracy implies a possibility of 
constituting a counter-order, a counter-hegemonic order as a result of alternative 
decisional acts. This move implies that processes of constructing the people are precarious 
and that the state has always to be reinvented on the level of the symbolic.  
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the case of vanguard movements in art  
What are the consequences of the agonistic model of democracy for the 
understanding of the political dimension of artistic practices and their possibility to 
contest dominant politics and contribute to their reconstitution in alternative ways? How 
may art contribute to the construction of people? In order to offer a possible answer to 
these questions, I will begin with the observation of the relationship between bourgeois art 
and the avant-garde art, drawing upon a literary critic and art scholar Peter Bürger. In his 
landmark work Theory of the Avant-Garde (1984) Bürger discussed why the avant-garde 
movements failed to challenge and displace bourgeois art. The insight into his theory 
shows why, rather than the artistic strategies of rupture that are suggested by Rancière’s 
theory, the artistic strategies of engagement that we have located in Mouffe’s theory play 
an important role in challenging dominant system of representation in art and in politics. 
By extension, the artistic strategies of engagement will enable a particular view on the 
way politics and art may challenge the existing neoliberal bodies and contribute to the 
reconstruction of the bodies in different ways. 
To begin with, let’s have a brief look on the twentieth century art. At the beginning 
of the 20th century, the break with the disciplinary strictures of modernity led to a 
renunciation of the autonomous and apolitical character of art precisely by connecting 
aesthetics to the political. The avant-garde movements opposed the dominant institution of 
art (artistic and curatorial practices, museology, representations, techniques...) in an 
attempt to create society anew, in which art and politics would not exist any more as 
separate entities. Bürger observed this move on the European avant-garde scene in terms 
of an attack on bourgeois art seen as an institution that is unassociated with the life praxis 
of people.  By drawing a distinction between sacral art of the High Middle Age and 212
courtly art at the court of Louis XIV on the one hand, and bourgeois art characteristic for 
modernism on the other hand, Bürger demonstrated how collective production and 
reception of art were gradually transformed in such a way so that they became a matter of 
the individual production and individual reception of art. He explained that cult objects of 
sacral art and objects of sociability of courtly art have been gradually replaced in the 
nineteen century with ‘the objectification of the self-understanding of the bourgeois 
class’.  With the appearance of the bourgeois class, the production and reception of self-213
understanding, as it was articulated in art, ceased to be tied to the praxis of life. On this 
point, Bürger suggested that the avant-garde movements stand for an attack, not on the 
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bourgeois forms of art, but on art as institution detached from the praxis of life.  This is 214
why the avant-garde has been considered as a demand for the return of art to its social 
function, to its specific use connected to the praxis of life.  Moreover, Bürger suggests 215
that the return to the pragmatic role of art advocated by the avant-garde movements was 
not sought on the level of content, but on the level of aesthetics. Accordingly, he wrote 
that the avant-gardists ‘assent to the aestheticists’ rejection of the world and its means-
ends rationality’.  This means that the avant-gardists did not undertake a task to integrate 216
art into the existing praxis, but ‘to organise a new life praxis from a basis in art’.    217
The consequences of the equitation of the avant-garde with the new praxis of life are 
far reaching. We could say that the first set of consequences belongs to the moral register. 
Instantly, we can notice how the detachment of bourgeois art from the praxis of life 
implies the construction of the image of a fictional order that is ‘better’ and more free than 
the prevailing one. By the same analogy, we can notice how the avant-gardists’ 
construction of a new life praxis may be seen as distinct and more free from the ‘bad’ life 
praxis of the existing society. The second set of consequences belongs to register of 
economy. When ‘the cultural industry has brought about the false elimination of the 
distance between art and life’,  the avant-garde quest for the new life praxis, for the 218
absolute beginning, became an instrument for the production of capital, thus obtaining the 
economic function. Once the radical negation of art in the existing praxis of life, the 
radical negation of the category of individual creation, and the elimination of the limits 
between producers and recipients, that is between art and audience, are accepted as works 
of art under the moral and economic principles advocated by liberalism, any vanguard 
movement loses its critical potential. This is to say that once a massed-produced object, 
such as a urinal, is signed and placed in a museum, provocation and critical gesture 
disappear every time such a gesture is repeated.  
The failure of the avant-garde to re-politicises society, may be seen precisely as a 
consequence of its claim on an absolute beginning. As we have observed above, the 
consequence was the fall of the avant-garde into the moral and economic registers. By 
claiming on an absolute beginning, the avant-garde argued a total break with the dominant 
representational system and, thus, opposed the existing politics and institutions of art. This 
allowed the avant-garde to disrupt the realm of art determined by the rise of the bourgeois 
society and to develop in parallel to it. However, the opposition and parallelism of the 
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avant-garde to bourgeoise art and the existing life practice, precluded the avant-garde 
from the possibility to engage with the existing praxis and norms of representation, and, 
hence, to challenge and rearticulate them.  More importantly, the operation of opposition 219
— as the logical necessity of opposites prescribes — allowed for the absorption of the 
avant-garde’s demands for absolute beginning to the modern and postmodern teleology of 
consolidation under historical evolution and hegemony of capital. The consequence was 
the blurring of frontiers between bourgeois art and the avant-garde. This is how the avant-
garde and any later vanguard movements allowed the modern and post-modern teleologies 
to spatialise their contesting political potential, by transforming the paradoxical nature of 
dialectical relations between them into the relations of contradiction and opposition, that, 
at the end, presupposed homogeneity and consensus in art. In fact, this is how modernity 
abstracted and deprived vanguard art from the possibility to intervene within the existing 
norms of representation and to articulate different ones.  
It is then precisely by means of a transition from the disciplinary strictures of 
traditional art and modern aggregation of rationally organised genres deprived from the 
political character, to the avant-garde and later vanguard movements — which renewed a 
demand for politicisation and art criticism — that the artistic creativity in the 20th century 
was witnessing a transition from the disciplinary society to the society of control, from 
fordism to post-fordism, or from modernism to postmodernism, in which the realm of art 
and its demands for social change have been manipulated by capitalism — by the 
capitalist’s techniques of production and domination — so that they became its ‘common 
sense’.  By these means, liberalism deprived the vanguard art from its inherently 220
contesting political potential, and strengthened its own hegemonic power to create, what 
we call today, the post-political condition. That being said, new strategies are necessary so 
that the dominant politics and forms of representations may be challenged.  
the articulation of mise-en-sense into mise-en-scène  
and Marlene Monteiro Freitas’ choreography 
Despite the failure of the vanguard movements in art to rearticulate the norms of 
representation that comply with the demands of capital, the political dimension of art did 
not disappear. To perceive the political dimension of art it is necessary to abandon the 
artistic insistence on an absolute beginning that opposes existing institution of art and, 
therefore, entails artistic politics of disruption and withdrawal. As demonstrated above, 
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the insistence on an absolute beginning precludes art from the possibility to intervene 
within the established norms of representation and, thus, separates art from its inherently 
relational, contesting, and constitutive political dimension. What is hence necessary, is 
precisely the engagement with the existing institutions of art and representations 
established on the level of the symbolic. The operation of engagement provides art with 
the possibility not only to continuously challenge or contest meanings sedimented in 
techniques, materials, or forms. More importantly, it enables art to rearticulate and 
constitute them in alternative ways. Accordingly, the artistic strategies of engagement 
support Rancière’s assertion that art is a partaking of the sensible (le partage du sensible). 
Yet, they enable us to envisage how ‘the system of self-evident facts of sense perception 
that simultaneously discloses the existence of something in common and the delimitations 
that define the respective parts and positions within it’, by means of the distribution of 
spaces, times, and forms of activity,  is engendered and put into form, into mise-en-221
forme. A philosopher Bernard Flynn wrote that social practices, including art practice, ‘are 
recognisable as such only because they mean something within the general context of 
meaning, otherwise they would be simply physical motions’.  Flynn’s view implies that 222
the pluralism of facts of sense perception, distributed by ways of disrupting ‘the clear 
partition of identities, activities and spaces’, has to be structured into — what Claude 
Lefort calls — mise-en-scène that concerns the symbolic ordering of social relations. 
Drawing upon Lefort, Flynn emphasised that the mise-en-scène of social relations ‘means 
that society gives itself a “a quasi-representation of itself”’.  This implies that a disorder 223
initiated by mise-en-sense, which contests the hierarchies of representation, has to be 
nevertheless articulated at the particular moment into an order of representation, into 
mise-en-scène.  
The distinction between the mise-en-sense and the mise-en-scène draws a clear 
difference between Rancière’s and Mouffe’s projects of democracy and the disparate 
consequences that they have on envisaging the relationship between art and politics. As I 
demonstrated above, while anarchism stands for the artistic strategies of disruption 
conveyed by le partage du sensible, agonism stands for the artistic strategies of 
engagement that articulate initial mise-en-sense into mise-en-scène. And, as long as the 
former implies a disorder of the plurality of egalitarian positions, the later advocates an 
order of the plurality of positions instituted through hegemonic relations that are 
constructed through symbolisation; by extension, a hegemonic order always already 
anticipates a disorder; or, to put it differently, the mise-en-scène anticipates the mise-en-
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sense.  
The Lisabon based Cape Verdean choreographer Marlene Monteiro Freitas observes 
society as constructed at the point of intersection of disorder and order in Bacantes - 
Prelúdio Para Uma Purga (Bacchae – Prelude to a Purge), a performance that premiered 
in 2017.  As the reference to Euripides’ tragedy The Bacchantes (405 BC) from the title 224
indicates, this performance is concerned with the disparate natures that construct 
people.  In Euripides’  Bacchantes, Dionysus, the son of Zeus and mortal mother 225
Semele, claims his divine nature whilst the royal house of Cadmus, to whom his mother 
belongs, denies it. In revenge, and in order to prove his divine origin, Dionysus throws 
rites in a mountain consisting of songs, dance and intoxication. The Dionysian rites draw 
women wild, including the three sisters of his mother who also denied that Semele got 
pregnant with Zeus. After Dionysus forced Pentheus, the King of Thebes, to climb the 
mountain, Agave, Semele’s sister and Pentheus’ mother, kills Pentheus in her madness, 
taking him for a lion. Within this context, a philosopher Friedrich Nietzcshe, back in 
1872, observed that the Dionysian ideals stands for the spirit of chaos, music, dance, 
collectivity, and formlessness, in contrast to the Apollonian ideals that stand for the 
structural principle, architecture, sculpture, individuality and form-giving.  Indeed, the 226
entire Euripides’ Bacchantes is engaged with the place of irrationality designated by the 
Dionysian principles within a society rationally ordered by the Apollonian principles. 
Nevertheless, the narrative of Euripides’ Bacchantes is not evident in Freitas’s 
Bacantes - Prelúdio Para Uma Purga. Rather, through the rhythmical sequences of 
images, objects, movements and gestures, twelve dancers and musicians  create 227
situations that reflect on the conflictual natures of the Apollonian and Dionysian 
principles, of reason and irrationality, form and formlessness, and individuation and 
collectivity.  The tension that brings rhythmic uncertainty to Bacantes is the reason why 228
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Kunstenfestivaldesarts, May 5-27, 2017), 20. 
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Freitas prefers to speak about her performances in a term of fiction.  The staging of 229
Freitas’ Bacantes, as performance critic Rita Natálio observed well, ‘is firmly engaged 
with a fragmented consciousness and it proposes a flow of associative freedom that 
postpones the rationality of interpretation’.  And further on that ‘[t]he history of tragedy 230
is thus paradoxically convoked and dissolved.’  In fact,  we should notice, the history of 231
Bacchantes is constructed as the drama unfolding at the verge of tragedy and comedy and 
consciousness and unconsciousness within the non-linear structure of the performance.  
The mise-en-scène of the performance is a bright white cube, with a wide yellow 
strip of paint covering the floor by width. Within, a few stools and music stands are 
arranged. The black and white male and female bodies of the performers are ‘masked’ 
with a heavy make-up that emphasises their eyes, and especially their lips. They are 
dressed in costumes reminiscent of uniforms. And, whereas the dancers are wearing the 
white costumes, the musicians are dressed in the blue and black ones. The brightness of 
the space, heavy make-up, primary colours of costumes, shiny swim caps and flashy 
gloves in Freitas’ staging of Bacchantes, are suggestive of the comedia dell’arte, or, even 
more, of the cabaret. The music performed by five trumpeters (sometimes transformed 
into hybrid instruments by use of plungers or hoses) and one drummer gives rhythm to the 
movements. The movements are mechanical and evocative of slapstick; sometimes 
performers move like robots or dolls; sometimes they engage in Charlie Chaplin like 
walks. However, what at one moment may appear as an organised order of images, 
movements, gestures, and attitudes, in another moment turns into a disorder in which 
every threat between the performance’s parts gets lost. It is within such a structural system 
of alternating sketches of orderly and disorderly and absurdly and logically organised 
situations, that a synchronised movement of performers executing the same gesture — 
that, for example, simulates writing on a typewriting machines, walking without ever 
touching the ground (while the performers are seated on stools), or, that unites the bodies 
of musicians in swinging — at the certain moment turns into a set of obliques gestures 
and actions that dissolve the initial orderly choreography into a seemingly uncontrolled 
set of moves and pleasures; however, only to again return to the organised choreography. 
And, just like the choreographic order of mechanical movements sometimes dissolves in 
formless moves, the melodies of Erik Satie’s Gnossienne No. 1 (1890), and the entire 
fifteen minutes of Maurice Ravel’s Boléro (1928) — performed by trumpeters live on 
  A moral side of ‘making room’ in performance and giving rhythm to it, prompted Freitas to speak about her 229
performances in terms of fictions. In: Ibid.,
  Rita Natálio, “The Spiralled Dualism of Marlene Monteiro Freitas”, written in May 2017, Departures and 230
Arrivals, accessed October 3, 2017, http://departuresandarrivals.eu/en/texts/texts-and-reviews/the-spiraled-
dualism-of-marlene-monteiro-freitas-625.
  Ibid., 231
!62
stage — at a particular moment dissolve or disarticulate into unknown scores.  Freitas’ 232
performance symbolises a constant play between the Dionysian and Apollonian ideals, 
between formless and form-giving, disorder and order, and individual principles and 
collective demands. Bacantes - Prelúdio Para Uma Purga points at the need for 
questioning the order of images, movements, gestures and attitudes, through the mutual 
engagement of the paradoxical, counter-positions, and the need for constituting their 
relationship in alternative ways.  
This insight into Freitas’ performance allows us to envisage what renders the 
political dimension of art. Firstly, we understand that it is necessary to abandon the idea of 
opposing the existing institutions of art, the idea that the historical avant-garde claimed 
and that the vanguard movements have reiterated. Second, it is necessary to recognise that 
our reality is discursively constructed, understanding discourse not as a mere 
representation of the social that encompasses only practices of speaking, writing and 
communicating, but as the practice of symbolisation through language and actions within 
which objects and subjects are constructed. The first suggests a need to give up a claim to 
an absolute beginning that entails artistic politics of rupture and withdrawal. The second 
indicates that art should be perceived by means of discourse analysis, which implies 
artistic strategies of engagement with the existing symbols and their rearticulation in 
alternative ways.  At once, this is a moment of their constitution in, what Flynn calls, a 233
quasi-representation. This view recognises a constitutive relationship between differential 
situations, and the inherent process of articulation and sublimation of one into another 
position, of disorder into order, of that which is excluded from symbolisation into 
symbolisation, of the Dionysian ideals into the Apollonian ideals, of the individual into 
the collective, or the initial affectivity into representation. Hence, not only that disorder is 
possible, it is even necessary for an order to be established.  
redrawing limits between the intelligible and abject bodies 
My thesis is that there is no pure or total form of art. By virtue of performativity, art 
 When one takes into consideration that Gnossienne was composed at the time of archeological excavations of 232
the city of Knossos on the Greek island of Crete, and, hence, the most common explanation that the title of 
Satie’s piece refers to the ritual dances performed by the inhabitants of Knossos, famous in Greek mythology 
for the story of its labyrinth, Theseus and the minotaur, and that Boléro was composed as a ballet out of an 
interest for the reinvention of dance movements, then these compositions indeed become in Freita’s 
performance the symbols of the constitutive and paradoxical natures of the Dionysian and the Apollonian 
ideals, of formless and form-giving, disorder and order, individual principles and collective demands.
 To read more about the importance of discourse analysis see chapter 1.233
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stabilises and articulates a particular system of relations into a certain configuration that is 
manifested in representation. Borrowing Mouffe’s vocabulary, I have suggested that each 
representation implies a hegemony of the symbolised or chosen on the one hand, and a 
possibility for that which is excluded from symbolisation, and which has no entity on its 
own, to be articulated and sublimated into a counter-hegemony. This is so, because, 
however individual is production of art, no action has been discovered to exist in 
isolation. As Dewey stressed, ‘the action of everything is along with the action of other 
things’.  To that effect, representation in art is always decisive, partial, and proximal; it 234
is articulated and constrained in relation to what it excludes. It stands for a possible way 
of conceiving societies within which the matter — that is symbolised or named through 
art — exists in its proximity. Representation proposes an order of relations that is eternally 
traversed by disorder. When representation in art is envisaged in this way, then it points at 
a paradoxical, insuperable tension and conflict between different and counter-hegemonic 
discourses and, hence, properties of different associations that are concerned with the 
recognition of distinct demands. It is precisely the ontological dimension of conflict that 
renders contingent the paradoxical nature of discourses and every representation in art.  
In performance, the paradoxical and conflictual relation between different social, 
political, or cultural discourses, is reflected through the continuous performative tension 
between the intelligible and abject bodies. In Bodies that Matter (1993), a philosopher and 
gender theorist Judith Butler suggested that bodies are constructed through discursive 
means and that they ‘only appear, only endure, only live within the productive constraints 
of certain highly gendered regulatory scheme’.  In other words, ‘gender is constructed 235
through relations of power’.  On the one hand, the acknowledgement of the relations of 236
power in the construction of gender precludes the view on the relationship between 
differently constructed bodies in terms of oscillation, as Erika Fischer-Lichte’s 
performance theory suggests.  This is so, because oscillation erases all the limits 237
established between differential bodies, between their contours and movements, just as it 
erases all the limits between subjects and objects, and audience and performers. On the 
other hand, what the acknowledgement of relations of power in the construction of gender 
 Dewey, The Public, 22. 234
  Butler, xi. 235
  Ibid., x. 236
 Drawing upon Maurice Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology and semiotics, Erika Fischer-Lichte distinguished 237
phenomenal bodies from semiotic bodies, that is, the sheer presence of the body from the representation of 
the body. In order to overcome a dichotomous relationship between them, she introduced the operation of 
oscillation. When the relationship between these two positions is oscillatory, then the difference between the 
phenomenal and semiotic bodies, including the difference between the subject and the object, and the 
difference between the audience and the actors, become overcame and erased. This is how the audience 
becomes performers. In: Erika Fischer-Lichte, The Transformative Power of Performance (London, New 
York: Routledge, 2008). 
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enables us to recognise is that the relationship between differently constructed bodies is 
regulated by power and hegemonic laws.  In this view, the body is always performative; 238
it implies a reiterative and citational practice by which discourse produces the effects that 
it names as the result of power relations and hegemony. Any attempt to erase, or rather 
repress the limits between differential bodies and forms of identification, as well as 
between subject and object, or audience and performers, is always threatened by the 
repressed, by the other. According to philosopher and psychoanalyst Julia Kristeva, every 
loss of distinction between subject and object evokes abjection. She writes that ‘the plane 
of abjection is that of subject/object relationship’.  Abjection accordingly does not 239
respect the established limits, positions and rules, but dissembles them; it ‘disturbs 
identity, system, order’.   240
Given these points, we can observe how abjection disturbs all the limits of the body 
conceived as the intelligible body. Philosopher Michael Foucault designated the 
intelligible body as an object of knowledge; knowledge which is regulated by means of 
power and discipline through different discourses.  Drawing upon Kristeva’s notion of 241
abject and Foucault’s definition of intelligible bodies, Butler then distinguishes intelligible 
bodies from abject bodies. Intelligible bodies stand for a domain of formed subjects, while 
abject bodies are those who are not yet subjects, ‘but who form the constitutive outside to 
the domain of subject’.  Accordingly, we could say that the intelligible body is a 242
corporeal manifestation of a present way of being, of a possible way of being in the world, 
regulated by law. It understands itself in relation to the abject bodies that it encounters and 
that it excludes. For its part, the abject body is continuously concerned with the present 
ways of being in the world. It is possible to suggest that it understands itself through the 
conflictual relationship with the intelligible bodies. As such, it emphasises the fragility of 
the law that circumscribes the intelligible body and the possibility to disarticulate it. In 
fact, as Judith Butler observes, the abject body is a paradoxically different body, an 
excluded body, the limit to intelligibility.  As such, it stands for a constitutive outside to 243
the body which is constructed through different, and hegemonic discourses. The abject 
body has an inclination to take up a relationship with the intelligible body and rupture it, 
  In chapter 5, power and hegemonic laws are discussed with respect to the distinction between the capitalist 238
techniques of production and the capitalist techniques of domination. 
 Julia Kristeva, Powers of Horror. An Essay on Abjection, trans. Leon S. Roudiez (New York: Columbia 239
University Press, 1982), 64. 
  Ibid., 4. 240
  Michael Foucault, “Body and Power,” interview by Quel corps (1975), trans. Colin Gordon, accessed June 8, 241
2017, http://www.generation-online.org/p/fpfoucault6.htm. 
   Butler, Bodies, 3. 242
  Ibid., xi.243
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‘opening up possibilities for the bodies which have no intelligible place’.  244
All things considered, we could suggest that the body politics manifests at the point 
of intersection of intelligibility and abjection; it articulates their paradoxical relation by 
reconfiguring an ensemble of discourses, practices, and institutions, in a specific unity that 
however privileges certain types of bodies while it excludes others. In this context, 
corporeality is not any more a matter of a ‘metaphysics’, a matter of the human body 
inhabited by the spirit, nor is it a matter of the abject body displaced by the intelligible 
body — or vice versa, as Rancière’s theory may imply. For if bodies only appear, endure 
and live within the productive constraints of a certain highly generated dynamic of power, 
as Butler suggests, then, corporeality reflects a concern and conflict with the regulative 
norms that materialise the bodies through categories such as sex, gender, or race, aiming 
to articulate the ways of representing them in another way.  In other words, corporeality 245
points at the coercive techniques of domination that circumscribe bodies within particular 
identities and laws of intelligibility, and the need for contesting these identities and laws 
by means of engagement and struggle from the abject position. This approach enables a 
shift from the pre-established perspective on bodies in terms of class -, gender -, or race - 
based identities, towards that which Mouffe calls the relational forms of identification.  246
In this context, corporeality is to be envisaged as a reflection on the performativity 
of the multiplicity of paradoxical and conflictual discourses, concerned with the norms of 
representation in choreography which contest or comply with the dominant regulatory 
body politics. Once this is recognised, it becomes apparent that corporeality manifests a 
decisive articulation of paradoxical bodily positions in an intelligible choreography of the 
bodies. For if choreography is constituted by corporeality, it should then be recognised 
that the performing body does not simply unfolds its potential of being. In fact, the body 
is always implicated in the system that entangles it; it represents itself in relation to the 
bodies that it encounters and the bodies that it excludes. Choreography, thus, 
acknowledges that the indispensable phase of exclusion opens up a possibility for a 
choice. It becomes a matter of a decisional act that draws limits towards certain bodies 
and circumscribes other by a particular discourse and context. To choose one, is to 
exclude another being; it is to confine intelligibility and propose a name. For that matter, 
the indispensable phase of exclusion of bodies demands, as choreographer Daniel Linehan 
 Butler also writes about dispossessed bodies as abject bodies. A dispossessed body is the body deprived of a 244
belonging to the world in a broader sense; in fact, it has been  stripped from the land, citizenship or property, 
and, as such, it is inclined for a social and political action. In: Athena Athanasio and Judith Butler, 
Dispossession: The Performative in the Political (Cambridge: Polity, 2013), 59.
 Borrowing Heidegger’s vocabulary, conflict becomes an essence, something that ‘presences’ itself and sets 245
itself forth from out of itself; it is yet to happen. See: Martin Heidegger, The Question Concerning 
Technology and Other Essays, trans. William Lovitt (New York: Harper Torchbooks, [1949] 1977), 160. 
  Chtantal Mouffe, The Return of the Political (London: Verso, 1993), 78-86. 246
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suggests, a need to challenge the intelligible body embedded within the dominant system 
from the aporetic outside albeit acting within it.   247
Drawing upon Freud and Lacan, psychoanalyst Nestor Braunstein argues that it is 
only a psychotic who has no choice, who does not choose.  Following Braunstein’s 248
thought, choreography becomes a matter of decision — it may either assist or contest the 
current distinction between the intelligible and abject bodies. The intelligible body is, 
hence, always a matter of contingency; an effect of a partial stabilisation, of a regulatory 
hegemony of discourses incited by particular social, political, or cultural demands that 
may always be challenged from the abject position, from the outside. To that effect, sex, 
gender, or race, are to be envisaged as categories that represent hegemonic corporeal 
systems of symbols and names to be continuously challenged and contested. It is then 
only by a possibility of a counter-hegemonic collective decision that the struggle between 
an order of identities may be contested by a disorder, or, as we previously observed, that 
the Apollonian ideals may be contested by the Dionysian ideals.  By means of struggle 249
we may undo and redo the dominant neoliberal condition of indistinctness that is 
established through a particular order and that we call the post-political, and open up 
possibilities for articulating alternative societies. Performance practices and theories, as 
we will see in the forthcoming chapters, may play important roles in these processes. 
 Daniel Linehan, A No One Can Make Space (MER: Paper Kunsthalle, 2013), book VI. 247
 Nestor Braunstein,”You Cannot Choose To Get Crazy”, in Lacan on Madness: Yes, You Can’t, eds. Patricia 248
Gherovitci and Manya Steinkoler (London: Routledge, 2015), 85 - 98. 
  On collective decisions, see chapter 5. 249
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4 
The Return of Drama  250
  
Numerous protest movements arose worldwide since the beginning of the 
millennium. The different natures of protest movements inspired some political 
philosophers to envisage alternative models of democracy. Michael Hardt and Antonio 
Negri envisaged the model of absolute democracy inspired by the horizontality of protest 
movements.  Chantal Mouffe envisaged the model of agonistic democracy inspired by 251
the verticality of protest movements.  Drawing upon political theorist Benjamin Arditi, 252
the advocate of absolute democracy, and political theorist Yannis Stavrakakis, the 
advocate of agonistic pluralism, it will be stressed throughout this chapter that agonistic 
pluralism anticipates the choreography of sublimation of horizontality into verticality. The 
choreography of sublimation, that enables the engagement of horizontality with 
verticality, is envisaged as a condition for challenging a dominant politics and constituting 
an alternative.  
To examine how popular passions for the political change and politico-
philosophical discourses on democracy influence the understanding of the political 
dimension of performance practice, I distinguished the post-representational discourse in 
performance theory from the representational. Whereas the former resonates the 
horizontality of absolute democracy and the post-hegemonic politics of harmony, the latter 
is inspired by the verticality of agonistic pluralism and the hegemonic politics of polemics 
and struggles. Theatre scholar Hans-Thies Lehmann is the most influential advocate of the 
post-representational discourse. For him, modernity succeeded to expel the political 
dimension from dramatic representation associated with conflict. This is why ‘the political 
gesture’ in theatre stands for tragic experience enabled by transgression, by overstepping 
    This article will be published as: Goran Petrović Lotina, “The Return of Drama. Protests, Politics and 250
Political Discourses in Performance Theory,” in Cultural Critic (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 
2018).
   See chapter 2, and Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri, Empire (Cambridge, London: Harvard University 251
Press, 2000). 
  Chantal Mouffe: The Democratic Paradox (London: Verso, 2000); On the Political (London: Routledge, 252
2005); Agonistics (London: Verso, 2013).
!69
all moral, ethical or political limits.  For the postdramatic and post-representational 253
approach to theatre, the political dimension is the immediate experience of reality through 
affects. I will claim that the privilege of transgression and affects through presence in 
performance philosophy precludes the possibility of constructing alternative politics and 
representations. In contrast, I will demonstrate that the political dimension of performing 
arts lies in dramatic representation precisely because it is associated with conflict. In this 
view, conflict is not a mere matter of the plot, of the closed system relating polemics and 
struggles between the characters on the stage, but a dramatic form of engagement of the 
audience with the performance. Drama enables the choreography of sublimation of the 
audience’s affects into representation. What I will be calling the representational approach 
to theatre is a condition for the sublimation and articulation of the audience as passive 
onlookers into active citizenship that may construct alternative politics. 
the horizontality of protest movements and post-hegemony  
Following the global political and economic crisis of the new millennium, 
numerous protest movements arose worldwide: in South America, the Arab countries, the 
USA, the EU and in Europe more generally. What is common to these protest movements 
is that they are driven by popular demands for political change. However, what 
distinguishes them are the strategies applied to achieve these goals. Generally speaking, 
there are two types of protest movements. On one side, there are protest movements that 
are horizontal by nature. They have no leaders and advocate direct rule of the people 
outside state institutions. As such, they are post-hegemonic protests. Some of the 
examples are the Argentinian Piqueteros (2001), Arab Spring (2010/11),  international 254
Occupy movement (2011), Spanish Indignados (2011), Greek Aganaktismenoi (2011), 
Black Lives Matter (2013- ), French Nuit debut (2016) and Serbian Ne davimo Beograd / 
Let’s Not Drown Belgrade (2016- ). On the other side, there are protest movements that 
are vertical by nature. They have leaders that represent popular demands. This type of 
protest movements support hegemonic politics and assert that political change may be 
achieved through the engagement with state institutions. This is why they always turn into 
political parties, seeking for representatives within the parliamentary political system. 
Some of the examples are the Spanish Podemos / We Can (2011 - 2014),  the Slovenian 
Združena levica / United Left (2011 - 2014) and the Croatian Zagreb je naš / Zagreb is 
 Hans-Thies Lehmann, “A Future for Tragedy? Remarks on the Political and the Postdramatic,” in 253
Postdramatic Theatre and the Political, eds. Karen Jurs-Munby, Jerome Carroll and Steve Giles (London: 
Bloomsbury, 2013), 93-95. 
 The Arab Spring took place in Tunisia (2010), Syria, Libya, Yemen, Egypt, Bahrain, Morocco and Algeria 254
(2011).
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Ours ( 2009 - 2017).    255
Whether they arise in response to the incompetence of politicians to deal with the 
economic and social crisis, dissatisfaction with austerity measures, or disgust with 
corruption or unjust policies, most of the recent left-leaning protest movements are 
horizontal by nature; they are self-organised, egalitarian and leaderless protests. Arditi’s 
argument for the horizontal politics evolves around the critic of hegemony. He particularly 
takes issue with Laclau’s and Mouffe’s understanding of hegemony as a dimension that is 
inherent to all social practices. When hegemony is understood in these terms, he writes, 
then it ‘construes all politics as hegemonic politics’ leaving no space for the outside or 
beyond hegemony.  In addition, Arditi explains, if hegemonic forms of politics revolves 256
around the production of a chain of equivalence between different demands, subject 
positions and forces, then there is no room for those groups that are not part of that chain 
and that ‘do not require or demand a surplus signification for relations of equivalence 
among groups or struggles’.   257
To defend his argument for post-hegemony, Arditi provides a survey of the 
Argentinian protest movement (2001) against economic reforms carried out under the 
government of the Radical Civic Union party (URC), assembled out of Piqueteros (a 
group of unemployed workers), Asambleas de Barrios (an assembly of autonomous 
neighbourhood), Peronistas (labour movement) and variety of radical leftist parties. Arditi 
stresses that despite the absence of leadership and ideology, Argentinian protesters took 
over factories and brought down the Argentinian President Fernando de la Rúa, the head 
of the URC, whose neoliberal government introduced strict austerity measures, such as 
budget cuts for health and education. For these reasons, Arditi sees the Argentinian protest 
movement as an ultimate example of what he calls a post-hegemonic outside: a multitude, 
or a network of movements which is self-organised outside the state, without equivalence 
between different groups, agency of articulation and hegemony. It is in this context that 
the Argentinian protest movement stands for ‘the multitude in action’,  for the plurality 258
of movements in the public space without the moment of convergence in the single 
representative.  
Nevertheless, Arditi does not explain how the multitude gives rise to a politics that 
we envisage in Mouffe’s terms as ‘the set of practices and institutions through which an 
  In all three cases the first year refers to the year in which a movement or a protest began, while the second 255
year refers to the year in which a movement or a protest transformed into a political party. 
 Benjamin Arditi, “Post-hegemony: Politics Outside the Usual Post-Marxist Paradigm,” in Radical 256
Democracy and Collective Movements Today. The Biopolitics of the Multitude versus the Hegemony of the 
People, eds. Alexandros Kiopkiolis and Giorgos Katsambekis, (Surrey: Ashgate, 2014), 24. 
 Ibid., 25. 257
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order is created’.  He is mainly attentive to vindicate the multitude, singularity and 259
action outside chains of equivalence. What he calls ‘viral politics’ stands for a mode of 
action that is based on informal networks between singularities.  Viral politics are 260
concerned with the ways these networks are structured, that is, with the tactics and 
procedures of organisation, rather than with the ways in which series of dispersed actions 
and movements may establish an order and give rise to politics. What the strategies of 
defection from the counter-hegemonic representations — that Arditi nevertheless 
reluctantly argues for — do not demonstrate are the ways particular demands of the 
multitude may be defended and put to work by avoiding the state.  In fact, as Žižek put 261
it, the strategies of defection or exodus do not demonstrate how the multitudes rule 
themselves;  and, similarly, as Laclau put it, they do not demonstrate how the multitude 262
articulates in the people.  Actually, Arditi does not inform us about the consequences of 263
the immediate horizontal, non-representative, anti-institutional and leaderless Argentinian 
movement for the post-hegemonic outside, for the multitude.  
However, a brief look on the Piqueteros movement during the Argentinian 
elections in 2003 may tell more about this. Namely, as Mouffe pointed out, when the 
elections took place in Argentina, Piqueteros had no relay with the institutions or the 
parties.  The consequence was the electoral struggle between traditional parties, the 264
centre-right faction of the Peronist Justicialist Party, headed by Carlos Menem,  and the 265
centre-left faction of the Peronist Justicialist Party, headed by Nestor Kirchner.  It is 266
important to notice, as Mouffe emphasises, that only at the initiative of the elected 
President Kirchner a faction of Piqueteros movement entered the government. This 
allowed certain Piqueteros’ demands to be heard and to be defended in the parliament. 
Considering this, we can certainly agree with Arditi that protest movement or ‘insurgences 
are particularly intense moments of experimentation and improvisation’ and that they, to 
  My definition of politics is envisaged within the framework of Mouffe’s political-philosophy. See: Chantal 259
Mouffe, On the Political (London: Routledge, [2000] 2009), 9. 
 Arditi, “Post-hegemony,” 29.260
 Arditi is reluctant because he does not in fact favour post-hegemony, while, at the same time, he rejects 261
hegemony; he writes: ‘It is myopic and ideological — in the pejorative sense of this word — to think that 
either there is hegemony or exodus.’ Artidi, “Post-hegemony,” 37. 
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 Markus Miessen, “The Space of Agonism (Markus Miessen in Conversation with Chantal Mouffe),” in 264
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the certain degree, do engage with the transformation of the given.  Yet, as the case of 267
the Piqueteros movement shows, we have to recognise that the network of autonomous 
struggles, which operates as the self-organised multitude, is capable to transform 
dominant politics only when it is articulated in a counter-hegemonic horizon of 
representation and, consequently, engaged with the hegemonic institutions.  
Similar to the Piqueteros movement, most of the ‘post-hegemonic’ square protests 
failed to transform or to displace dominant politics and fizzled out despite abounding and 
progressive ideas and aspirations. This could be said for the Arab Spring, the Occupy 
movement and the Nuit debout. Each of these examples testifies that the neoliberal 
politics always survive post-hegemonic protests and become even more stronger. First, 
because the hegemonic position of the neoliberal politics enables the appropriation of 
protestors’ demands for the benefit of its own interest and, second, because the strategies 
of counter-hegemony are insufficiently institutionalised. Given these points, we should 
notice that the strategies of autonomous and horizontal, that is, non-hierarchical and non-
representational protests — which argue a direct popular governance — preclude the 
possibility of protesters to confront, challenge and displace vertically structured 
hegemonic politics, representations and discourses established by neoliberalism. If global 
neoliberalism, obviously, can not disappear on its own accord, then, in contrast to the 
politics of defection, exodus or withdrawal from the discourses that are sedimented in the 
neoliberal politics, institutions and representations, more explicit engagement with them is 
required.   268
the quasi-verticality of protest movements and hegemony:  
a choreography of sublimation 
Stavrakakis envisages the relationship between the horizontal and vertical politics 
and, consequently, between post-hegemony and hegemony, in terms of a co-constitution 
of immediacy and mediation.  In this view, immediacy stands for the horizontality of 269
post-hegemony and direct democracy that advocate strategies of withdrawal from any 
representation appropriated by the state, while mediation points at the verticality of 
 Arditi, “Post-hegemony,” 37. 267
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hegemony and representative democracy that argue strategies of engagement with 
representations appropriated by the state. Stavrakakis envisaged the co-constitutive 
relationship between immediacy and mediation in terms of a choreography that implies a 
gradual sublimation of one position into another. 
Drawing upon psychoanalytic theory Stavrakakis asserts that gradual sublimation 
stands for the diversion of the libido, of the immediate affective impulses of pleasure into 
the noninstictual, culturally acceptable values.  Now, to support his own argument for 270
the choreography of sublimation in constructing any social and political totality, 
Stavrakakis turns to the post-Marxist discourse theory.  In the preface to the second 271
edition of their book Hegemony and Socialist Strategy (2001) Ernesto Laclau and Chantal 
Mouffe wrote: 
“Discourse” has a pedigree in contemporary thought going back to the 
three main intellectual currents of the twentieth century: analytical 
philosophy, phenomenology, and structuralism. In those three the 
century started with an illusion of immediacy, of a non-discursively 
mediated access to the things themselves — the referent, the 
phenomenon and the sign, respectively. In all three, however, this 
illusion of immediacy dissolved at some point, and had to be replaced by 
one form or another of discursive mediation.  272
In this landmark piece, Laclau and Mouffe wrote that discourse reflects the material 
character of every social construction and, therefore, that the very being of an object is 
itself a discursive production. Accordingly, they wrote that discursive totality can ‘exist 
[only] as a partial limitation of a “surplus of meaning”’.  The operation of limitation, or 273
mutual exclusion, implies that discursive totality and surplus of meaning condition each 
other. Contrary to the post-hegemonic political project of horizontal democracy which 
argues a direct rule of the multitude, that is an immediate access to the being through 
habits and affects of the multitude by relinquishing discourse and representation, Laclau’s 
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 Stavrakakis designates mediation drawing upon Laclau’s and Mouffe’s discourse analysis. In Laclau and 271
Mouffe, a pre-discursive mediation stands for an illusion of immediacy, which is contrasted with 
overdetermination that stands for a discursive mediation. In their views, immediacy points at a conceptual 
practice, which implies a system of logical transitions that conceives relations between objects as following 
relations between concepts. A pre-discursive immediacy is defined by determination in the last instance. In 
contrast, overdetermination is a performative practice. It conceives relations between objects through 
symbolisation and, as such, points at the construction through articulation. Ernesto Laclau and Chantal 
Mouffe, Hegemony and Socialist Strategy (London: Verso, [1985] 2001), 93-97. 
  Laclau and Mouffe, Hegemony, xi.272
   Ibid., 111.273
!74
and Mouffe’s hegemonic political project is constructed precisely through discursive 
mediations, allowing for the sublimation or rather — from the point of view of discourse 
analysis — the articulation of the initial immediacy into mediation: of the affective into 
the symbolic, the multitude into the people, or counter-hegemony into hegemony.  
The operation of gradual sublimation is accountable for the Spanish Podemos / We 
Can, a political party articulated out of a fraction of the horizontal grass-root movement 
Indignados that arose against austerity measures and corruption (2011-2014); for the 
Slovenian Združena levica / United Left, a left-wing coalition which underwent a similar 
process, by transforming the initial strategy of the Party for Sustainable Development of 
Slovenia (TRS) to occupy the Faculty of Fine Arts in a protest against financial academic 
restrictions, into an organised political coalition (2011 - 2014);  and also for the Croatian 274
Zagreb je naš / Zagreb is Ours, a political party that grew out of the initiative of Croatian 
intellectuals Pravo na grad / Right to the City that stood against the politics of private 
interest (2009 - 2017);  and, partially, for Kirchner’s Peronism, which included a portion 275
of Piqueteros in the government (2001-2003). In all these cases, the multitude sublimated 
into the people. Actually, the passionate affects of the multitude gave rise to the people 
through discursive means — through political institutions, representations and practices. 
This is why the relational, vertical, hegemonic, representative and institutional politics are 
playing an important role in radicalising democracy. They argue for the engagement of the 
protestors with actual hegemonies — dominant politics, institutions, representations and 
practices — through counter-hegemonic actions. The institutionalisation of protestors’ 
demands allows the possibility of confronting, deconstructing and rearticulating a given 
political order and, finally, constituting or articulating it in another way. This implies that 
the separation of the multitude and the people in autonomous and non-relational 
categories arrests the possibility of transforming dominant politics and prevailing political 
discourses.    276
Stavrakakis justifies the choreography of sublimation of the multitude into the 
people observing that ‘a multitude of autonomous struggles have historically become 
effective only when articulated within a common counter-hegemonic horizon of 
representation’.  This means that a social movement may transform a dominant political 277
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order and give rise to alternative politics, provided that it appoints representatives in the 
parliament who will defend the protestors’ demands. This is why, rather than envisaging 
horizontality and verticality as isolated entities, Stavrakakis’ observations suggest the 
study of their co-constitutive interpretations, opportunities and challenges. From the point 
of view of discourse formation, the choreography of sublimation point at the articulation 
of the multitudinous of popular demands and activities into an order, of the real into 
representation, or what Artidi calls ‘the multitude in action’ into hegemony. Finally, this 
approach inclines the conclusion that a politics of verticality is in fact quasi-vertical by 
nature; it takes into account every available position and open up a possibility for the 
constitution of democracy in plural terms.  
relational dialectics: horizontality and verticality   
The operation of co-constitution or mutual engagement of horizontality and 
verticality allowing for a choreography of articulation calls to attention a post-Marxist 
politico-philosophical polemic about eclecticism and dialectics. In this polemic, which 
echoes revolutionary political thinker Vladimir Ilyich Lenin’s world view in terms of 
reciprocal relations, eclecticism stands for the causal connection between different facets 
or different formal structures of one and the same object (a glass cylinder and a drinking 
vessel), while dialectics examine all facets, connections, mediations, and historical 
constructions of an object, reflecting relations with the ‘objective world’.  Whereas the 278
former is concerned with the experience of an immediate totality of the object — the 
extrapolation of data from its all-sidedness, or all facets of the object, the latter is 
concerned with a mediate totality of the object — the way it is relationally and historically 
constructed through discourse formation and articulated in its all-sidedness.   279
We have suggested before that the operation of articulation opens up a possibility 
for the constitution of democracy in plural terms. Let’s observe for a moment which type 
of relations may enable the operation of articulation to unfold in such a way so that it 
embraces a pluralism of positions: the causal type of relations characterised by 
eclecticism, or the co-constitutive type of relations characterised by dialectics? To suggest 
an answer to this dilemma, I will turn to philosopher Antonio Gramsci’s critique of the 
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orthodox revisionist’s approach to Marxism. His critique points at the reduction of 
philosophy to a form of sociology, to ‘a method of scholarship for ascertaining particular 
facts’ and to an ‘empirical compilation of practical observations’.  Reduced to the 280
scientific method dependent on a pre-elaborated system, philosophy becomes a 
‘mechanical formula’, a logical and coherent system of laws. By narrowing philosophy to 
a search for laws, all empirical observations become facts determined by the immediate 
economic factors that discern productive forces as the engines of social totality. The type 
of relations that the bond between economic structure and superstructural appearance 
suggests is — what we called — the causal type of relations: a type of relations between 
cause and effect characterised by eclecticism.  From the point of view of eclecticism, the 281
totality of any object is reduced to the abundance of abstract concepts that objectify a 
closed system. In contrast, Gramsci envisages philosophy as a theory of history that 
reflects ‘a generic search for historical sources’.  For him, as philosopher Leonardo 282
Paggi pointed out, ‘economics consists in confining historical materialism to historical 
reconstructions and thus preventing an evaluation of ongoing historical and political 
processes’.  To allow the evaluation of ongoing historical and political processes, 283
economics has to be seen only as one among other factors in which historical processes 
present themselves. This implies that economics ceases to relate to the production of 
goods and starts to address social relations, just like politics.  
Drawing upon Marx, Gramsci emphasises the antagonistic character of social 
relations.  The acknowledgement of antagonistic dimension of social relations allow us 284
to recognise that the historicity of humanity is linked to the struggling social associations 
that contain in themselves the elements of further development.  Accordingly, we have 285
to acknowledge that the theory of history is not social science determined in the last 
instance by economics, but the philosophy of praxis. The notion of praxis designates the 
system of antagonistic social relations in struggle for hegemony, a system that underlines 
the means of production. Gramsci asserts that praxis ‘can only be conceived in a 
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polemical form and in the form of a perpetual struggle’.  It is precisely a view on 286
societies and on philosophy in terms of polemics and struggle that accounts for the 
dialectical materialism. It permits us to envisage and evaluate the relationship between 
differential and paradoxical entities as co-constitutive, not supplemental. In this view, the 
totality of any object points at the knowledge production through the conflictual processes 
of objectification.  
According to Gramsci’s inspiring view on society, the dialectic does not relate to 
eclecticism, to the formal aggregation of unitary abstract facts, that is to concepts and 
laws deduced from the pre-discursive and primordial realm that exorcise the dimension of 
antagonism from the philosophical debate on society. In contrast, the dialectic demands 
the evaluation of ongoing antagonistic processes that shape societies. It implies the 
constitutive character of the multiplicity of factors (economic, political, geographical, 
religious...) to the struggling of different social demands (those of the workers, women, 
environmentalists, black people, LGBTQIA, poor…).  As Paggi pointed out, the 287
dialectic is ‘the cognitive method necessary to gain a concrete and realistic representation 
of the antagonistic social unity’.  Consequently, a co-constitutive relation of the plurality 288
of positions is not simply a relation of causes and effects, or bases and superstructures. 
More importantly, it implies action and reaction in an attempt to construct a possible unity 
out of conflicting social forces in — what Gramsci calls — a concordia discors.  The 289
dialectic is thus the critical evaluation of operations that reflect the outcome of the 
struggle between contesting and antagonistic social forces for hegemony at the given 
moment.  
The way we have just envisaged dialectics — in terms of materialism, history, 
praxis, discourse, polemics, antagonism, struggle and plurality — is reminiscent of 
political theorist Carl Schmitt’s writing on ‘the political’. Schmitt states that ‘the 
substance of the political’ is contained in concepts, images and terms, as well as in 
everyday language, tactics, practices, competitions and intrigues. This is so because they 
are all focused on conflict and have ‘a polemical meaning’.  Accordingly, Schmitt 290
claims that ‘the political is the most intense and extreme antagonism’.  For this reason, 291
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antagonism implies a friend-enemy grouping.  Without antagonism, that is, without a 292
specific conflicts and polemics between friends and enemies, all the words that relate to 
different objects, such as the state, society, economics, culture, or art, simply turn into 
empty abstractions. Thinking with Schmitt and against Schmitt, Mouffe stresses that the 
task of democratic politics is not to allow conflict between the differential positions to 
take the form of antagonism, but the form of agonism.  The central category of Mouffe’s 293
agonism are adversaries. They are not enemies to be destroyed; they are adversaries 
‘whose ideas might be fought, even fiercely, but whose right to defend those ideas is not 
to be questioned’.  In Mouffe’s view, the struggle between adversaries is the ‘very 294
condition of a vibrant democracy’.   295
Mouffe’s view on a democratic politics in agonistic terms enables us to deepen the 
notion of dialects. Once we have acknowledged that agonism is always traversed by 
antagonism, we shall rethink the dialectic in terms of the choreography of sublimation of 
an initial immediacy into a mediated representation. From the point of view of discourse 
analysis, the choreography of sublimation becomes the choreography of articulation of the 
antagonistic relations between enemies into the agonistic relations between adversaries.  296
Concerning the protest movements, this choreography suggest the articulation of popular 
and passionate demands into a set of practices; or, concerning the object, the articulation 
of the ‘being’ of the object into its symbolic representation. It is at this point that it could 
be said that we engage with the essence of the political and not only with the facts of 
politics.   297
Hans Thies-Lehmann: 
protest movements and postdramatic politics of perception 
We shall envisage the consequences that different politico-philosophical ways of 
grasping the distinction between the horizontal and vertical natures of protest movements 
— absolute democracy and agonistic democracy — as well as the distinction between the 
types of relations between differential positions — eclecticism and dialectics — have on 
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performance theory eager to explore the political dimension of performance practice with 
respect to protest movements. Accordingly, I distinguished the post-representational 
politico-philosophical discourse in performance theory from the one of representation. 
Whereas the former reflects the characteristics of absolute democracy and eclecticism, the 
latter shares the characteristic of agonistic democracy and dialectics. My point of 
departure is Hans-Thies Lehmann, one of the most influential advocates of the post-
representational approach to the performing arts and the key reference points in the 
international debate on contemporary theatre and performance. By outlining Lehmann’s 
theoretical tenets relevant for our observation, I intend to demonstrate the limits of the 
post-representational discourse in performance theory for grasping the political dimension 
of performance practice. I will show that Lehmann’s privileging of presence precludes the 
possibility of unfolding dialectics important for the evaluation of the construction of any 
objectivity through discourse formation, through conflicts, struggles and polemics, and 
hence the possibility of unfolding the choreographies of articulation. As we will see, at 
stake in the post-representational approach to performance are one-sided post-hegemonic 
politics of harmony.  
In his book Postdramatic Theatre (2006), Lehmann envisaged the cultural and 
social change from the 1960s onwards mainly as the consequence of the development of 
new technology. According to Lehmann, new technology in theatre requires a shift from 
dramatic theatre dominated by a text-based and mimetic representation of conflict, to new 
media, immanently de-structured processional event that is “more presence than 
representation”.  His thoughts on the ways presentation in theatre may open up a multi-298
perspectival form of perceiving — that he names the politics of perception, led him to 
develop a theory of transgression. In order to provide a ground for the theory of 
transgression and the argument for the political form of theatre in A Future for Tragedy? 
(2013) Lehmann departs from the global social and political protest movements. By 
drawing a distinction between drama and tragedy, he argues that tragedy, rather than 
drama, allows the possibility of grasping the relationship between political and aesthetic 
gestures in theatre within the context of mass movements. He asserts that tragedy appears 
in the postdramatic theatre as an event with ‘no performance, no theatre, and no acting out 
of a dramatic story’.  Because there is only the audience, tragic experience stands for a 299
certain perspective on the event which Lehmann calls a ‘dramaturgy of the spectator’. 
This event transgresses all moral, ethical or political limits. All things considered, it is 
precisely tragedy that enables the audience to practice the political in theatre by means of 
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transgression.  
In order to grasp Lehmann’s idea about the relationship between aesthetic and 
political gestures in tragedy with reference to protest movements we, should take a closer 
look at his work. Lehmann claims that philosophers, from Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel 
and György Lukács to Walter Benjamin and Theodor Adorno, including a dramatist, 
theatre activist and theorist Bertolt Brecht, relegated tragedy to antiquity and historicity 
and proclaimed its death.  The dissolution of tragedy led to a new formalism, the higher 300
level of abstract justice and despotic rationalism. By these means, modernity succeeded to 
expel the political dimension of theatre by giving primacy to drama tied to the 
representation of conflict. Now, seeking an alternative to the post-political drama and 
conflict that it implies, Lehmann argues for the return of tragedy. He envisaged tragic 
experience as the one capable of ‘reaching and overstepping [...] the limits of a given 
cultural intelligibility’.  This possibility is ascribed to tragedy because Lehmann sees it 301
to be closely connected historically to basic questions of the political: the polis, history, 
power and transgression.  
To clarify this thought, in Tragedy and Dramatic Thought (2016) Lehmann 
suggests that the articulation of the tragic experience is not necessary linked to a dramatic 
procedure, but to the play between the aesthetic and the real, between aesthetically 
intended fiction and concrete life processes.  In order to develop this argument Lehmann 302
turns to ancient tragedy. He explains that since ancient times tragedy was linked to theatre 
not because theatre was drama, but because theatre was connected to rituals, such as ritual 
death penalties, public punishments, or the ritual of the Dionysian festivities.  Therefore, 303
the relationship between theatre and ritual stands for the blurred relationship between the 
aesthetic and the real, between the pleasure and the ethical and political responsibility.  304
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Precisely at the point when the real enters the aesthetic play emerges tragic experience.  305
This implies that tragic experience evokes a politics of perception that undermines 
certainties, such as whether we are simply spectators or participants in theatre. The 
overlapping experience of the aesthetic and the real enables the audience the possibility to 
put into question the cultural norms it adheres to, as well as the structure of the being in a 
polis.  
The encounter of the aesthetic and the real in tragedy raises the question about the 
nature of their relationship. Lehmann explains their relationship by introducing two 
theoretical approaches. The first is concerned with the nature of conflicts, such as 
political, moral and social conflicts. In this context, he calls attention to Hegel’s notion of 
sittlichkeit which he translates in terms of individual consciousness and publicly known 
rules. A double existence of sittlichkeit conditions the possibility of conflict between ‘the 
principle of justice as a rational political guiding norm and the uncompromising desire of 
individuals to live in a way that they deem to be authentic to their culture’.  Lehmann 306
associates this type of conflict with drama and questions its relevance. The second 
approach concerns the opposition of tragic experience to all ethico-political perception. 
Apropos, Lehmann writes, ‘even if it may assume the form of a political fight, tragic 
experience as such takes place beyond any moral, ethical or political — and even any 
rational — consideration’.  In other words, tragic experience is the unconditional 307
affirmation of life in transgression, in pain, suffering and loss; it is a matter of desire and 
passion, but not of representation. Drawing upon Kant’s notion of the beautiful, he 
suggests that the affective experience of life as overstepping of all sense, morals, or the 
limits of the self, leads to harmony.  This observation guided Lehmann to the conclusion 308
that tragic experience articulates the encounter of the aesthetic and the real in terms of a 
disruptive and destructive force working within the self.   309
In the context of mass social movements, protests and grassroots — from which 
Lehmann departs in order to envisage the political gesture of theatre — a post dramatic 
politics of perception designates the possibility of the immediate access to the real, to the 
being of the object, through transgression, which enables tragic experience within the 
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self.  Envisaged as transgression, the postdramatic politics of perception suggests the 310
expulsion of conflict that allows a view on any totality, including performance practice, in 
all its sidedness — taking into consideration tensions between the multiplicity of relations, 
between all ‘sides’, and actions and reactions that construct these relations through 
discursive mediations. This approach simplifies reciprocal relationship between 
differential positions to the level of causality, to the relation between cause and effect, or 
base and superstructure. By these means, it opens up a possibility for grounding particular 
canons and laws that have to be respected. What is then called ‘the political’ in 
postdramatic theatre is hence reduced to eclecticism, to the one-sided interpretative 
‘perspective on life’, or to the relationship of opposites which relinquishes the tradition of 
dialectics. A view on the political in terms of eclecticism suggests the production of the 
abundance of empty and abstract concepts independent of the hegemonic social relations 
and conflicts that they imply.  
Lehmann’s exclusively autonomous, eclectic and affective approach to theatre 
suggests that the postdramatic politics of perception belongs to the politico-philosophical 
project of absolute democracy. This argues a horizontal politics and withdrawal from the 
state and representational norms that they have established. Reducing the understanding 
of the political as a battlefield, struggle and conflict, to transgression of all limits, we are 
inclined to conclude that Lehmann’s politics of perception are post-hegemonic politics, or, 
in his own terms, politics of states rather than actions.  It is precisely the exclusivity of 311
the affective, self-affirmative, post-representational and horizontal approach that renders 
tragedy an autonomous and one-sided object of art and postdramatic theatre post-
hegemonic. 
the return of drama:  
redrawing the limits between the audience and the performances 
As demonstrated, a postdramatic politics of perception argues that performance 
practice is political only when it relegates what we observed to be the core of the political: 
the dimension of conflict between differential positions that draws limits between ‘us’ and 
‘them’, between one entity and the other. But, once we have acknowledged that conflict is 
inherent in societies and that it is a prerequisite for the pluralism of positions and, 
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consequently, for the articulation of their conflicting relations into a concordia discors, we 
have to admit that the political and ‘revolutionary’ dimension of art, including performing 
arts, cannot mobilise social change by relinquishing the other, transcendenting all limits 
and withdrawing from the existing politics and representational norms. Therefore, we 
should envisage the strategies of engagement and co-constitution in performance theory.  
This task requires a redefinition of the meaning of post-Brechtian theatre as it is 
envisaged by Lehmann. Lehmann defined postdramatic theatre in relation to Brechtian 
theatre,  despite significant differences between these two traditions. As we have 312
observed above, postdramatic theatre conceives of performance in terms of eclecticism, in 
terms of the informal aggregation and adequation of unitary abstract concepts and canons 
beyond representation and beyond conflicts.  For its part, Brechtian theatre approaches 313
performances in terms of dialectics, in terms of the evaluation of the struggle between 
antagonistic and hegemonic relations through representation. Both views claim to 
designate the political dimension of theatre. With the distinction between eclecticism and 
dialectics on mind, that we observed a few moments before, I would like to suggest that, 
rather than the postdramatic eclecticism, the Brechtian materialist dialectic stands for the 
return of the political, precisely by putting a focus on antagonism and struggle against 
hegemonic politics.  
For instance, the fabel, a dramaturgical technique developed by Brecht, is derived 
precisely from the historical materialism and the dialectical method that it implies. 
Writing about fabel in A Short Organum for the Theatre (1948) Brecht noted: ‘[F]or it is 
what happened between people that provides them with all the material that they can 
discuss, criticize, alter.’  Fabel is then ‘the complete fitting together of all the gestic 314
incidents, embracing the communications and impulses’.  In fact, fabel analyses the 315
embodiment of the character’s attitude, of the gestus, with respect to the character’s praxis 
— struggle with social, political, economic, historical, semiotic and other factors, that 
underline the means of production in which the character is inscribed.  If we 316
acknowledge that the moment of inscription of the character within the web of different 
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to in German, see: Bertolt Brecht, “Kleines Organon fur das Theater,” in Brecht Versuche, ed. Elisabeth 
Hauptmann, 27/32, 12 (Berlin: Suhrkamp Verlag, 1958): 109-140. 
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factors is the moment of representation, then the political significance of Brechtian theatre 
lies in the aspiration to point at the struggle of different social associations with the given 
order and to challenge the means of production and norms of representation advocated by 
dominant politics. Thus, in contrast to postdramatic theatre which acknowledges 
transgression within the self as a phenomenon of a sphere where bodily awareness, 
sentiment, mental shock and thinking may articulate the sense of disruption, Brechtian 
theatre recognises conflict and struggle to be inherent to societies and aims at examining 
complex systems of antagonistic relations between different social associations 
dramatised by means of productions. What I want to stress is that in Brechtian theatre 
priority is not given to the consciousness of the subject, but to the other, or otherness, 
situated outside the subject. The accountability of otherness is a condition for the audience 
to put into question the concreteness of any representation. Such is the drama that 
Brechtian theatre evokes.  
Nevertheless, Lehmann transformed the dialectic of Brechtian theatre of 
representing into the eclecticism of post-Brechtian theatre of presenting. For the most 
part, Lehmann’s intention was to remove the dialectic from theatre on the grounds that 
dialectics ‘represent a certain complexation of the dramatic situation, the paradox of the 
plot, whose content ultimately appears in and through conceptual interpretation’.  317
According to Lehmann, the audience in dramatic theatre is an orderly arrangement of the 
onlookers that may simply identify with the characters on the stage and interpret 
performance. Then, in order to enable the participation of the audience in performance, he 
replaces representation as a dramatic-dialectical model of conflict with the sheer presence 
of the performers. The consequence of this tactic is the transformation of the relationship 
between the audience and the performers. The audience ceases to be mere onlookers and 
becomes participants in the performance, equally present as the performers or actors on 
the stage. Now, instead of simply seeing the characters on the stage, the audience 
affectively experiences the performers and, consequently, their own presence. This is how 
the sheer presence of the performers addressing the audience becomes a matter of 
transgression, by overstepping the boundary between the stage and the audience, and by 
provoking the overstepping of limits within the self. It is this what characterises tragedy 
and tragic experience.  Accordingly, tragedy is the affirmation of life in transgression, in 318
suffering, pain and loss. When tragic experience is envisaged in affective terms — 
Lehmann claims — then it stands for a disruptive force working within the self. This is 
where the political gesture in tragedy emerges. The post-Brechtian sensibility becomes 
tragic experience precisely in an attempt to present material — rather than to represent it 
   Lehmann, Tragedy, 50. 317
   Ibid., 43.318
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— by depriving praxis from the moment of struggle with the other.   319
Now, if presence acknowledges the theatre’s political gesture through tragedy 
which enables transgression and disruption, then the questions that arise are: what is the 
effect of the moment of disruption, and, how the affects provoked among the audience 
become sublimated and articulated into cultural values? I would like to suggest that in the 
hope to dissolve the dialectic, Lehmann produces the eclecticism that simplifies the 
relationship between the affects and the modes of their culturally acceptable values to a 
binary formulation of cause and effect, to — what a philosopher and cultural critic Walter 
Benjamin might call — a sterile dichotomy of form and content.  As I indicated before, 320
the causal type of relationships manifests in the production of the abundance of free-
floating concepts as facts and the reduction of the politics of perception to eclecticism, to 
the one-sided interpretative perspective on life. Lehmann’s theory entices us to conclude 
that the affective experience of the immediate access to the real, to the being of the object 
or subject, reduces the cognitive capacity of the audience to the possibility of rationalising 
and extrapolating performance practice to the level of aggregation of self-founded and 
self-enclosed concepts that are deduced from formal structures. The consequence of this 
approach is that theatre is perceived as an event of dramaturgy and dance as an event of 
choreography without questioning the natures of dramaturgy and choreography as the 
articulating social practices.   321
What the belief in the immediate access to the being of the object through 
presentness thus overlooks or obliterates is that every social configuration, including 
theatre and performance, is historically constructed through discourse, understood as a 
  Theatre scholar David Barnett observed Heiner Müller’s critique of Brecht’s meta-narrate of Marxism. He 319
asserts that Müller’s critical view on Brecht had for a goal to remove the ‘ideological gaze’ from dialectics as 
a ‘false gaze’. Barnett observes that Lehman’s theory further supports and develops this endeavour. 
Accordingly, he writes that ‘[t]he post-Brechtian sensibility thus touches that of the postdramatic in that 
material tends to be present rather than represented’. Barnett’s thought enables us to recognise that precisely 
at this point the dialectic stops and, instead, the eclecticism starts taking place. To escape eclecticism, we 
shall further suggest, it is necessary to rearticulate ideology rather than to remove it from dialectics. This is 
so, because ideology helps in organising people, in establishing an order. Ideology, as Gramsci pointed out, is 
historically necessary and has a psychological dimension. It is a material construction, not an abstraction. 
See: David Barnett, “Performing Dialectics in an Age of Uncertainty, or: Why Post-Brechtian ≠ 
Postdramatic,” in Postdramatic Theatre and the Political, eds. Karen Jürs-Munby, Jerome Carroll and Steve 
Gilles (London: Bloomsbury, 2013), 47-66; See also: Gramsci, Selections, 375- 399. 
 Benjamin wrote that the concept of technique that allows materialist analysis ‘represents the dialectical 320
starting-point from which the sterile dichotomy of form and content can be surmounted’. From the point of 
view of dialects, to overcome this sterile dichotomy means, we can suggest, to affirm content in terms of 
material forces that are inconceivable without ideologies or orderly constructions that stand for the ‘form’. 
Walter Benjamin, “The Author as Producer,” lecture at the Institute for the Study of Fascism (Paris, 27 April, 
1934), in Art and Theory 1900-2000: An Anthology of Changing Ideas, eds. Charles Harrison and Paul Wood 
(Wiley-Blackwell, 2002), 485. 
   On the difference between performances as events and performances as agonistic social practices see chapter 321
6. 
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system of linguistic and extralinguistic relations.  Discourse does not stand for the self-322
foundational conceptual practice of speech, writing and speaking, that is for the 
production of the abundance of abstract and autonomous concepts deduced from the 
presence of the elements of theatre and dance as aesthetic events. Drawing upon 
Wittgenstein’s writing on language discourse becomes the system of relations materialised 
through language games: through language and actions within which language is 
entwined, that is, representing the moments of theatre and dance in the presence of the 
other. This implies that representation does not relate a rational, self-foundational project 
of stasis, but a self-assertive political project of action which requires the other. It points 
that what we call objects of art are in fact discursive and political constructions, or 
representations, always already constituted in an encounter between different entities on a 
nominal level.  323
Now, the encounter between the audience and the performers in theatre points at 
the relational construction of performances. Every performance is created among the 
production team, realised in the presence of the audience, and always envisaged in 
relation to different social, political, economic and semiotic discourses that are shared 
among the audience members within a particular and delimited cultural and geopolitical 
context. The delimited construction of performance on any of its stages of evolvement 
indicates that each performative totality is a contingent creation, partially fixed in a 
particular network of relations by the principle of exclusion of other relational choices. As 
I emphasised above, the principle of exclusion entails the ever-present possibility of 
conflict between differential positions, between included and excluded. What I am 
suggesting is that in theatre conflict relates the encounter between the audience and the 
performances. This means that drama ceases to be a mere matter of the plot, of the closed 
system relating the conflict between the characters on the stage, and becomes a form of 
the relationship between the audience and the performers.  
If we agree with Butler that ‘actors are always already on the stage, within the 
terms of the performance’,  then we cannot fail to recognise that the experience of 324
performance is based on acts that are always already symbolically represented by the 
  Analysing ritual dance, a linguist and performance theorist Leda Martins pointed out that neither gesture nor 322
voice stand for the embodiment of sheer presence. According to Martins, voice is also always symbolically 
constructed. Her argument challenges Lehmann’s and Erika Fischer-Lichte’s performance theories. Leda 
Martins, “Rite, Performance and Knowledge: Memory Times”, lecture, the IFTR conference Sao Paulo (10 
July 2017). On Fischer-Lichte, see: Erika Fischer-Lichte, The Transformative Power of Performance 
(London and New York: Routledge, 2008).
  It was Hannah Arendt who wrote that ‘political thought is representation. I form an opinion by considering a 323
given issue from different viewpoints, by making present to my mind the standpoints of those who are 
absent; that is, I represent them.’ This is a question of ‘being and thinking in my own identity where actually 
I am not’. In: Hannah Arendt, Between Past and Future. Six Exercises in Political Thought  (London: 
Penguin Books, 2006), 542 -543.  
  Judith Butler, “Performative Acts and Gender Constitution: An Essay in Phenomenology and Feminist 324
Theory,” in Theatre Journal, Vol. 40, No. 4 (Dec., 1988), 526. 
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principle of exclusion. Thus envisaged, drama, or conflict of positions, or tension between 
different positions, enables the materialisation of different possibilities, such as the 
possibility of the audience to critically engage with performance and to evaluate and call 
into question the concreteness of performed representation. A dialectical view on 
performances implies that representation, which always fails to grasp and reproduce the 
exteriority in its full totality, allows critical moments of disruption and articulation to take 
place.  Accordingly, we could say that precisely the moment of representation mobilises 325
affects and passions among the audience and opens up possibility for ruptures to occur 
within existing representations. This approach does not call for the transgression of all 
limits between the audience and the performers, but rather for the continuous operation of 
redrawing the limits between them.  
A redrawing of the limits may be envisaged in many different ways, whenever the 
tension between the audience and the performers is exposed. For instance, when the 
movements of aggression function as a choreographing system, like in Arkadi Zaides’ 
performance Archive (2014), then the audience can react to the representation that is 
performed and envisage how can people co-move through the different choreographic 
scores of living.  Similarly, when Mette Edvardsen in her performance Black (2011) 326
uses language to call into the realm of representation the objects that are absent, she 
stresses the indispensable moment of exclusion in the construction of any objectivity and 
the indispensable moment of drawing the limits between representation and its 
exteriority.  Similarly, Marlene Monteiro Freitas’ Bacantes - Prelúdio Para Uma Purga / 327
Bacchantes – Prelude to a Purge (2017) points out that societies are constructed in an 
encounter  between the Dionysian and the Apollonian ideals, between the formless and the 
form-giving, the disorder and the order, or the individual principles and the collective 
demands.  These performances demonstrate the need for questioning the order of terms, 328
images, movements, gestures, and attitudes, mobilising the audience to constitute them in 
alternative ways. In the overtly different performances, such as the Cuban artist Tania 
Bruguera's Tatlin’s Whisper #5 (2008) — in which performers as policemen on horses 
move through the Tate Modern’s Turbine Hall Bridge in London and control the 
movement of the audience,  or the Brazilian artist Marcelo Evelin’s Batucada (2014) — 329
  Similarly, Peggy Phelan wrote that “because of representation’s supplemental excess and its failure to be 325
totalising, close readings of the logic of representation can produce psychic resistance and, possibly, political 
change.” Peggy Phelan, Unmarked. The Politics of Performance (London and New York: Routledge, 2006), 
2. 
 On Arkadi Zaides’ Archive, see chapter 1. 326
 On Mette Edvardsen’s Black, see chapter 2. 327
 On Marlene Monteiro Freitas’ Bacantes - Prelúdio Para Uma Purga, see chapter 3. 328
 On Tania Bruguera’s Tatlin’s Whisper #5, see, for instance: André Lepecki, “Choreopolice and 329
Choreopolitics: or, the Task of the Dancer,” in TDR: The Drama Review, Volume 57, Number 4, Winter 2013 
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in which nude and masked performers walk, run and play instruments in a staged 
celebration of human community and protest and hence enable the audience to decide how 
to move, either by following, joining, or leaving the site of the performance, the limits 
between the performers and the audience are redrawn in another ways.  330
What all these performances share — despite the form of participation of the 
audience, which is indirect in case of Zaides, Edvardsen and Freitas, and direct in case of 
Bruguera and Evelin — is the will to explore the ways people organise relations and the 
consequences of organising relations in certain ways. They also engage us to think how 
relations between the people might be reorganised in a way that is suitable to the plurality 
of positions that constitute the social realm; how to articulate the antagonistic relations 
constructed along the line that separates ‘us’ from ‘them’ as enemies, in an agonistic 
configuration of relations constituted along the lines that separate ‘us’ from ‘them’ as 
adversaries. In other words, these performances point at the struggle for the constitution of 
alternative, striated public spaces. This is how, I would suggest, the operation of 
redrawing the limits between the audience and the performers enables the unfolding of 
discursive rearticulations and the possibility of the articulation of one into another 
position, thus transforming the audience as onlookers into engaged citizens, or their 
affects into symbols, or presence into representation, antagonism into agonism, 
horizontality into verticality, or counter-hegemony into hegemony. In these processes, 
instead of immediately measuring behaviour modifications, we encounter, as Loren 
Krugger suggests, the complex creation of democratic actors.  Allowing the mutual 331
engagement of differential positions, the operation of representation provides the 
possibility for the ever-present dialectic to unfold.  332
With this in mind, it is important to emphasise that the dialectic may not be reduced 
to a dialectical negation of a linguistic by its extralinguistic. Equally, it cannot be reduced 
to a dialectical negation of an interiority by its constitutive exteriority, and vice versa. 
Mouffe makes an important remark for understanding dialectics. She writes that: 
[i]n order to be a true outside, the outside has to be incommensurable with 
the inside, and at the same time, the condition of emergence of the latter. 
This is only possible if what is “outside” is not simply the outside of a 
concrete content but something which puts into question “concreteness” as 
 On Marcelo Evelin’s Batucada, see, for instance: Chantal Mouffe, “Marcelo Evelin. Dance as an Agonistic 330
Encounter,” in Time We Share: Reflection on and through Performing Arts, eds by Daniel Blanga-Gubbay 
and Lars  Kwakkenbos, 246-254 (Brussels: Kunstenfestivaldesarts & Mercatorfonds, 2015).
  Loren Kruger, “Democratic Actors and Post-Apartheid Drama: Contesting Performance in Contemporary 331
South Africa”, in Contesting Performance. Global Sites of Research, eds. Jon Mckenzie, Heike Rooms & C. 
J. W.-L. Wee, (London, New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012), 239.
  At this point, we should be reminded that the sheer operation of presenting has for the aim to decrease the 332
understanding of art as discursive practice. 
!89
such.   333
Once this is acknowledged, struggles and polemics can not be any more reduced to the 
dialectical reversals. This means that the dialectical outside is not a constitutive opposite 
— as Lehmann writes — nor a constitutive contradiction — as David Barnett suggests — 
to the concreteness of any kind of closure.  The dialectical outside, that is the other, is a 334
symbol of impossibility of any construction. It points at the hegemonic, conflictual, 
struggling and polemical character of the relations between differential positions. The 
political dimension of post-Brechtian theatre should be defined precisely in accordance to 
the possibility of the audience to evaluate and put into question the concreteness of any 
representation.  
tragedy and drama   
When every social practice is envisaged with respect to the dialectic — as a 
relationship discursively formed at the point of intersection of paradoxically differential 
entities in struggle — then post-Brechtian may not be envisaged as postdramatic as 
Lehmann proposes, nor it should be thought as a variant of postdramatic as Shannon 
Jackson suggests.  Simply, the operation of transgression that postdramatic theatre 335
implies cannot be understood as the only experience of the political in theatre. For this 
reason, it is necessary to restructure the relationship between postdramatic and Brechtian 
and redefine the notion of the political.  
As we have seen, for postdramatic theatre the political gesture of tragedy is a 
matter of transgression in suffering which enables an immediate access to the being of the 
object through the desire of individuals for being-in-themselves. In this view, tragedy may 
articulate social and political change by exorcising hegemony, limits, conflicts and 
representations by reducing relations between differential position to eclecticism. For 
Brechtian theatre the political dimension is the consequence of conflict or drama between 
paradoxically differential positions that allow a mediate access to the being through the 
peoples’ desire for the lack-of-being. Once it is acknowledged that desire is constitutive to 
lack — thus pointing at the impossibility of achieving the absolute control over one’s 
existence, over being-in-itself — then it has to be recognised that the experience of the 
 Chantal Mouffe, The Democratic Paradox (London: Verso, [2000] 2009), 12. 333
 David Barnett, “Performing Dialectics”, 47-66.334
 Shannon Jackson, “Postdramatic Labour in the Builders Association's Allandeen,” in Postdramatic Theatre 335
and the Political, eds. Karen Jürs-Munby, Jerome Carroll and Steve Gilles (London: Bloomsbury, 2013), 
170. 
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being is attainable only through that which lacks, that is, in relation to the other.  Strictly 336
speaking, the experience of the being of the object, including art, is the result of an 
encounter that may be obtained only through discursive mediations.   337
Seeing that, I want to suggest the view on the political that differs from the 
affective, self-affirmative, post-representational, horizontal and one-sided approach 
embraced by postdramatic theatre. From the point of view that I advocate, theatre of 
drama grasps the dimension of the political by acknowledging the mutual engagement and 
co-constituency of differential positions.  In this encounter, the desire for the immediacy 338
of affects always articulate into discursive mediation. As Lacan emphasised, ‘[i]t is only 
once it is formulated, named in the presence of the other, that desire, whatever it is, is 
recognised in the full sense of the term.’  This means that the representational approach 339
to theatre triggers a dramatisation of tragic experience of the suffering self, by means of 
sublimation and articulation of the subject’s initial affective needs into praxis, into the 
network of social relations and concrete demands. By this mean, onlookers become active 
citizens.   
If the role of tragedy, as Lehmann argues, consists in ‘reaching and overstepping 
[...] the limits of a given cultural intelligibility’, then the political dimension of tragedy 
may be perceived only in relation to drama, as its constitutive and counterpart, putting 
into question the concreteness of representation through the strategies of engagement of 
the audience — through their reactions and actions. The co-constitutive character of tragic 
to dramatic should be seen as internal to theatre, because the dialectic never serves the 
idealisation of tragic nor the idealisation of dramatic, precisely because of the ontological 
status of lack. The mutual engagement and co-constitution of tragic and dramatic allows 
the operation of articulation to take place. What I am suggesting is to conceive the 
articulation of needs into demands, the real into representation, initial immediacy into 
discursive mediation, or individual affectivity into collective struggle, as performative 
practices that render the political dimension of theatre within the context of protest 
movements; as dramaturgy  and choreography of articulation that transform the initial 
horizontality of individual affectivity into the horizon of vertical representations of 
   On lack of being see chapter 2. 336
  On distinction between a desire for being-in-itself and a desire for the lack-of-being, see chapter 2. 337
 Performance scholar Adrian Heathfield asserts that dramaturgy is a discursive practice constructed through 338
the encounter of paradoxes; it is always occupied with language and communal meaning making, and intends 
to resolve paradoxes. However, Heathfield’s theoretical approach does not support paradox. Despite his 
claims, it suggests a possibility of a resolution of paradoxes in superabundance, in a plurality of 
representations co-existing in harmony. ‘Dramaturgy without a dramaturge’ should be understood in this 
framework. In: Adrian Heathfield, “Dramaturgy Without a Dramaturg,” in Rethinking Dramaturgy. Errancy 
and Transformation, eds. Manuel Bellisco and María José Cifuentes (Centro Párraga / CENDEAC, 2010). 
 Jacques-Alain Miller, ed. The Seminar of Jacques Lacan. Book I: Freud's Papers on Technique 1953–1954, 339
trans. John Forrester (New York and London: W.W. Norton and Company, 1991), 183. 
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collective struggles against dominant hegemony. The politics of perception should be 
envisaged precisely in terms of counter-hegemony: as a struggle between the vertical 
nature of representation and the horizontal axis of its contiguity that may articulate 
alternative politics.  
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5 
Performing Alternative Collectives   340
The post-democratic condition, which silences various people’s voices, and the 
growth of the right-wing populism, which stigmatises people on the level of race, gender, 
or colour, prompted some thinkers to envisage innovative projects of democracy that 
would give rise to alternative views on subjectivities and collectives. Post-operaists focus 
on the post-fordist techniques of production and the workers’ resistance to the capitalist 
quest for the acceleration of modes of production. On these grounds, performance scholar 
and philosopher Bojana Kunst advocates strategies of avoidance of existing politics and 
representational forms. In her theory, alternative subjectivities and communities evolve 
from the temporal dimension of duration — waiting and less work. Nevertheless, the 
studies of the political scientists, Robert O’Brien, Anne Marie Goetz, Jan Aart Scholte and 
Marc Williams stress the significance of the post-fordist techniques of domination in 
constructing societies, by observing the engagement of social movements with the 
multilateral economic institutions. The accountability of both post-fordist coercive 
techniques, those of production and those of domination, allowed me to widen Kunst’s 
demand for a workers’ resistance to capitalism through the strategies of avoidance, with a 
struggle of different collectives against capitalism by means of engagement. I will claim 
that the strategies of engagement permit a shift from the pre-established perspective on 
subjectivities in terms of class -, gender -, or race - based identities, towards the relational 
forms of identifications. Drawing upon political philosophers Ernesto Laclau and Chantal 
Mouffe, I will demonstrate that the relational forms of identification enable performances 
to construct subjectivities, communities and politics, in alternative, co-constitutive terms 
that are much more relevant for the idea of a plural society. This view does not privilege a 
temporal dimension, but takes into account both temporality and spatiality. As we will see, 
Rimini Protokoll’s performance 100% (Brussels) gives rise to this argument and allows a 
reflection on this idea.  
Bojana Kunst:  
performing resistance to the capitalist techniques of production   
In her book, Artist at Work, Kunst’s critique of representation in art springs from 
  Changed, this chapter will be published as: Goran Petrović Lotina, “Performing Alternative Collectives,” in 340
Performing Ethos: International Journal of Ethics in Theatre & Performance (Bristol: Intellect, 2017). 
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philosopher Maurizio Lazzarato’s thesis that the production of subjectivity is at the core of 
the capitalist work processes. Kunst writes that ‘art and capitalism have especially in 
common [...] the dangerous and seductive closeness of the appropriation of life’.  By 341
appropriating life art, like capitalism, contributes to the experimentation with subjectivity 
and to the production of subjectivity, through the processes of standardisation of human 
social, affective, cognitive and other life forms common to mankind.  This also means 342
that movement in dance and performance, collaborative relations between the performers 
and the audience, as well as the visibility of art and artists, are also centred around the 
techniques of production of subjectivity, by means of standardisation. Drawing upon 
philosopher Paolo Virno, Kunst observed the processes of standardisation in art along the 
transformation of the organisation of production processes from the industrial phase of 
capitalism, or fordism, to the post-industrial phase of capitalism, or post-fordism. In A 
Grammar of the Multitude, Virno envisaged the transition from fordism to postfordism as 
a consequence of changing the organisation of production processes and the role of work. 
Within this change, the means of production ceased to be reduced to machines and started 
to consist of linguistic-cognitive competencies inseparable from living labor.  343
Accordingly, Kunst writes that the essence of contemporary production moved the focus 
from the synchronisation of the body with the machine, onto the exploitation of constant 
movement and creative potentials of individuals to produce capital.  Kunst’s assertion 344
implies that by means of exploitation of human potentials to think, imagine, communicate 
and collaborate through movement, performances contribute to the ways of adding 
economic value to the physical and linguistic-cognitive abilities of the humans and hence 
to the homogenisation of society. When movement — including everyday spontaneous 
and flexible movements — is put at the core of the production of subjectivity and, 
consequently, capital, then dance becomes politically powerless. Therefore, in order to 
regain its emancipatory potential, Kunst suggests that dance, and art more generally, have 
to rethink the modes of work and subjectivity through spontaneous and flexible 
movement, and to preserve the potentiality of profanation that can return everyday 
movement to ‘common use’. For this to happen, art has to avoid and resists obstacles,  345
such as capital, and hence artist ‘needs to slow down and wait’.  At this point Kunst 346
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introduced a temporal dimension of duration as a moment subversive to capital.  347
Kunst’s theory suggests that duration has a subversive potential upon production 
processes that enable actualisation and finalisation by means of projective temporality. 
She suggests that the era of fordism recognised the distinction between the work time and 
leisure time, while in post-fordism that dividing line between work and non-work became 
erased. This is how the post-fordist processes of production brought the acceleration and 
homogenisation of time, adding economic value to temporality. Nevertheless, the entering 
of duration in performance revealed that our perception of time is socially constructed and 
economically conditioned. In contrast to projective temporality which fosters 
actualisation, duration ‘places us into a state of pure potentiality, into what is still 
supposed to come’.  Drawing upon a philosopher Giorgio Agamben, Kunst emphasises 348
that one becomes aware of one’s own potential when potentiality is not actualised. 
Duration, thus, allows us to understand that ‘being is potentially possible without self-
actualisation’.  For that matter, duration enables another way of understanding 349
temporality and, consequently, the notion of community and relations between the humans 
within it.  
Kunst’s reformulation of the notion of community springs from philosopher Jean-
Luc Nancy’s redefinition of the notion of common and Agamben’s understanding of 
profanation. Nancy wrote that ‘the community that becomes a single thing (body, mind, 
fatherland, Leader...) necessarily loses the in of being-in-common. Or, it loses the with or 
the together that defines it. It yields its being-together to a being of togetherness’.  350
Accordingly, common is not dominated by finality nor active transformation; it does not 
stand for any kind of totality in the harmonious space and time, wherein the distinction 
between work and leisure is erased and a future common goal determined in advance; nor, 
it stands for the representation of the order of community having something in common. 
Common, Kunst proposes, ‘is merely the ordinary state of being together, deprived of all 
historical tasks’.  When common is understood in these terms, then community enables 351
a constant dispossession of collaboration and a possibility for the subject to establish an 
attitude. In such a community there is no exchange, no identity, no economy, no 
universality, no otherness or anything else to be shared; in fact, in such a community, 
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Kunst proposes, ‘there is no common being’.  There is only “I”, or as Nancy suggests, a 352
‘strange being-the-one-with-the-other to which we are exposed’.  When community is 353
envisaged in these terms, it discloses collaboration which exploits human potentialities to 
be part of immaterial work. Drawing upon Agamben’s notion of profanation, Kunst 
asserts that this acknowledgment reverses procedure, allowing a profanation of 
collaboration, and hence returns the human potentiality to collaborate to ‘common use’. It 
is this that Agamben probably had in mind when he wrote that profanation occurs through 
contact, ‘a touch that disenchant[s] and returns to use what the secret separated and 
petrified’.  As he explains, through contact profanation ‘returns to common use the 354
spaces that power sized’.  The theory behind such view is that community is not united 355
by representation, but by the temporal dimension of, what Kunst calls, meeting.  356
Meeting stands for a durational procedure capable of addressing a specific relationship 
with movement. Thus, it allows a profanation and/or dispossession of collaboration to 
emerge. In fact, as a post-representational and durational category, meeting opens up the 
space for understanding community in terms of potentiality of closeness which designates 
that which is yet to come. This, finally, ‘means to belong to another temporal concept — 
potentiality’.   357
The temporal concept of potentiality implies that the role of art, including dance, 
should be to interfere the ways of being under the modes of work that places movement, 
as one of life forces, at the centre of production. If, today, subjectivity is organised as a 
unity of everyday movements through the intensification of collaboration, then art, and 
dance consequently, have to emphasise the potentiality of profanation that can return 
collaboration to ‘common use’. In other words, if contemporary techniques of production 
stand for the return to the field of secret by radically proliferating opportunities and 
identities in a homogenised time and space by means of exploitation of collaboration, art 
then should seek the return to the field of common by recovering opportunities and 
identities in the time of potentiality through the means of profanation of collaboration.  
This approach conceives of art works in terms of intermediation, that is in-
betweenness, which Kunst calls the ‘third condition’.  The third condition arranges art 358
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between the audience and the artists. And, by this division, art returns the relationship 
between the audience and the artists to common. This move does not only bring back the 
symbolic role of art that enables it to point at the hierarchical organisation of society and 
that ‘any kind of work ... is part of the constellations of power’;  it also permits the shift 359
from the exclusivity of present time and the obsession with the future time to ‘the time yet 
to come’. This means that in intermediation there is no projective temporality which sets 
in advance otherness, identity, opportunities, or the lack, that produce economic value 
through collaboration. Kunst reminds us that ‘the future is not related to actuality as a 
realisation of its “becoming”’ through collaboration.  This is why ‘we need to think 360
about the future of collaboration in the rupture between an impossible refusal of the 
collaborative process in which we are already implemented, and the possibility of genuine 
exchange, which has yet to happen.’   361
Following the logic of intermediation, performance may also subvert the 
institutional mechanisms that exteriorise movement. Kunst writes that ‘the ability to move 
may resist the economic and social organisation of the relational aspect of movement and 
open up other embodied ways of moving together that continuously create flows of 
disturbances and affective persistence’.  She adds: ‘with its various rhythms, movement 362
can create tensions and put pressure on the seemingly smooth protocols of the 
contemporary capitalist world’.  What is accordingly necessary, is to envisage 363
performances in the process of continuous avoidance of obstacles through duration. To 
justify the subversive potential of duration in performance, Kunst takes the Occupy 
movement as the examples of the ability of everyday movement to induce change. She 
writes that the protestors associated with the Occupy ‘switched from disembodied 
networks and global movements to localised but connected forms of temporal persistence 
and endurance in certain places — to a durational search for new political 
embodiments’.  In that sense, the Occupy movement shows that the relationship 364
between duration and movement enables waiting and looking at what is yet to come. 
Accordingly, Kunst writes: ‘[w]hile lasting, we wait for time to run out'.   365
To further justify the subversive potential of duration in performance, Kunst looks 
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into Igor Štromajer’s and Brane Zorman’s performance Statika (2007), a part of their 
project Ballettikka Internettikka (2001-1011), broadcasted from Lippo Centre in Hong 
Kong onto a big screen installed in the Hellerau Festival House in Dresden. Over thirty-
five minutes the audience — or what remained of it, as, we are told, many left frustrated 
— witnessed a static robot (though in a position as if stepping forward) in front of the 
flickering city lights. The result of this performance is that the audience felt disposed and 
hence that it needs to slow down and wait.  Within this framework, according to Kunst, 366
waiting becomes a pleasure that can create a radical political and antagonistic disruption 
and discloses ‘the plurality of the ways in which life comes to being’.  New ways of 367
solidarity come from laziness, which is associated with the durational processes, such as 
sleep and inactivity.   368
struggle against the capitalist techniques of domination  
We can agree with Kunst that the capitalist process of production plays an important 
role in the transition from fordism to post-fordism. We can also agree with Kunst that art 
may help us to envisage such a process of transition, including a transition from the 
neoliberal order of politics to the much more democratic order of politics that would 
imply different types of subjectivities and communities. Nevertheless, we have to 
acknowledge that the capitalist process of production does not consist only of the 
techniques of production which extract labour-power from people; it also consists of the 
techniques of domination imposing control over people and their practices.  It is by 369
means of the techniques of domination that capital controls every aspect of life, human 
and non-human. I will demonstrate that the accountability of the techniques of domination 
triggers an alternative view on the transition from fordism to post-fordism, the 
construction of subjectivities and communities, and the role of art. Besides, it suggests 
that the strategies of engagement, rather than the strategies of avoidance and waiting, may 
transform the post-fordist politics and invigorate democracy.  
In order to develop this thesis, I will turn to political scientists Robert O’Brien, Anne 
Marie Goetz, Jan Aart Scholte and Marc Williams. Their study, consolidated into the book 
Contesting Global Governance (2000), examines the relationship between the neoliberal 
multilateral institutions, such as The World Bank (WB), The World Trade Organisation 
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(WTO), and The International Monetary Fund (IMF), and the political forms of 
organisation of resistance, such as the women’s movements, labour movements, and 
environmental social movements. The insight into their study brings forth the importance 
of the capitalist techniques of domination for understanding the political processes and 
conceiving alternative ways of living together. For the purpose of our query, I have 
particularly focused on the relationship between the World Bank and the women’s 
movements.  In return, this example will allow me to envisage a possible way of 370
transforming post-fordism, by suggesting alternative answers to some of the central 
questions of democratic politics, such as: how to organise across differences and how to 
articulate a struggle for the recognition of diversity of political interests and ethical 
concerns? What kind of subjectivities are to be constructed for the democratic societies? 
How are citizens to exercise their democratic rights? And, how may performance 
contribute to the construction of new collectives?   371
To begin with, it is important to say something about multilateral economic 
institutions. In the post-war period the states were becoming increasingly influenced by 
international institutions and multinational corporations. The multilateral economic 
institutions that were established after 1944, such as the WTO, WB and IMF, have been 
gradually transforming the nature of governments, moving the concentration of power 
away from the nation states to the global economic institutions. The World Bank — ‘the 
Bank’ further in the text — is a useful case-study for  understanding  this process. This 
multilateral economic institution was established in 1944, as the biggest reconstruction 
and development bank. The decision making of the Bank is in the hands of the Board of 
executive directors appointed by twenty-five member states, with the US having a 
disproportionally strong influence on its work.  The main task of the Bank is to provide 372
policy-based loans, predominantly in developing countries.  Thereby, with the neoliberal 373
economic orthodoxy prescribing state withdrawal from the markets, the Bank has been 
gradually increasing loans to private sector, particularly from the early 1980s onwards.  374
As O’Brien, Goetz, Scholte and Williams’ study shows, the private sector, least controlled 
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by the Bank, registered great impact on labour, environmental, and gender standards.  375
In order to limit the power of the private sector and to promote “good governance”, 
from 1990s onwards the Bank started to ‘encourage greater participation in national 
institutions of governance’ stimulating global social movements ‘to make the Bank’s work 
more transparent and accessible to those most affected by it’.  That these intentions of 376
the Bank did not stay only on the surface, testifies the direct implementation of the Bank’s 
rhetoric at the World Conference on Women, held in Beijing, in 1995.  At this 377
conference — composed of official delegates representing United Nations member states 
— a range of women’s issues had been discussed, such as health care, education, 
employment and poverty. Besides, the conference launched ‘The Women’s Eye on the 
Bank’ campaign which featured the Platform for Action putting forth demands for the 
increased participation of grassroots women in the Bank’s economic policy making, such 
as the Bank’s greater investment in women’s education and health and the 
institutionalisation of a gender perspective in the Bank’s policies and legal and human 
rights, among others.  The Bank’s president at the time, James Wolfensohn, visited the 378
conference, met women’s civil society groups, and accepted ‘The Women’s Eye on the 
Bank' petition that called on the Bank to fully implement the Platform’s demands and 
increase women’s civil society involvement in the Bank’s activities. As a consequence, the 
same year Wolfensohn set up the External Gender Consultative Group (EGCG) consisting 
of fourteen women that belonged to different women’s movements worldwide to be 
consulted by the Bank on issues such as applying gender equity to work in private sector, 
or gender equity in the institutional change processes.  The next step the Bank took was 379
the establishment of a Gender Sector Board (GSB) in 1997, concerned with family and 
poverty issues on global and national levels.  Under these circumstances, the Bank was 380
seen not only to foster economic development, but also to encourage the development of 
social justice. At the same time, the global women’s movements were seen as being able 
to challenge the Bank’s economic policies by getting into a dialogue with local 
governments and by enabling the NGOs to have access to the Bank.   
Nevertheless, these initiatives, the EGCG and the GSB, have been widely criticised 
by women’s grassroots on the grounds that the selection of representatives is not 
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transparent, that selected women do not represent a variety of women’s movements, that 
women’s demands for change are not put into action, or that both EGCG and GSB do not 
have real influence on social justice, assigning value to women’s work, or improving 
women’s rights to the ownership, or access to education.  The incapacity of the Bank to 381
institutionalise various gender demands O’Brien, Goetz, Scholte and Williams explain 
with the difference in policy discourses between the Bank’s demands and women’s 
demands. They have showed that while the Bank’s neoliberal economic discourse departs 
from the level of macroeconomy, the feminist discourse begins at the level of 
microeconomics and a politics of decision making between women and men.  382
Furthermore, in contrast to the macroeconomic discourse which aims to improve market 
efficiency, the feminist discourse aims to improve gender or social justice.  In the 383
neoliberal economic environment this means to stress the economic case for gender 
equity, rather than the ethico-political or feminist case for gender equity.  
Further on, these authors wrote, that ‘[i]n interactions between gender equity 
advocates and the Bank, the terms of discourse are set by the Bank, as the more powerful 
interlocutor, obliging feminist critics to work within the framework of the neoliberal 
concern with efficiency.’  This assertion is very important for our study. It stresses the 384
fact that the Bank’s organisation of the process of production implies not only the 
techniques of production which are put in motion by means of flexibility, efficiency, 
capital accumulation and competition — as Lazzarato, Virno, Agamben and Kunst 
observed; it also implies the techniques of domination which are propelled by the 
hegemony of the neoliberal discourse by means of obligations, bureaucracy, date 
collection and surveillance, thus putting control over the women’s ethico-political 
demands for social justice. Once the distinction between the capitalist techniques of 
production and the capitalist techniques of domination is acknowledged, we have to 
recognise that the capitalist process of production necessarily implies a struggle of women 
(women in particular, and people in general) against the capital’s exercise of domination 
and sedimented neoliberal discourses. 
Accordingly, we are able to conclude that both the Bank’s aspirations to dominate 
and the women’s struggle against the techniques of domination influence the ways the 
process of production is organised. This conclusion is supported by O’Brien, Goetz, 
Scholte and Williams’ analysis which shows how gender equity concerns for girls’ 
education and women’s health influenced the Bank’s investment in these spheres, thus 
affecting the organisation and expansion of productive forces on both sides. Similarly, the 
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gender equity’s concerns with poverty by gender had been addressed through the 
Consultative Group to Assist the Poorest (C-GAP), by offering micro-credit to the very 
poor whose borrowers were mainly women.  On the one hand, these examples show that 385
the EGCG and C-GAP programmes are affected both by the neoliberal logic of capital and 
by the logic of women’s ethico-political demands. On the other hand, they testify that 
capital is capable of appropriating women’s discourses on equality, anti-hierarchy, 
decentralisation and autonomy, in order to secure mode of regulation of capital 
production. By means of appropriation of discourses on different women’s demands, 
capital is putting control over the process of production in a variety of fields — economic, 
social, cultural, and political — thus strengthening its hegemonic position through 
network economy. This observation shows that capital is not only reactive; rather, both 
capital and social movements play a pro-active role in the process of transformation of 
productive forces, thus enabling the transition from fordism to post-fordism. 
Taking into consideration that the Bank, within the framework of neoliberal 
hegemony, has power over discourses in a variety of sites, and that both capital and 
various social groups in struggle play a pro-active role in the transformation of one into 
another capitalist order, it is important to recognise that the contestation of the Bank’s 
hegemonic neoliberal discourse requires an action of women’s movements on many 
levels, wherever the relations of power between the Bank and women are articulated and 
wherever women are subordinated to capital. This requires a gradual sublimation of the 
multitudinous of women’s ethico-political demands into a hegemony, and thus, as Mouffe 
suggests, ‘launching a counter-hegemonic offensive in a variety of fields where the nodal 
points securing the new post-fordist mode of regulation of capitalism have been 
established’.  Similarly, O’Brien, Goetz, Scholte and Williams argue that in order to 386
influence dominant politics the women’s movements ‘must seek constructive engagement 
and “entry” into institutional processes and cognitive frameworks’.  It goes without 387
saying that this tactic calls upon a mobilisation of many women sectors in a unity 
constructed around a collective decision. On the one hand, the collective decision making 
process exceeds women’s NGOs and includes trade unions, grassroots, and other kinds of 
social sectors in which women take part, such as those of the people of colour, LGBTQIA, 
indigenous, environmentalists, human rights advocates, rural groups, and many others. On 
the other hand, it implies the engagement of these sectors with the variety of social 
practices, movements, institutions and cognitive frameworks, respectively nationally and 
internationally, locally and globally, or unilaterally and multilaterally, that is, wherever the 
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demands of women, and people more generally, are subordinated to capital.  388
Consequently, such a unity ceases to be symbolically defined by gender, and becomes 
symbolically defined by — what Gramsci calls — collective wills.   
This view on unity suggests that the strategy of engagement of many women’s 
movements in a struggle against the hegemony of capital may induce a transformation of 
the Bank’s cognitive framework from ‘the economic case for gender equity’, which 
contributes to the instrumentalisation of women under the neoliberal discourse, to ‘the 
ethico-political case for gender equity’, which empowers women in decision making 
processes, improves women equality and, finally, replaces neoliberal gender discourse. 
The goal is to establish an order in which gender-based demands would not be any more 
perceived in terms of problems to be addressed through particular interventions and 
solutions offered by macroeconomic strategies. In fact, gender would be recognised in 
terms of relations present in all social levels, thus rendering gender differences in the 
domain of politics irrelevant. The closing of the moment of a pre-established harmonious 
unity in which essence — such as, gender, class, race and other markers of identity — 
underlines common, opens up a possibility for contest, struggle, anti-essentialism, 
heterogeneity and articulation.  
 The complexity of this strategy implies that the unity of many movements around a 
common cause — not a ‘common good’ — should not be sought in any privileged subject 
position.  Once we  have acknowledged that the worker’s identity is a symbolic unity 389
discursively constructed on the basis of economic interests which are inserted in the 
relations of production, and that the women’s identity is discursively constructed due to 
the division between the private and the public wherein economic interests play an 
important part, we are able to propose that the struggle against capitalism requires another 
form of a unity — the unity constituted out of the ensemble of social relations in which 
those of production and womanhood are only a few among many. Therefore, the worker’s 
and women’s unities should not be perceived as being rational, but rather as being 
relational. In fact, they should be conceived as the consequence of construction through 
identification of different subject positions with the set of ethico-political values that, 
consequently, unite them in the struggle against post-fordist forms of domination over 
‘workers’ and ‘women’. This explains, as Mouffe indicated, that ‘as the result of the 
construction of nodal points, partial fixations can take place and precarious forms of 
identification can be established around the category “women” which provide the basis 
for a feminist identity and a feminist struggle’.  We can envisage in a similar way the 390
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category of “workers”, which embraces the workers’ identity and the workers’ struggle. It 
is the feminist identity and a feminist struggle that play a foundational role in the 
transformation of the politics when they act collectively, together with the workers and 
other human associations, to establish the power of the people over the subjugating 
politics.  This view on subjectivities in relational and collective terms, enables us to 391
envisage alternative ways of living together.  
from rational identities towards relational collectives  
The insight into O’Brien, Goetz, Scholte and Williams’ study draws our attention to 
the pro-active role that both capital and social movements play in transforming the 
process of production. Their study points out that the process of production in post-
fordism, including the production of subjectivities, is dominated by the hegemony of the 
neoliberal discourse over social movements. Then, the insight into Mouffe’s study of 
citizenship stresses the importance of the struggle of social movements against the 
hegemony of the neoliberal discourse. What the insights into these studies show is that 
social movements, just like other social practices, should not be occupied exclusively with 
resisting the capitalist institutions through the strategies of withdrawal, avoidance, or 
refusal. On the contrary, they suggest that various social practices should engage in a 
struggle against the capitalist institutions, in order to transform the domination of the 
market mode of capital and the (re)production of consumer identity, secured by the 
hegemony of the neoliberal discourse. The strategies of engagement bring an alternative 
perspective on the concepts of common and community, and the ways art, including 
performance, contributes to the construction of alternative ways of living together. The 
view that I will accordingly unfold differs from the one proposed by the thinkers of 
immanence, post-operaists and their followers, including Kunst.  
As we have observed, Kunst suggests that the strategies of avoidance may disturb 
and transgress neoliberalism and, hence, offer alternative answers to the central questions 
of democratic politics, such as: how to organise across differences? How are citizens to 
exercise their democratic rights? What kind of subjectivities are there to be constructed? 
How can performance practice contribute to these processes? In order to answer these 
questions, Kunst developed the thesis asserting that the post-fordist demands for the 
acceleration of consumption put every aspect of movement — including the relations 
among people that everyday movements imply — at the core of the capitalist process of 
production. This proposition led her to the conclusion that in post-fordism both the artists 
and the audience are always at work. Then, in order to secure the moment of disruption of 
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the post-fordist condition, Kunst introduced a post-representational and temporal 
dimension of duration, capable of providing the workers with the potential to avoid the 
movement accelerated by capital. Accordingly, the strategy of avoidance can enable a 
disruption of the temporal dimension of acceleration by waiting, that is, by working less 
and being lazy. The community that is called into existence by this strategy is the 
community without identities, consisting out of the plurality and parallelism of positions 
of “I”. 
Nevertheless, despite an attempt to erase any form of identity by means of duration, 
Kunst’s view remains trapped in the very problematic that she wants to challenge. By 
ascribing the political value to duration, Kunst pre-established identity on the level of a 
temporal dimension, now manifested by less work, laziness and waiting. The consequence 
of this strategy, which opposes the workers’ identity associated with acceleration with the 
one associated with duration, is a creation of an essentialist identity. Once we 
acknowledge that the logic of opposition always brings the same, we have to recognise 
that it simply reconfirms the workers’ identity that — in reversal — works slow and lazy. 
Consequently, the unity of people becomes designated by class identity that should be 
capable of disrupting the post-fordist process of production. Within this view, the 
citizenship becomes a class-differentiated model of democracy.  
Kunst’s thesis, which puts focus on the workers’ resistance to the capitalist process 
of production, is to the large extent reminiscent of Marxism endorsing Marx’s concept of 
‘labour-power as commodity’.  The concept of ‘labour-power as commodity’ designates 392
the power of the people exclusively in terms of commodity whose use-value is labor. 
Accordingly, the power of the people is designated by class. And, when the relations of 
production are conceived entirely in terms of classes, then the unity in the workers’ 
identity has to be understood as the unity constituted around economic interests. Within 
this view, workers’ interests are considered to be objective because they are determined — 
as in Louis Althusser — in the last instance by economy. For that matter, all workers’ 
demands, such as those for the higher wages, better working conditions, lower working 
hours, better health insurance, right on vacation, or less work, or slow work, are 
objectively justified. At stake here is what a cultural theorist Stuart Hall in his reading of 
philosopher Antonio Gramsci’s critic of economism suggested: that ‘immediate class 
interests’ are challenged by a more structured analysis of ‘economic class formations’, 
that in fact simplifies social relations to a structurally transparent ‘expressive totality’.  393
Expressive totality is objectivity ‘in which every level of articulation corresponds to every 
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other, and which is from end to end, structurally transparent’.  In fact, it reduces the 394
complexity of social articulations, both vertical and horizontal, to a single line of 
determination.  
Within this context, it becomes apparent that the imagined authority of the working 
class united around economic interests is incapable of representing the variety of other 
political demands, such as those of the women, immigrants, refugees, poor, people of 
colour, environmentalists, LGBT, anti-bio and anti-nuclear weapon activists, including 
demands that vary between the workers in the same or different company, country, or 
continent. In fact, the unity in the workers’ identity overlooks that the process of 
production may not be determined exclusively by economics; the process of production is 
also the consequence of the various social practices. What the concept ‘labour-power as 
commodity’ thus omits is an important distinction between ‘the productive inputs 
embodied in people capable of social practices and all those remaining inputs for whom 
ownership by capital is sufficient to secure the “consumption” of their productive 
services’.  This distinction entails that the process of production is the result of different 395
inputs mobilised by distinct forces and, hence, that both social practices and capital play a 
pro-active role in the transformation of the process of production. At this point, we can 
distinguish the logic of determination governed by capitalist forces from the logic of 
political formation governed by that which Gramsci calls social forces.  396
Once we have recognised that both capitalist forces and social forces play a pro-
active role in the transformation of the process of production, the capitalist forces have to 
be redefined in terms that are accountable of social practices capable of confronting them. 
For that matter, the capitalist forces are not to be perceived only in terms of economic 
inputs that are manifested through the post-fordist techniques of production, such as the 
acceleration of production and time, the accumulation of capital, or the exercise of 
efficiency and flexibility. More importantly, the capitalist forces are also to be perceived 
in terms of the post-fordist techniques of domination over peoples’ own social practices. 
The post-fordist techniques of domination are discursively set in motion by the various 
systems of control, such as mass media, education, religion, obligations, bureaucracy, 
surveillance, and so on. They relay on semiotics that, as Mouffe pointed out, govern 
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affects and passions towards the creation of subjectivities capable of reproducing 
capital.   397
Leading us towards the importance of the distinction between the techniques of 
production and the techniques of domination for the capitalist process of production, 
Laclau and Mouffe emphasised that ‘labour process cannot exist without a series of 
relations of domination’.  Their assertion implies that the power of people cannot be 398
fictionalised in terms of commodity whose use-value is labor. As demonstrated above, 
such a view produces the acceleration/duration dualism. On the contrary, the power of the 
people has to be envisaged in terms of social forces in a struggle against the domination of 
capital whose goal is to extract maximum labour from people by putting in motion 
discursive means of control over their social practices. The struggle of different 
subordinate groups against the hegemony of the neoliberal discourse advocates counter-
hegemony that encompasses different economic and political unity than the one advocated 
by capital.   399
common-cause of unity 
When the process of production is understood as the consequence of the struggle of 
the people against the hegemony of the post-fordist techniques of domination over their 
practices — and not only as the result of the post-fordist techniques of production 
concerned with the competition and accumulation of capital, as Kunst’s thesis suggests — 
then subjectivities can be envisaged in alternative ways. They can be envisaged beyond 
reductionism to any pre-established identity that has an ultimate ontological foundation, 
such as workers’ identity, women’s identity, or any other essentialist construction of 
identity. When subjectivities are understood exclusively in terms of either class, gender or 
race identities, then in turn, as I showed above, they preclude the possibility of 
constructing a unity that welds together various people’s demands, or — to use Gramsci’s 
terminology — various people’s wills in a collective decision.  Drawing upon Gramsci, 400
we can suggest that only when the unity is organised around a collective decision, the 
quantity of various wills becomes the quality of collective will, which is then capable of 
challenging the power of capital on every level it dominates people. Finally, this means, 
that political identities are the consequence of collective identifications; identifications 
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that stand for the articulating principle of popular wills in a collective decision. That being 
said, the operation of identification does not relate to the process of identifying with the 
economic interests, but, as Mouffe’s theory suggests, with the set of ethical and political 
values that are shared among the people.  When subjectivities are approached in 401
collective, relational and ethico-political terms, constructions such as women and workers 
do not in fact disappear. They stand for the feminist and labour struggles for the equality 
of women and workers on every level on which these identities are subordinated to the 
capitalist forces of domination — locally and globally, nationally and internationally, 
inside institutions and outside institutions. 
Once subjectivities are understood in relational terms, we have to acknowledge that 
community can not stand for an exposure of the ordinary state of being underlying the 
essence. If that is the case, then community would be given by the biological nature of 
subjects. Neither community may stand for a meeting of concrete workers that are united 
by a temporal dimension of duration, seen as a form of resistance to the capitalist process 
of production. This view suggest that community is defined exclusively by the capitalist 
techniques of production, wherein economy and capitalist demands for efficiency and 
flexibility determine all social relations, including everyday movements and collaborative 
relations that they imply.  In contrast to these views, I am proposing a perspective on 402
community in different terms: as a system of social relations symbolically articulated in a 
collective which is at the same time a locus of struggle of that collective against various 
techniques of domination. In such a community, people do not avoid existing identities, 
economies, universalities, otherness, collaborations and everything else that can be 
shared, as a post-operaists’ approach to community proposes. On the contrary, in the 
community united around a collective decision people engage with all the existing 
categories that are dominated by capital, in order to transform the established order and to 
rearticulate it in another way.  
This approach, does not intend to reduce community to the equivalence and 
parallelism of many dissimilar subjects deprived of relations and collaborations, or — as 
Kunst put it, drawing upon Nancy — to the ‘strange being-the-one-with-the-other’ in 
which there is only “I”. On the contrary, this approach supports the idea of a community 
that presupposes that “I” is part of “we”. It therefore indicates that “I” is constituted at the 
point of intersection of an ensemble of social relations and that “I” as such has a social 
function in which historical processes present themselves; evidently, “I” is relationally and 
   Mouffe, The Return, 84. 401
  From the point of view of postcolonial studies, it becomes clear how the privilege of duration produces what 402
historian Dipesh Chakrabarty calls ‘the period of waiting that the third world has to go through for capital’s 
logic to be fulfilled’. In fact, duration becomes empty, homogeneous and underdeveloped time. See: Dipesh 
Chakrabartry, Provincializing Europe. Postcolonial Thought and Historical Difference (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 2000), 49.
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historically constructed.  Then, drawing upon Gramsci’s thoughts on human nature, we 403
can understand social relations to be expressed by diverse associations of people that 
presuppose one another and whose unity is dialectical,  not formal.  They stand for the 404 405
‘“equalities” that are felt as such among the members of an association and “inequalities” 
that are felt between associations’.  Accordingly, community is a collective historically 406
constructed of conflicting encounters between different associations which anticipate “I” 
in terms of “we” and “they”. When community is envisaged in such a way, then it points 
at becoming in what Gramsci calls ‘“concordia discors” that does not have unity for its 
point of departure but contains in itself the reason for a possible unity’.   407
 Once we have recognised that the reason for a possible unity are capitalist 
techniques of domination, than we need to redefine the notion of the common too. Kunst’s 
view on societies which privileges temporal dimension in constructing collectives, implies 
the existence of a ‘common good’ that is associated with “common use”. But, once we 
take into account the indispensable moment of articulation of time into space, we are able 
to propose that there is only a “common cause”. As I have pointed out earlier, articulation 
implies a necessary moment of sublimation of initial immediacy into discursive 
mediation. I explained that this process enables the articulation of affective into symbolic, 
antagonism into agonism, multitude into people, counter-hegemony into hegemony, tragic 
into dramatic, or the real into representation.  Now, drawing upon Laclau’s view on time 408
and space, I am envisaging every initial immediacy — affects, antagonisms, multitude, 
counter-hegemony, tragedy, the real — as the temporal dimension, and every moment of 
discursive mediation — symbol, agonism, people, hegemony, drama, or representation — 
as the spatial dimension. As maintained by Laclau, space is a structure discursively 
constructed as a system of contingent relations that exteriorise other possible relational 
configurations. And, since it depends on the exterior, space is thus always traversed by a 
mere possibility which stands for a form of temporality and which enables dislocation. 
This is to say that every structure implies a spatialisation of time, while time continuously 
dislocates space. In Laclau’s terms, dislocation is both the condition of possibility and 
impossibility of total spatialisation.   409
Since we are dealing with a specific dislocation that steams from the capitalist 
  I have elaborated the relational aspect of society in terms of opinion formation in chapter 6. 403
  On relational dialectics see chapter 4. 404
   Gramsci, Notebooks, 186. 405
   Ibid., 187. 406
   Ibid., 186. 407
  See chapter 4. 408
 More on dislocation, time and space in: Ernesto Laclau, New Reflection on the Revolution of Our Time 409
(London: Verso, 1990), 40 - 43.
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techniques of domination, we have to identify the techniques of domination with the 
‘common cause’. When time is spatially represented through a cyclic succession of 
dislocations, then, what is called space becomes a sequence in which relations between 
different subject positions are partially structured and represented within a particular 
spatial context, precisely by an act of exclusion of other possible configurations.  410
Accordingly, every sequence is always threatened by its constitutive temporal exteriority 
that constantly traverses it, dislocates it, and arrests its total spatialisation. Sequence is 
hence the common cause of a struggle that inhabits temporal exteriority. The struggle 
against the common cause that we observe in terms of the techniques of domination — 
that may prioritise class over gender, gender over race, race over religion, or economic 
interests over ethico-political values — has for a goal to dislocate a hegemonic discourse 
spatialised in institutions and representational forms. We should also notice how the 
common cause of subordination and struggle triggers the process of sublimation of an 
initial immediacy designated by a temporary dimension, into a mediation designated by 
spatial dimension. In fact, the process of articulation of affects into symbols, antagonisms 
into agonism, multitude into people, or the real into representation, enables initial 
immediacy not only to put into question the concreteness of any discursive mediation 
spatialised in dominant representations, but also to establish another order of sequences 
that will become a common cause for other struggles. When space is hence constructed 
through the process of articulation — rather by the principle of development — then it 
stands for a representation of a possible unity spatially constituted as a respond to the 
techniques of domination rendering a common cause. This is a unity discursively 
constituted in what we call after Gramsci concordia discors, or collective will.  Once 411
sequence is understood to belong to the order of struggle and conflict and, hence, to the 
order of temporality, then common ceases to be a matter of an ontic location of ‘common 
good’, and becomes a matter of an ontological principle, of the ‘common cause’ of 
struggle.  
The Occupy movement, which Kunst takes as an example of the success of the 
 In contrast to that which Deleuze calls an instant, a sequence has a spatial dimension. Oliver Marchart 410
emphasised that ‘the concept sequence — if it implies putting diachronous elements into synchronous order 
— is in itself a spatial concept’. This allows us to observe how in a sequence relations between different 
subject positions, between specific forms of individuality and identity allegiant to certain ethico-political 
values, become partially structured in representation, in a particular spatial context traversed by the 
dimension of time. Source: Oliver Marchart, “Art, Space and the Public Sphere(s). Some basic observations 
on the difficult relation of public art, urbanism and political theory,” European Institute for Progressive 
Cultural Policies (eipcp), accessed February 14, 2017, http://eipcp.net/transversal/0102/marchart/en/#f9; On 
instant, see: Gilles Deleuze, The Logic os Sense, ed. Constantin V. Boundas, trans. Mark Lester (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 1990), 147. 
 A movement from one to another dimension, from time to space, is not a movement envisaged in Aristotelian 411
terms as a movement from potentiality to actualisation. Neither, as Oliver Marchart shows, it is a movement 
from activity to passivity. Time is a constitutive outside to space, and it may prevent total spatialisation; 
space can always be reactivated, it can always be temporised. For this reason, as Marchart shows, Laclau’s 
theory stands beyond constructivism and post-constructivism. In: Marchart, Art Space.
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strategy of avoidance through duration, in fact supports the counter-thesis, that I have just 
outlined in terms of articulation that enables a sublimation of time into space. 
Accordingly, what would be necessary for the post-representational protest movements, 
such as the Occupy movement, is to transform the durational potential of the protestors 
that enables the resistance to neoliberalism, into the struggle of the protestors that would 
institutionalise or spatialise their demands for the purpose of establishing an order. Further 
on, since every order is a contingent category, then every institution stands for a sequence 
in a cyclic succession. Such is the drama that brings the sublimation of the protestors’ 
initial affects into the concrete demands that would be defended by the representatives in 
the parliament. It is only by means of struggle, engagement and institutionalisation, that 
protestors may be capable not only to challenge dominant politics, but also to combat the 
right-wing populism and thus construct different, much more democratic communities.  412
All things considered, it seems to be that the strategies of avoidance by duration are not 
strategies of the political construction, but strategies of the political abstention.  
the articulation of alternative collectives 
The view on subjectivities, communities and common in relational, conflicting, 
articulating and representational terms brings alternative perspective on the role of art and 
the relationship between performance and its public. It implies that the political dimension 
of art does not manifest only in locating the artwork between the audience and the artists, 
in what Kunst calls the ‘intermediation of a third condition’ that enables the abilities of the 
audience to listen, watch, read and judge and, thus, rehears to be together while being 
separated.  To be sure, this has always been one of the arts’ roles in which the political 413
appears. This view also implies that the political dimension of performance does not 
manifest only in the potentiality of the body to move or to move less.  This is so, 414
because neither slow nor accelerated movements render the ontological categories of 
performance, including dance, but their possible forms of representation in which the 
political appears.  The view that I advocate departs from the hypothesis that art, 415
including dance and performance, always possess the political dimension. And, as I have 
  This critique is accountable for many other movements, such as Black Lives Matter, Indignados, Nuit debout 412
or  the Women’s March on Washington that took place in January 2017, after a newly inaugurated President 
of the USA, Donal Trump, reinstated a global gag rule that bans US-funded groups around the world from 
supporting abortion. When these movements are discussed the question that always arise is: how the 
immediate, horizontal, non-representative, anti-institutional and leaderless movements may challenge state 
institutions and institutionalisation of the right-wing populism? 
  Kunst, Artist, 71 - 72. 413
  Ibid., 116. 414
  I drew a similar conclusion from Andrè Lepecki’s theory in chapter 1. 415
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previously argued, ‘while some art discloses the political dimension by complying with 
existing politics, another art discloses the political dimension by contesting them’.  It is 416
in relation to the complying and contesting strategies that we can observe how art, 
including performance, always traverse the audience.  
Performance scholar Joe Kelleher observed that performance always engages us 
personally and this engagement has to do ‘with feeling ourselves somehow involved in 
things going on in other times and other places’.  The artistic strategies of engagement 417
enable whether complying with or contesting the constructed, historical and contingent 
systems that are sedimented in a variety of hegemonic institutions, representations and 
forms. And, whereas the complying artistic strategies of engagement reproduce the 
existing order and maintain status-quo, the contesting artistic strategies of engagement 
have a tendency to disarticulate the dominant order, and articulate an alternative one. One 
of the significant characteristics of the contesting artistic strategies of engagement is that 
they enable the operation of articulation. It is by means of articulation of counter-
hegemonies that the contesting performance practices are capable of mobilising affects 
and passions towards a struggle against various social, economic, and moral laws that 
subordinate people to the dominant politics, techniques and representations, thus imposing 
control over every aspect of human and non-human lives. Since the outmost goal of 
mobilisation is not only to challenge the existing order, but also to constitute an alternative 
one, we have to recognise that mobilisation implies an articulation of initial affects into 
representations, or self-assertion into counter-hegemony, or mise-en-sense into mise-en-
scène or mise-en-forme.  Consequently, performance does not relate any more to a 418
particular form; on the contrary, it embraces a multiplicity of forms.   419
When performance belongs to the order of counter-hegemony, then it ceases to be a 
matter of an ontic location, and becomes a manifestation of an ontological principle: a 
manifestation of contest and struggle against discourses appropriated by hegemonic 
politics that are sedimented in various social practices and representational modes. 
‘Against a politics that govern affects and passions, counter-hegemonic and contesting 
artistic practices provide a terrain for confrontation to this operation and, consequently, for 
constitution of politics and societies in alternative ways’.  Pointing at the exclusion and 420
  See chapter 1. 416
  Joe Kelleher, Theatre & Politics (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009), 13. 417
  On the distinction between mise-en-sense into mise-en-scène see chapter 3. 418
  Accordingly, I indicated in chapter 1: ‘representation in performance stands for a choreography which may 419
appropriate elements from different artistic genres and different genres of performing arts (dance, theatre, 
mime, opera, concert, video, drawing, among others) as well as from various social practices (dance, sport, 
aerobics, promenading, jumping, boxing, working, and so on) and discourses (economic, political, cultural, 
moral, ethical, archeological, mathematical, or any other discourse). 
 Ibid., 420
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conflict to be inherent to societies, art disarticulates the smooth space deprived from any 
sort of identification, and articulates the striated space that consists out of the multiplicity 
of associations of people that are constructed precisely though identifications with the 
different ethico-political values.  The striated space enables an encounter between 421
various agonistic positions and the possibility of constructing a collective out of 
adversaries decisively united around a common cause: to challenge and dislocate the 
hegemony of the capitalist techniques of domination on every discursive level these 
techniques subordinate freedom and liberty. By mobilising affects of hope and change, art 
contributes to the dislocation of dominant politics and the construction of political 
identities.  
What this view suggests is not a call to dismiss the political dimension of Ballettikka 
Internettikka’s Statika. Rather, it proposes an alternative perspective on defining ‘the 
political’ in this performance. This endeavour requires the widening of the strategies of 
avoidance and waiting, with the strategies of engagement with the hegemonic discourses. 
The strategies of engagement enable the overcoming parallelism of positions that the 
strategies of avoidance employ,  and advocate a radical relationalism between them. In 422
the case of Statika, these strategies recognise illusion that the static defeat could take place 
without some kind of drastic rearticulation of such a political imaginary, and without 
engagement with the dominant order of politics and representations. This indeed, as Kunst 
suggests, means that duration, constructed by the static robotic performance, may be seen 
as a disruption of a particular order. Nevertheless, arising within the shattered symbolic 
framework, duration as a point of rupture requires a gradual sublimation or articulation in 
the symbolic and representational surface that transcendents the initial political imaginary. 
This is so, because the initial political imaginary, springing against the acceleration of 
every aspect of life, has to become articulated into a (counter-)hegemony that is 
represented. Without articulation, the initial political imaginary may fade away. The 
question that is rising out of this strategy is: how the need for slowing down the capitalist 
movement accelerated to the level of embracement of every aspect of human lives, is to 
be represented in relation to the variety of demands that are not shared by the workers’ 
perspective on society which requires waiting and laziness, or any other pre-established 
perspective on subjectivities isolated in terms of class -, gender -, or race -  based 
identities? How can it be accountable of the techniques of domination?  
If the post-fordist techniques of domination, and not only the post-fordist techniques 
of production, take place on the multiplicity of stratums, this means that we need a type of 
a mobilisation of human sectors in a unity constructed around a collective decision — 
taken not only by trade unions, but also NGOs, grassroots and many kinds of social 
 Further about identification in chapter 6. 421
 On the parallelism or adequation of positions, see chapter 2. 422
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movements, such as women, black, LGBTQIA, indigenous, environmentalists, human 
rights advocates, rural groups, poor and others — and the engagement of these sectors 
with the variety of social practices, movements, institutions and cognitive frameworks, 
respectively nationally and internationally, locally and globally, or unilaterally and 
multilaterally, wherever the demands of the peoples are subordinated to capital. It is here 
that the political subjectivity ultimately appears. This, by extension, implies that the 
political dimension of performance does not reside in time dimension in which artist as 
workers gather to wait for a sort of a Messianic moment to happen; it rather resides in an 
ontological principle which implies struggle and — as Kelleher correctly observed — 
concern with participation, ownership, membership and exclusion.  In this view, 423
duration in performance may be seen only as a way of resisting the order that excludes 
particularities, but not as an ultimate political principle of performance. It is so, because 
duration does not provide a terrain for a complex forms of articulation of different 
struggles into a contingent symbolic unity. On the contrary, it reduces conflict to 
resistance tied to a specific structural location.   424
performing alternative collectives:  
Rimini Protokoll’s 100% Brussels   425
If the reason for a unity of different associations of people in a struggle for the 
recognition of various demands lies in the capitalist’s techniques of domination, we shall 
observe for the moment how can performance suggests a construction of alternatives 
collectives. My point of departure is a Berlin based team of author-directors, consisting of 
Helgard Kim Haug, Stefan Kaegi and Daniel Wetzel, who work together since 2000, 
under the label of Rimini Protokoll. The name Rimini Protokoll refers to the oil depletion 
Rimini Protocol, also know as Uppsala Protocol. Rimini Protocol was proposed in 2004, 
 Kelleher, Theatre & Politics, 5. 423
   If we, finally, recognised that even duration requires a structural location, then we have to acknowledge that 424
the dimensions of time and space are constitutive to each other; they cannot be separated. The question that 
is rising out of this is: what kind of space is created by privileging a temporal dimension of duration? Isn’t 
this the same space of absolute beginning and originality that brought about the failure of vanguard 
movements in art, as we observed in chapter 3? 
  I have opted for Rimini Protokoll’s performance 100% Brussels in order to explore the way performance 425
may suggest the construction of alternative communities. In this decision, I have not been led by the form of 
performance, but rather with the ways Rimini Protokoll conceives dance within this performance — as a 
social practice capable of uniting differences in a community; dance as an agonistic practice. At the same 
time, my interest was to explore the meaning of this dance within a particular geo-political context, having 
in mind that 100% Brussels was performed a few weeks ahead of Belgian federal elections held on 25 May 
2014. This is why 100% Brussels as a choice prevailed over some other performances that are more dance 
than theatre, such as Jérôme Bel’s performance Gala (2015), in which twenty ordinary people and 
professional dancers from a range of generations, backgrounds, abilities and disabilities to dance appear 
together on stage and dance over an hour and fifteen minutes. 
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by geologist Collin Campbell. The main objective of his proposal was the organisation of 
a convention of nations with the purpose of reaching an agreement on the ways of 
stabilisation of petroleum production and petroleum price. The purpose was to ‘prevent 
profiteering’ and to ensure a fair global distribution of petroleum, while seeking a 
transition to alternative fuels. Writing about oil depletion, Campbell stated that ‘[t]he 
decline of oil will have a severe impact on the modern economy which has become 
dependent on it. Accordingly, a Protocol to match demand against the falling supply, as 
imposed by Nature, is urgently needed to lessen world tensions and achieve an orderly 
transition.’  It is in this framework that we can understand the choice of the members of 426
Rimini Protokoll to call itself label, rather than company or collective. In fact, every 
aspect of their work, weather theatre, sound and radio plays, or film and installation, 
refers to Rimini Protocol, to the impact of the decline of oil on world tensions and 
conflicts, in one or another way. This is why the main task of Rimini Protokoll became the 
‘development of the tools of the theatre to allow unusual perspectives on our reality’.  427
To achieve this goal, Rimini Protokoll decided to work, not with actors, but with 
ordinary people. Performance critic Eva Behrendt refers to the presence of ordinary 
people in performance as “experts of everyday-life”. Writing on Rimini Protokoll’s play 
about death in Deadline (2003), Behrendt defined experts of everyday-life as everyday, 
average dying, such as the owner of crematorium, the tomb-stone sculptor, funeral-
violinist and student of medicine.  For their part, the theatre critics Ulrike Garde and 428
Meg Mumford envisaged ordinary people in performances as “real people”, ‘that is, 
contemporary people who have a verifiable physical existence, and who usually have not 
received institutional theatre training and have little or no prior stage 
experience’ (2016).  Further on, they wrote that ‘[t]hese real people literally appear on 429
stage or are represented — through techniques such as verbatim text, film, pre-recorded or 
live-feed video — and figure as consensual protagonists in specific theatre forms and 
genres’.  At this point, it should be stressed that real people are always already 430
constructed in an encounter with the other and inscribed within the state of affairs, within 
the system of representations that antagonises them. Consequently, real people are not 
simply present on stage. Their voices and opinions are always already represented within 
  Collin Campbell, “The Rimini Protocol: an oil depletion protocol,” Energy Policy, Vol. 34, Issue 12  (August 426
2006): 1319. 
  Rimini Protokoll, “About Rimini Protokoll,” Rimini Protokoll web site, accessed October 8, 2017,  427
      http://www.rimini-protokoll.de/website/en/about. 
  Eva Behrendt, “The Experts of Everyday-Life” (first published in 2003), accessed October 8, 2017,  428
      http://www.rimini-protokoll.de/website/en/text/the-experts-of-everyday-life.
  Ulrike Garde and Meg Mumford, Theatre of Real People: Diverse Encounters at Berlin’s Hebbel am Ufer 429
and Beyond (New York: Bloomsbury, 2016), 5. 
   Ibid., 430
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the terms of performance. When real people are engaged with different forms and genres 
of performance, they can bring forth the significance of the capitalist techniques of 
production and the capitalist techniques of domination in construction of societies.  
Performance scholar Katharina Pewny’s writings on Rimini Protokoll’s one-on-one 
performance Call Cutta which performed in 2005, in Berlin, gives rise to this 
distinction.  Pewny explains that upon the registration at the Hebbel Theater, mobile 431
phones were distributed to the audience. Then, each member of the audience received a 
phone call from a call-centre in Calcutta, in India. Trained by Rimini Protokoll, 
teleworker-performers for the next hour ‘give them [the audience] instructions via the 
head-sets on their phones, on how to move through the streets of Berlin’.  To be sure, in 432
her analysis of Call Cuta, Pewny never uses the the same terminology — the techniques 
of production and the techniques of domination. But, what gives rise to the distinction 
made is her observation that the telephone communication in Call Cutta does not only 
bridges many thousands of kilometres, but also ‘the separation between the local and 
transnational economic transactions of late capital’.  And, whereas ‘communication 433
techniques [that] are adapted to the demands of mobility and flexibility’  point at the 434
hegemony of the capitalist techniques of production, ‘the absence of trade unions for 
people working in call centres in India’  point at the hegemony of the capitalist 435
techniques of domination. It is within this framework that I am observing how Rimini 
Protokoll’s performance 100% City suggests a construction of alternatives collectives that 
counter the hegemony of the capitalist techniques of domination.  
In 2008, Rimini Protokoll staged the performance 100% Berlin, in collaboration 
with the familiar inhabitants of Berlin, with what Garde and Mumford call real people. 
With 100% Berlin the author-director team Haug, Kaegi and Wetzel wanted to observe 
how it would look like if Berlin was represented on stage by 100 persons. The casting was 
based on Berlin’s demographic data conveyed by the Berlin Brandenburg Statistics Office 
which classified about 3,450,000 of Berlin inhabitants in categories of gender, age, civil 
status, nationality and type of income. Haug, Kaegi and Wetzel cast one person to cast the 
second person that would then cast the third one, and so on, until there is a 100 persons 
cast altogether, always reflecting on demographic data. Through this chain reaction, each 
  Unlike in Berlin, in Brussels, where Call Cutta was performed at the Kunsten festival des Arts in 2008, the 431
audience was seated at the tables, overlooking the city from La Monnaie / Muntschouwburg, the Brussels 
federal opera house of Belgium. 
  Katharina Pewny, “Real Theatrical Transformations in European Theatre in Rimini Protocoll’s Karl Marx, 432
Das Kapital, Erster Band and Call Cutta,” Literature and Aesthetics, 18: 2 (December 2008): 52. 
  Ibid., 433
  Ibid., 53.434
  Ibid., 54.435
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persons cast to participate in the performance stood for approximately 34,500 Berliners. 
Giving life to pie wedges, bars and curves, on stage, Rimini Protokoll demonstrated how 
many Berliners are male and how many are female, how many of them are employed and 
how many are unemployed, or how many of them are married and how many divorced. 
After 100% Berlin, Rimini Protokoll staged 100% in many cities across the world.  In 436
each city 100% was staged as a cite-specific performance in collaboration with ‘real 
people’, reflecting on demographic criteria, such as age, region of birth, family 
composition, residential location, sex, nationality, civil status, number of tourist per year, 
spoken language, and so on, in that particular city.  
100% Brussels was staged in 2014, and performed during the Kunstenfestival des 
Arts (kunstenfestivaldesarts), within a few weeks before the federal elections that were 
about to take place on 25 May of the same year. The casting of 100 Brusselaars had been 
hold in accordance to the five criteria maintained by the Brussels Institute for Statistics 
and Analysis (BISA): age, sex, nationality, place of residence, and family composition. To 
make the population of Brussels even more representative, the data proceeding from the 
sociological surveys, such as language, employment, nationality at birth, religion and 
sexual orientation, were also taken into account. In addition to 100 persons, five 
undocumented individuals, such as an immigrant, asylum seeker, diplomat, expat and 
foreign student, were also invited to take part in the performance. Each participant was 
then asked to select a subsequent one, respecting the mentioned demographic criteria. 
Nevertheless, the complexity of Brussels demographics did not allow the chain-casting to 
be respected for a full 100% within the given timeframe for the production of the 
performance, from September 2013 to May 2014. This is why deviations from this tactic 
occurred. Hence, Briggite Neervoort, a Brussels based Rimini Protokoll’s delegate 
responsible for coordination and casting of 100% Brussels, employed a cluster principle 
that sometimes engaged her and her six-team staff in seeking persons that would fit the 
statistics.  Afterwards, each participant was photographed, and interviewed on the basis 437
of the following questionnaire: “I am unique because…, At home I speak…, On stage you 
can recognise me by…, I would join a demonstration for or against…, The slogan would 
be…, I have this tic or idiosyncrasy…, The sound that I associate my life in Brussels with 
is…, The smell that I associate my life in Brussels with is…, I belong to the following 
groups…, But I definitely don’t belong to the following groups…”.  The questionnaire 438
  Some of the cities are: Cologne, Karlsruhe (2009), Athens, Vienna (2010), Zürich, London, Braunschweig, 436
Melbourne (2012), Tokyo, Kraków, Dresden, Cork, Copenhagen, San Diego (2013), Amsterdam, Riga, 
Philadelphia, Darwin, Paris, Gwangju, Brussels (2014), Yogyakarta, Penang (2015), Brisbane, São Paulo, 
Salford (2016), and Marseille and Motréal (2017). 
  For example, sometimes it would take one person to find another person that corresponds to statistic data up 437
to three weeks. To allow the unfolding of the casting in such a way meant to bring the realisation of the 
project under question. Brigitte Neervoort, interview by the author, October 9, 2017. 
  Rimini Protokoll, 100% Brussels (Brussels: Kunstenfestivaldesart, 2014). 438
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served as a basis for the performance narrative, while answers of 100 participants to these 
questions accompanied their portraits in the book, also containing the statistic data, the 
description of the casting process and the text by a sociologist Eric Corijn who described 
the city of Brussels in all its diversity.  439
100% Brussels starts in the following way: one person steps in the spotlight and 
starts speaking in the microphone in French and, for a moment, in Dutch: ‘Je m’appelle 
Benoit Laine […] Ik werk voor BISA,  Staatsinstelling voor het Brusselse Gewest”.  440 441
After giving some autobiographical information and showing the book that contains 
statistic information on Brussels inhabitants divided into categories, such as sex, age, 
community, civil status and nationality, as well as the list of citizens taking part in the 
performance, Laine — responsible for the “Methods and Statistics” unit of BISA — 
explains the process of casting. This is what he says: ‘Après il nous fallait trouver 100 
personnes pour représenter la ville avec ce plan d’échantillonnage. Moi, j'habite a 
Molenbeek-Saint-Jean comme 8 % des Bruxellois. Il me restait à en trouver 7. Mais, il 
fallait aussi trouver 14 personnes entre 0 et 9 ans. Alors, j'ai commencé une réaction en 
chaîne, et comme numéro 2 j'ai choisi ma fille Marion qui a 7 ans.’  Just like Marion, 442
Laine’s daughter, appeared on stage with the swimming googles that identify her, every 
other person stepped in the spotlight with an object of identification that extended their 
autobiographical narratives. At once, each person is live streamed on the backdrop.  
Hundred inhabitants of Brussels proceed to the microphone, one at a time, and 
introduce themselves. They are families with children, singles, or couples. We are 
introduced to the people of different origins, from different countries, speaking different 
languages. Some are scientists, teachers, social workers, or voluntarists; some are retired, 
unemployed, students, or pupils. Among them are disabled people, persons without 
papers, people of colour, members of LGBTQIA community. Slowly, people of different 
origins, language groups, colours, gender, sex, age, weight, or hight, fill in the stage. From 
now on, all the actions performed by 105 people (within a circle lit by a video projection 
that has a function of an enormous spotlight) are live-streamed on the backdrop. An 
elderly women, Christian Gabriels, who at the beginning introduced herself as a retired 
person now dedicated to a voluntary work, steps out of the crowd to explain that 100 
persons on stage represent 1,154,635 inhabitants of Brussels, and that each one of them is 
a representative of approximately 11,546 inhabitants of Brussels. Then, another person, 
Max Nisol, announces that 49% of Brussels inhabitants are men, and 51% women, and 
  See: Ibid.,439
  BISA or ‘Staatsinstelling voor Brusselse gewest’ stands for the Brussels Instituut voor Statistiek en Analyse / 440
Institut Bruxellois de Statistique et d’Analyse / the Brussels Institute for Statistics and Analysis.
 Video link to performance: “100% Brussels,” Rimini Protocol, accessed on October 8, 2017,  441
     http://www.rimini-protokoll.de/website/en/project/100-brussels. 
 Ibid.,442
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that transgender community, to whom this person belongs, is not officially represented in 
BISA statistics.  At that moment, the rest of 99 persons split on stage between men and 443
women.  
Hundred persons on stage would split in different associations in order to simulate 
different collectives of people based on age difference, nationality, or belonging to the one 
of 19 Brussels different communities; and, when one person announces to live in Belgium 
due to the political and economic crisis in his own country, another person joins the same 
side of the stage. Participants express their opinions on topics such as ‘I think there should 
be one common language within the European Union’, or ‘I think the EU should grow’.  444
The demands of women to wear a veil, unemployed to work, gay to adopt children, and 
many other local actualities always split the citizens according to their opinion in different 
associations, left and right from the line that divides the stage. The same would happen 
with the questions about capitalism, about who is belonging to political parties, and so on. 
And, when those who decided not to vote on the forthcoming federal elections in Belgium 
were asked to leave the stage, they could have only observed how the rest of the 
Brusselaars decide about issues that might be of their own concern, such as prostitution in 
the city, the Trans-Atlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP), financing Congo’s 
government — that is keeping it in debt, tax paying, reducing number of cars in the city, 
and so on.  
Rimini Protokoll’s 100% Brussels demonstrates that different associations of people 
may share the view on some demands, and disagree about others. More importantly, it 
demonstrates that each citizen may belong to different associations of people united 
around disparate and conflicting ethico-political values, entailing a moment of inclusion 
and exclusion at the same time. By approaching collectivity in terms of various 
identifications, 100% Brussels conceives the city in the eternal play between the 
Dionysian disorderly choreography of personal movements, lives, and demands and the 
Apollonian orderly choreography of shared, collective forms of life.  Hence, the city is a 445
striated space inhabited by agonistics and the multiplicity of agonistic human associations 
that are constructed though the identifications with the different ethico-political values co-
existing in conflict. Nevertheless, by putting all its inhabitants to dance, on the music 
performed live on stage by a jazz orchestra, 100% Brussels suggests that dance unites all 
differences between various associations of people. Envisaged within the context of 
Belgian federal elections that were to be held on 25 May, just a few weeks after the 
  Belgian office BISA gathers information about population based on age, sex, nationality, place of residence, 443
and family composition. All other data, such as those relating the total number of LGBTQIA persons in the 
city, or those concerned with the different religious beliefs among the citizens of Brussels, are provided by 
different sociological surveys, such as those led by universities, NGOs, or institutes. 
  Video link to performance: “100% Brussels,” Rimini Protocol, Ibid.,444
  More about order and disorder and about the Apollonian and Dionysian ideals, in chapter 3. 445
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performance, dance in 100% Brussels becomes a symbolic unity of different human 
associations in a struggle against a common cause, against the hegemony of capital that 
dominates them personally and collectively and splits them on the basis of pre-established 
identities.  Besides, in 100% Brussels a call for a unity of people in a struggle for the 446
recognition of various demands, does not propose a unity in a revolution against the 
capitalist techniques of domination. It suggests an agonistic unity in a collective turnout 
as, so far, the most democratic way to fight the domination of neoliberalism.  
  Within the framework of Rimini Protokoll’s 100% Brussels, Kunsten festival des Arts organised in 2014 five 446
talks moderated by a sociologist Eric Corijn. Speakers were invited to see the performance. Then, following 
talks took place: 1) Brussels Politics, with the following representatives of the local political parties: Bruno 
De Lille (Groen), Paul Delva (CD&V), Vincent De Wolf (MR), Liesbeth Dhaene (N-VA), Christos 
Doulkeridis (Ecolo), Didier Gosuin (FDF), Karine Lalieux (PS), Joëlle Milquet (cdH), Pascal Smet (sp.a), 
Guy Vanhengel (Open Vld); 2) European Brussels, with the following participants: Jan Truszczynski 
(director general for Education and Culture at the European Commission) and Bernard Foccroulle (composer 
& opera director; 3) Religious Brussels, with the following speakers: Mohamed Fatha-allah (imam and 
professor in Islamic religion) and Daniël Alliët (priest and activist for refugees in Brussels); 4) (In)secure 
Brussels, with the following participants: Saad Amrani (director of the Ixelles Police Department) and Bleri 
Lleshi (political philosopher); 5) Young Brussels, with the following participants: Mohamed ‘El Killer’ 
Boulef (21 year-old K1 Thai boxing world champion, who grew up in Molenbeek-Saint-Jean), Sarah Carlier 
(23 year old musician, who grew up in Schaerbeek), Muzammal Chaudry (21 year-old member of the 
European Muslim Network) and Lander Piccart (21 years old, president of the Flemish Youth Council, 
student at the VUB, living in a student house in the city centre of Brussels). 
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6 
CONCLUSION 
Performance as Agonistic Practice 
This dissertation starts with the observation of the crisis of democracy. Political 
philosopher Chantal Mouffe writes that the Western model of democracy constitutes of 
the liberal tradition of freedom, which stands for the rule of law and individuality, and the 
democratic tradition of equality, which stands for the popular sovereignty.  Whereas the 447
former is preferred by the right political parties, the latter is favoured by the left political 
parties.  The liberal tradition, formulated as neoliberalism, dominates political discourse 448
today. Neoliberalism is an order of politics established by the elites and regulated by 
financial capital. It undermines the institutional framework for the principle of the 
sovereignty of the people characterised by an agonistic struggle between the right and the 
left popular parties. The consequence of this politics is the rise of the right-wing populism 
and the left-wing populism. To re-establish a terrain of an agonistic battle between the 
‘right’ and the ‘left’ unities of the people, the objective is to create a collective will that 
may change existing institutions and invigorate democracy. As Mouffe suggest, ‘[g]iven 
that numerous social sectors suffer the effects of financialized capitalism, there is a 
potential for this collective will to have a transversal character that exceeds the right / left 
distinction as traditionally configured.’  This could lead to the replacement of the rule of 449
the elites and the re-establishment of agonism.  
Within such a context, the main research question of this dissertation became: how 
might performance contest existing politics and contribute to the constitution of 
democratic politics giving rise to alternative ways of living together? To offer a possible 
answer to this question I introduced an agonistic discourse to performance studies. My 
objective was to examine the relevance of  Mouffe’s model of agonism for performing 
arts, by continuously looking at the different philosophical, political and artistic 
discourses that cherish contemporary performance theory. To investigate how 
performance practice may choreograph agonism, it was necessary to outline a politico-
   See chapter 1. 447
  Chantal Moufe, “The Populist Movement”, in Open Democracy, published on November 21, 2016, accessed  448
in January 2017, https://www.opendemocracy.net/democraciaabierta/chantal-mouffe/populist-moment. 
   Ibid., 449
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philosophical framework of Mouffe’s notion of agonism. Therefore, this dissertation starts 
with the observation of two distinct trajectories within contemporary continental 
philosophical thought: the trajectory of immanence (Deleuze) and the trajectory of quasi-
transcendence (Derrida).  Whereas the former gives rise to the project of absolute 450
democracy (Hardt, Negri), the latter gives rise to the project of agonistic democracy 
(Mouffe). Drawing upon political philosophers Oliver Marchart and Yannis Stavrakakis, 
the distinction between these two philosophical and political trajectories is deepened in 
psychoanalytic terms. It is envisaged as a distinction between the positive ontological 
imaginary of abundance — desire for being in-itself, and the negative ontological 
imaginary of lack — desire for the lack-of-being. It is stressed that the negative 
ontological imaginary of lack anticipates the co-constitutive relationship between lack and 
abundance, precisely because the dimension of negativity precludes both the idealisation 
of lack and the idealisation of abundance.  The suggested co-constitutive and agonistic 451
type of relationship between the paradoxically different positions, such as lack and 
abundance, also became a challenge to philosopher Jacques Rancière’s one-sided political 
model of communal anarchism, which advocates politics of disorder above the politics of 
order, or mise-en-sense above mise-en-scène.  In order to move towards the pluralism of 452
positions, relations between paradoxically differential positions are envisaged in terms of 
dialectics. Relational dialectics recognise antagonistic conflicts and polemics to be 
inherent in societies (Gramsci, Schmitt). Further on, antagonistic conflicts and polemics 
are envisaged by means of discourse formation (Laclau, Mouffe), allowing for the 
articulation of antagonism into agonism (Mouffe).  The operation of articulation requires 453
articulation of initial immediacy into discursive mediation: of disorder into order, abject 
bodies into intelligible bodies, mise-en-sense into mise-en-scène , horizontal politics into 454
vertical politics, passive onlookers into active citizenship,  the multitude into the 455
people , and affects into representation . The operation of articulation requires a view 456 457
on societies — including social practice of performance — in terms of discourse, 
hegemony and antagonism. These three political components enabled us to envisage what 
I call the contesting political dimension of performance that is manifested through the 
 See chapter 1.450
 See chapter 2. 451
 See chapter 3. 452
  See chapter 4. 453
  See chapter 3. 454
  See chapter 4. 455
 See chapter 5. 456
 See chapter 6. 457
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strategies of engagement, giving rise to the choreography of articulation. The insights into 
contemporary performances by Arkadi Zaides , Mette Edvardsen , Marlene Monteiro 458 459
Freitas , and Rimini Protokoll , are just some of the possible examples that allow us to 460 461
observe how choreographing agonism performance practices and performance theories 
may contribute to the constitution of democratic politics and different ways of living 
together. 
Throughout different chapters of this dissertation I have stressed that the operation 
of articulation implies a sublimation of antagonism into agonism and initial affectivity 
into representation. Once we have examined how agonism may change our perception of 
objects , human bodies , relations between the audience and the performances , and 462 463 464
collectivity , we are able to observe the articulation of affects into representation 465
through the process of choreographing performance, through the relationship between the 
choreographer and the performers. In concluding this dissertation, I will demonstrate why 
the artistic strategies of engagement in performance practice require articulation of affects 
into representation. In the spirit of this PhD research, the concluding chapter does not aim 
to promote a dogmatic view on the form of performance practice. Rather, the goal is to 
employ the choreography of articulation in such a way that new questions about 
choreographing agonism may become raised in performance studies.  
the relationship between the choreographers and the performers  
As mentioned above, the research undertook in this dissertation is inscribed within 
the context of current populist movements that struggle for the recognition of different 
democratic demands. Despite popularity of the left-leaning horizontal protest movements 
without leadership, it was claimed (in chapter 4) that the left-leaning quasi-vertical protest 
movements with leaders play a significant role in challenging the institutionalised 
hegemony of neoliberalism.  This is why the quasi-vertical type of the relationship 466
 See chapter 1. 458
 See chapter 2. 459
 See chapter 3. 460
 See chapter 5. 461
 See chapter 2. 462
 See chapter 3.463
 See chapter 4. 464
 See chapter 5. 465
 See chapter 4. 466
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between the leaders and the people, is very useful for analysing the relationship between 
the choreographer and the performers, and the choreography of articulation of affects into 
representations. In order to approach this topic, I take as a point of departure a theory 
developed by performance scholar André Lepecki. Lepecki observes the relationship 
between the choreographer and the performers in terms of ‘leadingfollowing’. 
Leadingfollowing is dance in which ‘one engages by constantly taking the initiative to 
fuse and to confuse lines of authority and of submission’.  Within this framework, 467
‘leadingfollowing’ is an a-personal, unconditioned singularity or event, while the 
actualisation of leadingfollowing is an immanent, ‘a-personal compositional plane of 
choreography’ that exceeds predetermined acts.  Henceforth, the politics of engagement 468
enable the actualisation of the event into that which Lepecki calls ‘a true affective field of 
compossibilization’.  The significance of the politics of engagement lies in opening up 469
the space for a rupture interval, for rebellion and disobedience.  
Lepecki’s view on the relationship between the choreographer and the performers 
in terms of leadingfollowing is highly relevant because it asserts the very political point 
that I am trying to make in concluding this chapter: that the strategies of engagement in 
performances imply the articulation of affects into representation. Once the operation of 
articulation is considered as constitutive to performance practice, two obvious conclusions 
do necessarily follow: (1) choreography cannot be reduced to the initiation of a kinetic 
phenomenon; (2) performance cannot be reduced to ‘a true affective field of 
compossibilization’. Abandoning the centrality of movement that implies the infinite 
partaking of the mise-en-sense, and the possibility of performance to compossibilises the 
unconditional truth, I will apply a different political logic in envisaging the relationship 
between the choreographer and the performers. After examining the origins of the 
‘unconditional truth’ and ‘compossibilisation’ in the philosophies of Gottfried Wilhelm 
Leibniz and Gilles Deleuze, I will turn to the political-philosophy of Ludwing 
Wittgenstein, Antonio Gramsci, Hannah Arendt, Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe. The 
insights into their works will emphasise the importance of ‘discourse’ for the analysis of 
the relationship between the leader and the lead and between the choreographer and the 
performers. From the point of view of discourse formation, choreography is a result of an 
affective identification between the choreographer and the performers. If it is not 
authoritarian, then this type of relationship gives rise to different opinions that imply 
conflicts, polemics and disagreements. But, once agreement in opinions is reached, a 
collective investment of affects in objects takes place. This is how affective identification 
 André Lepecki, “From Partaking to Initiating: Leadingfollowing as Dance’s (a-presonal) Political 467
Singularity,” in Dance, Politics & Co-Immunity, eds. Gerald Siegmund, Stefan Holscher (Zurich, Berlin: 
Diaphanes, 2013), 35. 
 Ibid., 36. 468
 Ibid., 31.469
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articulates into representation. We could suggest that it is on the choreographer to lead the 
articulation of initial affectivity into representation, into performance that always contains 
this conflictual dimension. I am emphasising the notion of affective identification 
precisely because it points at the construction of collectives. To employ affective 
identification to the analysis of choreography is to stress the importance of agonism for 
performance practices, giving rise to the conflict of opinions on the ways body language is 
used and performed. In this context, to choreograph agonism is to induce affects through 
representations, allowing the audience to see things differently and envisage different 
possibilities of living together. 
André Lepecki:  
performance as ‘a true affective-political field of compossibilization” 
In his essay From Partaking to Initiating: Leadingfollowing as Dance’s (a-
presonal) Political Singularity (2013) a performance scholar André Lepecki examines 
how dance may activate an otherwise passive politics of perception. This approach 
implies the production of a theory of initiation, which shifts the focus from participating 
in representation to the creation of ‘a co-extensive affective field of compossibilization of 
political purpose and action’.  Lepecki builds the argument by drawing upon 470
philosophers Jacques Rancière and Hannah Arendt, performance scholars Roger 
Copeland, Randy Martin and Mark Franko, and political philosophers Erin Manning and 
Brian Massumi, mainly working within the framework of the immanent philosophy of 
Gilles Deleuze. First, Rancière’s and Arendt’s theories enabled Lepecki to conjoin a 
sensorial distributing or partaking — as that which separates, excludes and allows 
participation (Rancière), and energeia — as that which energises energy and triggers 
action (Arendt). The established relationship between partaking and energeia in Lepecki’s 
theory becomes a condition for overcoming ‘the politics of disengagement’ (Copeland), 
which Lepecki sees to be the western, predominantly passive patterns of politics of 
perception lying at the core of the contemporary production of subjectivity. Therefore, 
Lepecki opts for ‘the politics of engagement’, which opens up the space for surprise, 
inventiveness, rebellion, or disobedience, and moves us to the place other than the one in 
which we are.  The politics of engagement enables not only a dissensual sensorial 471
redistribution or partaking, but also a formation of active and engaged modes of existence. 
 Ibid., 470
 It is through Lepecki’s critique of ‘participation’ that we can grasp the consequences of the politics of 471
engagement. Lepecki asks: ‘how much in participating and by participating do we actually engage with a 
kind of moving that takes us no other place that where we are (always) already (properly) expected to arrive 
at?’ In: Ibid., 29. 
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Borrowing Leibniz’s and Deleuze’s vocabulary, a politics of engagement becomes the 
actualisation of events in that which Lepecki calls a compossibilisation of political 
purpose and action, implying ‘a mutual sharing of a true affective-political field’.  472
Let’s now unpack this brief summary of Lepecki’s view on a politics of 
engagement, which is supposed to activate a passive politics of perception. Lepecki 
claims that dance ‘engages engagement’ in a politics by means of initiation.  Drawing 473
upon Arendt, he shows that energeia refers to the notion of action, or of taking initiative. 
The potential of courageously taking initiative points not only at the moment of action 
but, as Arendt indicated, at setting something in motion.  Finally, Lepecki concludes, 474
‘this is why taking initiative, to initiate an act, is always a profoundly political and kinetic 
phenomenon’.  Nevertheless, Lepecki moves away from Arendt’s figure of a ‘self’ and 475
the theatrical dance’s epideictic mode of rhetoric, and proclaims their demise in order to 
introduce the notion of ‘leadingfollowing’. For that matter, he stresses that energeia is 
linked to the act of leading, that is the ethics of following, and to the affect-event of 
courage.  Now, in order to develop the notion of leadingfollowing, Lepecki draws upon 476
Manning. Referring to Manning, Lepecki emphasises that to follow is to initiate, ‘to take 
the initiative of engaging with the leader and demonstrating through engaging that the 
leader is always the one who, by leading and because of leading, must follow’.  477
Nevertheless, Lepecki, following Manning’s theory, arrests the possibility of the leader to 
decide. This is why leading becomes the way for the opening up a gap that is then 
followed. Lepecki call the opened gap after Rancière a partaking gap, a ‘rupture interval 
that defines dissensus’.  Given these points, leadingfollowing becomes a choreography 478
that creates the relation of an interval, of a moving interval which points at moving 
together without identification. Within this framework, leadingfollowing is not to be 
envisaged as the [dancer’s] person or individualization,  ‘but always as immanent force, 479
invisibly composing a particular unexpected dancing, a particular singular actualisation of 
what really matters, rather than the matter of regal exceptionality’.  Leadingfollowing 480
 Ibid., 31. 472
 Ibid., 32. 473
 Hannah Arendt, The Human Condition (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1998), 177, in Lepecki, Ibid., 474
 Lepecki, “From Partaking to Initiating”, 32. 475
 Ibid.,476
 Ibid., 34. 477
 Ibid.,478
 Lepecki asserts that a juridical name of individualisation is person. André Lepecki, Singularities. Dance in 479
the Age of Performance (London, New York: Routledge, 2016), 6. 
 Lepecki, “From Partaking to Initiating”, 36. 480
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thus becomes ‘a-personal singularity’, or unconditioned event, or ‘a dancing that initiates’ 
without choreographers.  Leadingfollowing is, we can suggest, a singular dissensual 481
event, not representation. Given these points, a dancer is one who always engages, by 
taking an initiative to fuse and confuse lines of authority — or of the leader, and of 
submission — or of the follower.  This is how dance ‘enacts a crucial (choreo)political 482
critique of leadership'.   483
The choreography of leadingfollowing without choreographers presupposes the 
body as ‘a reservoir of dissensual somatic-political capacities’ , and movement in dance 484
as ‘activation and actualization — of corporal and critical capacities towards the 
composition and formation of engaged modes of existence’.  Accordingly, Lepecki 485
conceived subjectivities as affective constructions of corporealities.  Lepecki’s theory 486
suggests that the role of dance is to initiate activation of subjectivities to engage in the a-
personal transformations of existing compossibilisations and compose different ones. 
Within this framework, different compossibilisations become initiated by a-personal 
dissensual affective energies. Whereas a-personal is a singularity, a thing, that designates 
both human and non-human,  compossibilisation is the actualisation of a-personal 487
things, of unconditioned singularities, or actants, in a collective, whether objects, animals, 
rocks, or humans.  This is how within Lepecki’s view, compossibilisation becomes ‘a 488
mutual sharing of a true affective-political field’.  What does this mean? Lepecki 489
explains that when, for example, subjectivities that constitute a collective become 
energised by a sentiment to a particular imminence, then in response they create gestures, 
steps, positions, dynamics, and assemblages. At a certain moment, these gestures, steps, 
positions, dynamics and assemblages, become actualised in particular movements, 
transforming existing compossibilisations into a different co-extensive affective fields, 
which is corporeal.  
 Ibid., 35. 481
 Ibid.,482
 Ibid., 483
 Ibid., 22. 484
 Ibid., 30. 485
 Lepecki, Singularities, 6. 486
 Ibid., 36. 487
 Compossibilisation in Lepecki’s theory is associated with the theory of ‘compositionalism’ developed by 488
sociologist and philosopher Bruno Latour. Nevertheless, compositionalism is not concerned with truth 
procedures. Latour’s compositionalism is concerned with the action between associated entities of actants 
occupied with experiments. See for example: Bruno Latour, “An attempt at ‘Compositionist Manifesto’,” in 
New Literary History (2010): 471-490; Bruno Latour, Pandora’s Hope (Cambridge, London: Harvard 
University Press, 1999). 
 Lepecki, “From Partaking to Initiating”, 31. 489
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Now, we should recognise, as Lepecki does, drawing upon Martin and performance 
scholar Amelia Jones, that subjectivities are historically created.  This is why Lepecki 490
departs from compossibilisation in order to review reenactment in performance. This 
thought is elaborated in his book Singularities (2016). In Singularities, Lepecki recalls 
reenactments in performances produced after 2000 — among others, performances such 
as those by Fabian Barba, A Mary Wigman Dance Evening from 2008, in which Barba 
reenacts Mary Wigman’s 1929 performance Schwingende Landschaft; or, by Xavier Le 
Roy, who in 2009 staged Product of Other Circumstances, a performance based on 
archival material of different Butoh dances. Lepecki writes that ‘current dance re-
enactments become privileged sites for exploring the theoretical and choreographic 
relations between experimental dance and its will to archive’.  Drawing upon Massumi, 491
he defines this ‘will to archive’ as a capacity to identify ‘still non-exhausted creative fields 
of “impalpable possibilities”’.  These fields of possibilities Lepecki calls, after 492
Massumi, the fields of virtual ‘“abstraction pertaining to the thing in general”’.  And 493
precisely these fields of abstraction pertaining to things — not objects — concern the 
possible.  The activation of these abstractions, of the things in-themselves, or 494
singularities, is a matter of creating the compossible and/or incompossible.  Lepecki’s 495
theory of compossibilisation is steady in its proposal to overcome objecthood — and, we 
can suggest, representation — by fostering the concept of the thing and singularity. It 
asserts that ‘one reenacts not to fix a work in its singular (originating) possibilisation but 
to unlock, release, and actualise a work’s many (virtual) com- and incompossibilities’.   496
It is not difficult to detect from this that precisely the engagement with the existing 
compossibilisation, and the actualisation of alternative possibilities of compossibilisation, 
open up a  potential for overcoming the passive patterns of the politics of perception. 
Lepecki indicates that the engagement of spectatorship lies in the act of initiating a 
movement, that is in activating a spectator to actualise ‘the nascent unthinkable’ beyond 
authority and politics of disengagement.  The most prolific view on the ways 497
  Lepecki stresses the significance of history in ‘From Partaking to Initiating’ drawing upon Randy Martin’s 490
writing about dialectics of history and agency, and in Singularities drawing upon Amelia Jones’ concern with 
the relationship between history and performance art. See: Lepecki, “From Partaking to Initiating”, 31; 
Lepecki, Singularities, 116. 
 Lepecki, Singularities, 117. 491
  Brian Massumi, Parables for the Virtual: Movement, Affect, Sensation, Post-contemporary Interventions 492
(Durham: Duke University Press, 2002), 91, quoted in Lepecki, Singularities, 120. 
 Massumi, Parables, 93, quoted in Ibid.,493
 Lepecki’s critique of objecthood and the Object Oriented Ontology is developed in Singularities. 494
 Lepecki, Singularities, 120. 495
 Ibid., 496
 Lepecki, “From Partaking to Initiating”, 37-38. 497
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performance may ‘activate a spectator towards actualisation’ I find in Lepecki’s book 
Exhausting Dance, Performance and the Politics of Movement (2006). In it, Lepecki 
asserts that ‘perspective is the effect created by a specific organization of lines on a 
representational surface’.  Accordingly, perspective operates by reduction of the three-498
dimensionality of space and the embodied nature of perception.  The reduction of the 499
embodied nature of perception stands for the corporeal grounding of sensation. Here, 
grounding points at the moment in which sensation surrenders itself to the algorithms of 
visibility. Perspective hence reduces the embodiment of vision to a fixed point of view, 
which is associated with the hegemony of the phallogocentric representational functioning 
of vertical lines that organise bodies in an abstract smooth space.  The role of 500
performances is thus to split the audience’s attention and to keep the audience’s eyes 
always in mobility.  According to Lepecki, this task requires a transformation of the 501
reductive operation of perspective to verticality through the introduction of horizontal 
lines. These lines operate against phallogocentric forms, significations, and 
representations, and open up a possibility for a ‘space of pure potentiality’.  In fact, it 502
requires a choreography that enables the audience to ‘attend simultaneously to the vertical 
plane of representation of movement and to the horizontal plane of inscription of 
traces’.  The resistance to full and fixed representations of bodies along upright vertical 503
axis opens up a possibility for multiplying the operation of vision. The approach to 
choreography that challenges existing representations is capable of activating a spectator 
to actualise ‘the nascent unthinkable’ subjectivities, unthinkable bodies, identities and 
spaces.  
 André Lepecki, Exhausting Dance, Performance and the Politics of Movement (London: Routledge, 2006), 498
74. 
 Ibid., 74.499
  Lepecki stresses the phallogocentric and vertical plane of representation by drawing upon art critic Rosalind 500
Kraus. Observing the acts of painting, Kraus defined horizontality as a subversive force to verticality of 
representation. Similarly, Lepecki approaches horizontality in a formal way. For example, he develops an 
argument about a dissensual power of horizontality by analysing Thrisha Brown’s performance It’s Draw/
Live Feed (2003) in which the American choreographer, while dancing, leaves a trace on the surface of a 
paper placed on the floor. Once the paper is placed on the wall, it becomes a drawing. See: Rosalind Kraus, 
“Horizontality,” in Formless, A User’s Guide, eds. Yve Alain Bois and Rosalind Kraus, (New York: Zone 
Books, 1997); Lepecki: Ibid., 65 - 86. 
 Lepecki, Exhausting Dance, 74-75.501
 Ibid., 68.502
 Ibid., 74. 503
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event as unconditioned truth  
Lepecki’s argument for an artistic ‘politics of engagement’ is significant for 
envisaging the political dimension of performance. The choreography of 
‘leadingfollowing’, which enables a view on the relationship between the choreographer 
and the performers in affective terms, encourages us to envisage the relationships between 
the performance and the audience the same way. Although we could expect, by reading 
Lepecki’s earlier work from 2006, that initial affectivity would articulate at the certain 
moment into a representation, in his later work Lepecki restrains from the use of the 
notion of representation, advocating the actualisation of affects in a true political ‘field of 
compossibilization’. As we observed, Lepecki reduces the engagement between the 
choreographers and the performers to the initiation of act and motion, to the kinetic 
phenomenon. This is how the politics of engagement give centrality to movement and 
action. Once energised by sentiments, acts and movements of things in-themselves, that is 
singularities, initiate the leadingfollowing process. We have observed that 
leadingfollowing is a mutual or collective sharing of a true affective-political field among 
a-personal singularities and events. As such, it confuses the lines of authority in such a 
way so that in a performance there is no choreographers, but only performers. Since 
singularities and events stand for the unconditioned,  then we are able to conclude that 504
something unconditioned to truth drives the kinetic phenomenon that underlines the 
affective field of compossibilisation. All things considered in Lepecki’s theory, 
performance is a movement of singularities within a true event. It is, apparently, by these 
means that leadingfollowing reveals the event-effect as ‘a true chore-political nature’.   505
At this point, Lepecki’s theory gives rise to the following concluding questions, 
revisiting the notions I have developed in this PhD: Is performance about truth or 
opinion? Is it about truth procedures, or about substantial types of practices? Is 
performance about unconditional truth, or it  is conditioned by agreements and choices? Is 
performance actualised out of something abstract, such as truth in-itself, or articulated in 
relation to something concrete? Is it about conceptualising or about naming? Is 
performance a conceptual actualisation of an affective-political field, or is it a nominal 
articulation of affects into the meanings of signs? Does mise-en-sense require an 
actualisation in physical motion and mobilisation in order to destroy all of the hierarchies 
of representation, or it require an articulation into mise-en-scène and the construction of 
innovative representations, wherein moving or standing still does not play a decisive role 
for conveying the political message in performance? Consequently, is performance about 
action or also about passion? Is performance a collective actualised out of things, of 
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singularities in-themselves without identification, or is it a collective of persons 
articulated through affective identification? Is performance an event or an object of art? If 
performance can give rise to politics, what are the consequences of constructing society as 
a true affective field of compossibilisation and what are those of constructing society as a 
concrete horizon of opinion? Can we imagine politics without politicians and 
performances without choreographers? As Lepecki’s theory of the politics of engagement 
invokes Deleuze’s writing on event and compossibilisation, at this instant I shall turn to 
Deleuze’s philosophy in order to offer possible answers to these questions.  
To being with, I will focus on Deleuze’s theory of the event, introduced in his book 
The logic of Sense (1969). Deleuze’s writing on the event departs from his concern with 
the relationship between events-effects and language. He claims that ‘the characteristic of 
events is to be expressed or expressible, uttered or utterable, in propositions which are at 
least possible’.  In order to unpack this thought he stresses the importance of three 506
distinct relations within propositions: denotation or indication, manifestation or 
demonstration, and signification. Denotation stands for the relation of proposition to the 
external state of affairs, that is bodies, qualities, quantities, and relations.  It functions 507
through the ‘association’ of the words relating images that represent the state of affairs, 
and it is expressed by form. The criterions of denotation are the ‘true’ and the ‘false’. 
Whereas the ‘“true” signifies that a particular denotation is effectively filled’, the ‘false’ 
signifies the opposite.  Manifestation is ‘the relation of proposition to the person who 508
speaks and expresses himself’.  As such, it stands for a statement of desires and beliefs, 509
pointing at the internal causality of an image. Desire functions through causal inferences 
‘with respect to the existence of the object or the corresponding state of affairs’.  Belief 510
functions on the level of ‘anticipation of this object or state of affairs as its existence must 
be produced by an external causality’.  The personal character of manifestations that 511
begins with ‘I’ ‘functions as the principle of all possible denotation’.  Manifestation also 512
implies a displacement of logical values, so that the true and the false become substituted 
by veracity and illusion. Signification is ‘the relation of the word to universal or general 
concepts, and of syntactic connections to the implications of the concepts’.  From the 513
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standpoint of signification, the elements of proposition are signifying conceptual 
implications ‘capable of referring to other propositions’.  In fact, they are linguistic 514
signifiers that define relations between premises and conclusions in terms of affirmations, 
effects, and so on. The logical value  of signification is ‘the condition of truth’.   515
According to Deleuze, from the standpoint of speech (parole) manifestation has 
primacy over denotation and signification. He writes: ‘in the order of speech, it is the I 
which begins’.   That being said, “I” has a primacy over concepts. By extension, this 516
implies that ‘veracity and illusion’ have primacy over ‘truth’ and ‘conditions of truth’. 
Nevertheless, from the standpoint of language (langue) the primacy belongs to the order 
of signification. In the domain of language, Deleuze suggests, ‘a proposition is able to 
appear only as a premise or a conclusion, signifying concepts before manifesting a 
subject, or even before denoting a state of affairs’.  Signified concepts such as God or 517
the world, are primary in relation to the manifestation of “I” and the denotation of objects. 
The principles of true and false, which belong to the domain of denotation, ‘can be 
explained only by the constancy of the signified concepts’.  Similarly, desires and 518
beliefs which belong to the domain of manifestation, cannot enable veracity and illusion 
to form the orders of demands and inferences ‘if the words in which they are manifested 
did not refer first to concepts and conceptual implications’.   519
Nevertheless, Deleuzes emphasises that the primacy of signification over 
denotation is a delicate issue. In fact, ‘when we consider a proposition as concluded, we 
make it the object of an assertion’.  At this point, a proposition (Z) is considered for 520
itself, independently from its premises (A and B), and considered to be effectively true. 
Nevertheless, for this to happen, it is necessary that their premises (A and B) are 
considered to be true, too. This, consequently, gives rise to a proposition (C) whose 
premises belong to the order of conceptual implications, that is signification. As Deleuze 
explains ‘the conclusion can be detached from the premises, but only on the condition that 
one always adds other premises from which alone the conclusion is not detachable’.  521
This implies that signification is not homogenous and that signification or ’implication 
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never succeeds in grounding except by giving itself a ready-made denotation’.  This 522
process stands for the circle of proposition.  
Deleuze’s observation of the relation between the domains of signification and 
denotation is very important for our study as it engenders, what he calls, the fourth 
dimension of proposition — sense. It is sense that breaks the circle of proposition, 
revealing the cause of the failure of the order of signification and, hence, the circle of 
proposition. We have pointed out that propositions may be either true or false. The 
condition of truth — which belong to the order of signification — is a ‘form’ of a 
possibility of a proposition and a ‘form’ of a possibility for that proposition to be true. 
Now, in order to assure a real genesis of denotation, outside the circle of proposition from 
condition to conditioned, the conditional truth must have something unconditioned that 
differs from the ‘form’ of the conditioned, that is, from the conceptual possibility. This 
‘something unconditioned’ Deleuze identifies as ideational material or stratum, which is 
not any more signification but sense.  Borrowing Edmund Husserl’s phenomenological 523
vocabulary, Deleuze designates sense as an impassive and incorporeal noema, a 
perceptual content which is ‘neither acting nor being acted upon’.  Accordingly, a sense 524
is an ideational objective unity which does not exist and which is not given in perception, 
but appears as the consequence of intentional acts.  From this angle, sense is 525
incorporeal  and is not to be ‘confused with its spatio-temporarl realisation in a state of 526
affairs’.  Such a view allows Deleuze to define sense not as an attribute to propositions, 527
but to the things denoted by subjects and to the states of affairs denoted by propositions.  528
In fact, sense is ‘the expressible or the expressed of the proposition’.  Within this view, 529
sense cannot be recognised in an experience from the outside. Sense is simply a 
dimension of proposition.  This is why sense cannot exists in things, or mind; we can 530
only infer it indirectly, on the basis of the circle of proposition. Irreducible to entity, sense 
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resides at the surface of things, as ‘a pure event which inheres or subsets in the 
proposition’.  Deleuze asserts: ’The event is sense itself.’  531 532
Deleuze’s definition of sense gives rise to the question about the relationship 
between sense and the other three dimensions of proposition: denotation, manifestation, 
and signification. As shown above, denotation implies the association of words that 
denote things, or states of affairs that are considered either true or false. Evidently, sense 
cannot belong to the domain of denotation despite the fact that ‘all denotation presupposes 
sense’.  As far as the domain of manifestation is concerned, manifestation implies the 533
logic of causal inferences of desires, hence expressing veracity and illusion through 
speech. It is ‘founded on the order of the conceptual implications of signification’.  In 534
other words, it is founded on the order of language. All things considered, sense cannot 
belong to the order of manifestation. For its part, the order of signification is concerned 
with syntactic connections, with language. As we have seen before, signification 
demonstrates a relation between premises and conclusions. In this context, signification 
becomes the condition of proposition and ‘the condition of truth’.  Now, Deleuze 535
suggests that the condition of truth is a characteristic of signification which ‘it shares with 
sense, and which is already a characteristic of sense’.  When the condition of truth is at 536
once a characteristic of sense that, however, designates something unconditional, then that 
which is unconditional — sense — stands for the eternal truth or pure event. In a nutshell, 
sense is identified with the unconditional truth. Within this context Deleuze writes, that as 
‘the splendour and the magnificence of the event’, sense points that the event is ‘the 
purely expressed’, or the release of eternal truth.  Consequently, the truth of proposition 537
— of the events actualised in the state of affairs and identities — is the expression of the 
pure event, of the unconditional, of the eternal truth that resides in-itself. For this reason, 
every possibility of proposition expresses unconditional truth.  
Given these points, we shall ask what does it mean to define performance as the 
event? Is performance a consequence of pure events and eternal truths? Do performances 
express unconditional truth? If the event is incorporeal, impersonal, beyond the universal 
and the general, the collective and the private,  having no temporal and spatial 538
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dimension on its own, how can we conceive the ways performances are constructed 
outside these dimensions?  
the compossibility of concepts  
When the condition of possibility of something is the unconditional truth, then all 
that which is possible is inherent in things themselves and we are inclined to designate 
societies through truth procedures. According to this view, all that which is possible is 
compossible in-itself. But, what does it mean to envisage society in terms of 
compossibility of the compossibles in-themselves?   539
Compossible is a term coined by Leibniz. According to Leibniz, ‘our certainty 
regarding universal and eternal truths is grounded in the ideas themselves, independently 
of the senses, just as pure ideas, ideas of the intellect’.  This implies that the truth about 540
contingent singular things, arriving to us through confused perception, is required by 
truths of the intellect.  For instance,  as Leibniz suggests, colour or sound as illusory 541
images arrive to us ‘either from things themselves or immediatly from God’s unerring 
veracity’.  When the links between the sensible things depend upon intellectual truths, 542
then their truth is grounded in reason.  In other words, all relations are depended on 543
truth, that is on reason or mind. No matter that mind might be relating human or God’s 
mind, the ides of the mixed modes  of relations ‘are real just as long as the modes are 544
possible, or […] distinctly conceivable’.  It is this that requires that ‘its [mind’s] 545
constituent ideas be compossible, i.e. be able to be in mutual agreement’.  Nevertheless, 546
Leibniz immediatly stresses that ‘not all possible species are compossible’.  Unlike 547
compossible species or things that exalt the divine perfection, incompossible seems to be 
lower in rank and may not gain existence at all. In Leibniz’s opinion, as it can be seen, the 
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world, although containing everything in perfect harmony,  suggests a division in moral 548
categories.   549
Drawing upon Leibniz’s theory of “monad” which, as we observed, posits that all 
distinct things have reason in themselves, individually, and that their mixed modes of 
relations constitute compossible, Deleuze writes that the very condition of compossibility 
is ‘a prolongation or continuation of convergent series, one into the other’.  550
Compossibility hence points at the infinite processes of reconstitution of convergent 
series, that is, the world constituted by all series.  In this sense, compossibility could be 551
called ‘the totality of converging and extensive series that constitute the world’ and ‘the 
totality of monads [or individuals] that convey the same world’.  At this point, by 552
recalling Leibniz, Deleuze reintroduces another type of relations — incompossible. In 
contrast to compossibles, incompossibles designate ‘the series that diverge, and that from 
then on belong to two possible worlds’ and ‘mondas [or individuals] of which each 
expresses a world differently’.  Regarding the Bible, which provides the description of 553
the first sin committed by Adam, Deleuze envisaged the incompossibles in terms of ‘the 
relation of vice-diction’.  Now, if the world is expressed by monads that are constitutive 554
of individuals emitted by singularities, which are standing for the relationship of 
coincidence between ordinary points (A and B), then the world is, as Deleuze suggests, ‘a 
pure emission of singularities’.  Further on, since singularities have a function of the law 555
of convergence that ties all individuals, then the relation of vice-diction, or of 
incompossibles, points at the divergence from singularities of this world that, for example, 
do not sinn and that are, hence, considered compossible as the best of the worlds.  
At this point, we should stress that every monad is defined by pre-individual 
singularities, and is thus compossible with monads whose singularities converge with its 
own, and incompossible with monads whose singularities diverge from them.  Although 556
pre-individual singularities are indefinite and indeterminate (garden is just a garden), they 
tie individuals by the law of convergence to concepts (garden might be the one of sin). 
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That being said, individuals, just as subjects, appear as the consequence of the 
actualisation of pre-individual singularities. More importantly, they exist by virtue of the 
power of concept. Nevertheless, concepts that — as we have previously observed — 
belong to the order of signification, do not simply relate determination, but condense and 
prolong singularities.  Once singularities are understood as events, then condensation 557
and prolongation of events means to raise events to the state of multi-determinable 
concepts. A concept hence stands for ‘the metaphysical reality of the corresponding 
subject’.  This means that individuals convey the world, the compossible world, on the 558
conceptual level.  
In What is Philosophy? (1994) Deleuze and Guattari wrote that ‘concept is defined 
by ‘the inseparability of a finite number of heterogeneous components traversed by a 
point of absolute survey at infinite speed’.  These components are singularities, pure 559
variations ordered by other singularities. As such, they are characterised by proceduralism 
— that I will return to in a moment. Now, components, or singularities, are endlessly 
traversed by concepts. Although concepts belong to the level of the individual — as we 
previously noted — they are only intentions without spatio-temporal coordinates.  This 560
implies that concepts are incorporeal, and only effectuated in bodies.  Similarly, 561
concepts are not concerned with the state of affairs; they are only effectuated in them.  562
In fact, concepts are pure events, and should not be mixed with discourse. Unlike 
discourse, concepts do not link propositions together. In Deleuze’s and Guattari’s view, 
propositions are defined by their reference, expressed by sentence which is deprived from 
sense.  In contrast, concepts ‘freely enter into relationship of nondiscursive 563
resonance’.  We could suggests that the relationship between concepts is unconditional. 564
Hence, in their inter-relation, concepts, just like events, monads, sensations, individuals, 
and affects, express a possible, understood as the unconditional truth. What in fact 
concepts express, we can now suggest, is an ultimate positive feature shared by all the 
concepts in a chain.   565
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My goal is not to get into an attentive analysis of Deleuze’s theory. This task would 
require a separate work. But, what I want to point out at this moment, for the sake of our 
argument, is that the analysis of relations in infinite terms of compossible and 
incompossible, is a result of Deleuze’s endeavour to determine the truth of existence. It is 
from the concern with Leibniz’s distinction between the truth of essence and the truth of 
existence that Deleuze view on compossible and incompossible evolves.  Once this is 566
recognised, we can not help but notice that both compossible and incompossible fall out 
of the political logic. Compossible and possible, which point at the unity and pluralism of 
positions, stand for the arbitrary actualisations of unconditional true events into the 
adéquation of abstract concepts.  Within this philosophical model, all social relations are 567
determined by the logic of unconditional truth.  
opinion formation:  
a flight from the unconditional truth  
We have analysed a view on performance as a choreography of ledingfollowing 
that actualises in a ‘true affective-political field of compossibilization’, by locating the 
origins of ‘truth procedures’ and ‘compossibilisation’ in Leibniz’s and Deleuze’s 
philosophies. From this rapid, and obviously incomplete exploration of the literature, we 
can nevertheless move onto the search for an alternative perspective on choreographing 
performances. I will start by considering the relevance of the processes of opinion 
formation for this approach, drawing upon political philosophers Hannah Arendt and 
Chantal Mouffe. But, to begin, let’s start by questioning opinion formation from Deleuze’s 
philosophical framework.  
We have observed that in Deleuze’s philosophy ‘the event’ has an essential 
relationship with the order of signification, that is with language, in the processes of 
production of denotations as propositions. Hence our caution in identifying performance 
with the event. As demonstrated, Deleuze defines event as sense, having a characteristic 
of the unconditional truth. Accordingly, sensation embodies the unconditional truth, the 
truth in-itself. It is within this framework that Deleuze writes: ‘art is the language of 
sensation. Art does not have opinions’.  And, further on, art ‘exists in itself’.  But, why 568 569
at this point does it matter that art has no opinions? Deleuze envisaged opinions as 
‘functions of lived experience that […] claim to have a certain knowledge of 
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affections’.  He stresses that ‘opinion misjudges affective states and groups them 570
together or separates them wrongly’.  For instance, jealousy becomes an unhappy 571
consequence of love, that is, love resembles jealousy. Now, in order to reverse the order of 
affective states that are ‘misjudged’ and ‘separated wrongly’ through the principle of 
resemblance, Deleuze turns to sensations. He suggests that sensations embody the 
event.  In fact, what sensations embody is the unconditional and eternal truth, the truth 572
in-itself. Further on, sensation is not a contiguity within a coupling of two sensations 
through resemblance, but ‘something passing from one to the other’.  Sensation is hence 573
‘a zone of indetermination, of indiscernibility’.  In the zone of indetermination, things, 574
beasts, and persons, precede their natural differentiation. They are in-themselves, pointing 
at the unconditional truth that underlines them. And, it is this nonhuman becoming that 
arises from the zones of indetermination that Deleuze calls affect.   575
According to Deleuze, the affective dimension of indeterminacy can best be 
apprehended through art. Once we have recognised that sensation is realised when the 
material passes into the percept or the affect, then art, living in zones of indetermination 
stands for the being of sensation. Accordingly, artists are understood to be ‘presenters of 
affects, the inventors and creators of affects’.  From the point of view of art practice, 576
jealousy is finality or destination; it is ‘the meaning of signs - affects as semiology’.  577
Given these points, the things in themselves — rather than opinions — proceeding from 
sense and embodying the pure event and unconditional truth, compel the subject to invent 
new ways of being through affects. If, as Deleuze writes, ‘[t]he work of art is a being of 
sensation and nothing else: it exists in itself,’  then, we can suggest that art preserves 578
eternal truth in affects.  
Now, to begin with, let’s ask once more: does performance, and art in general, co-
extend and express unconditional truth? Is art about truth procedures? Statements such as 
‘dance expresses the immanence of the act’, ‘performance stands for the alignment of the 
body with movement’, ‘political dimension of performance manifests in moving less’, or 
‘tragedy is a superior form of theatre’, once perceived as truth, preclude polemics and, 
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hence, the possibility of opinion formation to take place. We could suggest that these 
statements, as well as different variations of them, are coercive and despotic. They deal 
with the unconditional perception of truth, not with conditional operations, such as 
persuasion and opinion. In fact, they do not take into account other opinions, which would 
be a gesture of political thinking and the essence of political life. The political logic 
implies, as Arendt pointed out, that ‘I form an opinion by considering a given issue from 
different viewpoints, by making present to my mind the standpoints of those who are 
absent; that is, I represent them.’  In Arendt’s view, the process of opinion formation is a 579
question of ‘being and thinking in my own identity where actually I am not’.  What the 580
political perspective suggests is that art is not concerned with truth procedures, but with 
opinions, with doxas, implying the other and the moment of representation. This is why 
from this viewpoint art ceases to speak facts that belong to the order of science, and aligns 
itself with the philosophy of praxis that designates a system consisting of a plurality of 
social positions.   581
At this point, we must start questioning the political dimension of performance in 
relation to the different political logics of opinion formation. For the most part, opinion 
points at the liberation from private interests. Arendt states: ‘I can make myself 
representative of everybody else.’  For Arendt, this detachment from private interests 582
relates ‘the world of universal interdependence’,  in which all positions and opinions are 583
impartial and interdependent. In such a world, people freely associate with the common 
public sphere. We can say that the common public sphere is a sphere in which the 
pluralism of opinions co-exist in harmony. The associative type of relations between the 
differential positions and opinions gives rise to a democratic politics of agonism without 
antagonism. Political philosopher Oliver Marchart calls this type of ‘the political’ 
associative.  584
Nevertheless, taking into consideration political theorist Carl Schmitt’s assertion 
that the political is the most intense and extreme antagonism’,  we are inclined to 585
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envisage the political differently.  Marchart stressed Schmitt’s view on the political in 586
which ‘a collectivity is established through an external antagonism vis-à-vis an enemy or 
constitutive outside, that is, by way of dissociation’.  When ‘the political’ is established 587
through dissociations, we are dealing with a democratic politics of agonism which are 
always traversed by antagonism. This project of democratic politics is envisaged by 
Mouffe. Hence the difference between the two kinds of pluralist democracy: Arendt’s 
pluralism, which assumes a collective established through harmony, and Mouffe’s 
pluralism, which assumes a construction of collectives through conflict. Mouffe’s view on 
agonistic pluralism implies that art is not simply an aggregation of opinions, or an 
abundance of opinions co-existing together in ‘the world of universal interdependence’, as 
Arendt’s theory suggest. On the contrary, art implies the acts of exclusion of certain 
opinions and hence it is a consequence of conflicts and polemics raised by particular 
voices in specific contexts.  
Drawing upon Wittgenstein, Mouffe stresses that ‘in order to have agreement in 
opinions, there must first be agreement in forms of life’.  On the one hand, this implies 588
the agreement about the way we use language and terms. On the other hand, ‘if language 
is to be a means of communication there must be agreement not only in definitions but 
also (queer as it may sound) in judgements’,  in the ways we use language. These 589
agreements are necessary so that procedures can be put in practice.  It is then for the 590
reason of their inscription in the shared forms of life, that procedures, as Mouffe suggests, 
‘should be envisaged as a complex assemble of practices’.  Within this framework 591
Mouffe writes that ‘[t]hose practices constitute specific forms of individuality and identity 
that makes possible the allegiance to the procedures’.  In other words, procedures 592
presuppose ethico-political values that are accepted, and allegiance to these values 
constitutive to social practices. This is how procedures give rise to individuality and 
identity through the established social practices. It is for that matter that procedural and 
substantial, or procedures and practices, cannot be separated. Given the co-constitutive 
character of procedures and practices, we have to acknowledge that the political thought is 
not matter of unconditionality, but of conditionality. This does not mean that the political 
thought stands for the fidelity to truth processes and singularity, as philosopher Alain 
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Badiou suggests.  His view implies the existence of a natural, fixed locus of origin. 593
Rather, a political thought stands for the allegiance to particular values that are shared 
among the people, and that enable agreement in opinion. Agreement in opinion implies 
the impossibility of avoiding human forms of life, which require democratic ethos and 
language, that is discourse.  
In the absence of the fixed locus of centrality — specifically of the transcendental 
signified such as Arendt’s, that is Aristotel’s energeia — everything becomes discourse. 
This, above all, implies that we agree upon the meaning of the term discourse.  Derrida 594
writes that in the absence of the centre everything is discourse, understood as ‘a system in 
which the central signified, the original or transcendental signified, is never absolutely 
present outside a system of differences. The absence of the transcendental signified 
extends the domain and the play of signification infinitely.’  Developing this idea, 595
Laclau and Mouffe demonstrated that discourse is not only a combination of speech and 
writing, but a system of linguistic and extralinguistic relations.  This is to say that every 596
social practice, including performance, is meaningful and only symbolically constructed.  
As I have indicated throughout this dissertation, within the realm of performance, 
discourse stands for the system of relations materialised through language games, through 
body language and actions with which body language is entwined. In other words, 
discourse stands for the moments of performance in relation to the other.  This assertion 597
implies a view on performance as a performative practice ‘concerned with the ways 
sociocosmic relations are materialised through the process of symbolisation and 
corporeally constituted, valued, viewed, and exchanged’.  Once we have acknowledged, 598
as Butler pointed out, that ‘actors are always already on the stage, within the terms of the 
performance’,  we cannot fail to recognise that the experience of performance is based 599
on acts that are always already symbolically constructed. Nevertheless, I have cancelled 
the totality of performance as a discursive practice. To explain what it means, in Chapter 
 Alain Badiou, Ethics: An Essay on the Understanding of Evil (London, New York: Verso, 2001), 41. 593
  Derrida criticised centrality sedimented in the history of metaphysics and the history of the West in general. 594
He writes that its matrix ‘is the determination of Being as presence in all senses of this word. It could be 
shown that all the names related to fundamentals, to principles, or to the center have always designated an 
invariable presence — eidos, arché, telos, energeia, ousia (essence, existence, substance, subject), alétheia, 
transcendentality…”; and, that the center can not be thought ‘in the form of a present-being’, that it has no 
‘natural site’. In: Jacques Derrida, Writing and Difference (London: Routledge, [1967] 2005), 353. 
  Derrida, Writing and Difference, 354.595
 Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe, “Post-Marxism Without Apologies”,  New Left Review, 166 (1987): 82. 596
  See chapter 1. 597
  Ibid.,598
 Judith Butler, “Performative Acts and Gender Constitution: An Essay in Phenomenology and Feminist 599
Theory”, in Theatre Journal, Vol. 40, No. 4 (Dec., 1988): 526. 
!142
1, I gave the following example: ‘the rigid ballet technique that maintains physical 
mastery over dancing bodies by means of strict methods (alignment, turnout, posture, toe 
pointing, and so on) is grounded in the exclusion of movement that relates any other 
social practice from choreography (street-dance, sports, games, stand-ups, protest 
marches, just wars, still-acts, and so on)’.  As this example points out, the cancellation 600
of the totality of the relational logic of performance implies exclusion. This is why a 
performative discursive totality does not exist in the form of a simply delimited positivity. 
As I have indicated in Chapter 2, there is something radically negative that underlines it. 
This radical negativity stresses that a possibility of one discursive totality is at the same 
time its impossibility, opening up the space for different opinions and polemics. It is in 
this context that we can say that the allegiance to procedures provides a partial limitation 
of performance and impossibility to define it in fixed terms, such as ‘dance is the 
alignment of the body with movement’.  
As I have pointed out in chapter 1, a discursive configuration of the social realm 
emphasises a hegemonic construction of societies and every social practice, including 
performance. The field of discursivity provides a view on hegemony as ‘a theory of 
decision taken in an undecidable terrain’.  Accordingly, every decisional act implies a 601
nodal point (point de capiton), which presupposes ‘a particular element assuming a 
“universal” structuring functioning within a certain discursive field […] without the 
particularity of the element per se predetermining such a function’.  It is in this 602
framework that before performing, the notion of the performer establishes the centrality of 
the category of identification, as pointed out in chapter 5. Identifications between 
performers, and between performers and choreographers, imply agreement between 
specific forms of individuality and identity allegiant to certain ethico-political values. 
Relations in performance, and, more precisely, hegemonic relations, are hence a result of 
agreement on shared forms of life. They imply decisions on processes of construction, 
such as why and how performers are going to perform, what they are going to perform, 
who is going to perform what, and for whom they are going to perform.  Such an 603
apportionment of parts and positions, as Rancière proposes, ‘is based on a distribution of 
spaces, times, and forms of activity that determines the very manner in which something 
in common ends itself to participation and in what way various individuals have part in 
 Ibid.,600
 Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe, Hegemony and Socialist Strategy (London: Verso, [1985] 2001), xi.601
 Laclau and Mouffe, Hegemony, xi.602
 Exploring the authenticity — understood as unmediated — theatre scholars Ulrike Garde and Meg Mumford 603
wrote that any analysis of performances ‘must consider the expectations and pre-knowledge of the individual 
participants — including artists, real-people performers, and audience members’. In: Ulrike Garde and Meg 
Mumford, Theatre of Real People: Diverse Encounters at Berlin’s Hebbel am Ufer and Beyond (New York: 
Bloomsbury, 2016), 12. 
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this distribution’.  It is then this agreement on shared forms of performance that gives 604
rise to certain opinions and excludes others, in such a way that performance presupposes 
that particularity. Therefore, to form an opinion in performance is to partially represent the 
universality of ethico-political values that reside in freedom and liberty for all — the 
democratic principles that underline human forms of life. 
From this point of view, performance is not any more conceived as the evental 
choreography. When performance is envisaged as the event, it becomes difficult to 
imagine not only how performers establish relationship between themselves and with the 
choreographer, but also how performance establishes relationship with the audience. This 
is so, because the evental approach to performance prevents the process of opinion 
formation, and, hence, polemics, hegemonic relations, and conflicts, indispensable for 
establishing a particular type of relations.  However, what is crucially important is not to 605
confuse opinion formation with the kinetic phenomenon, nor with opinionating, or with 
argumentation. Neither opinion formation should be associated with an agreement on a 
definition of performance. This is so, because to form an opinion is not about the 
intellectualisation of performance concerned with what performance is in-itself.  Rather, 606
to form an opinion is to agree on the ways performance is to be constructed, foreseeing 
the consequences of constructing performance as such for the others, especially for the 
audience.  In this sense, agreement in opinion implies not only the moment of 607
representation, but also, as we will shortly see, a passionate collective investment of 
affects in objects.  
the performativity of names:  
the articulation of affects into representations 
Drawing upon Arendt, and Laclau and Mouffe, I have demonstrated that the 
political logic is not occupied with the relations between singularities possible in-
themselves and, then, actualised by virtue of the unconditioned in a true conceptual 
 Jacques Rancière, The Politics of Aesthetics (London, New York: Continuum, 2006), 12.  604
 In the political arena, the types of relationship between the leader and the people may be authoritarian when 605
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denominator. Consequently, I have claimed that the political logic is not a principle of 
proposing an ultimate positive feature shared by all the concepts connected in the chain 
called compossibilisation. If it was so, we would be dealing with an operation of seeking 
unconditional truth that resides in a unity of compossible, or, as Laclau stated, with ‘a 
conceptual operation of finding an abstract common feature unrolling all social 
grievances’.  Within this context, as I have suggested earlier, Deleuze’s philosophy 608
implies a creation of an ideal society through the principle of subsumption of all 
differences by an abstract conceptual denominator.   609
The political logic that I employ in this dissertation is concerned with a 
performative practice of opinion formation that implies a passionate collective investment 
of affects in objects. Unlike a conceptual practice which constitutes the chain of 
compossibles, a performative practice or operation constitutes the chain ‘as such’. Let’s 
now unfold this assertion by drawing upon Laclau's definition of performative operation 
in terms of naming.  
According to Laclau, performativity implies that the names of universality — such 
as ‘freedom’ and ‘liberty for all’ — are singularities.  As such, they transcend particular 610
demands of popular identities — such as those for ‘bread, peace and land’.  On one 611
hand, this means that ‘popular subjects are always singularities’.  On the other hand, this 612
means that particular popular identities never disappear and that they are ‘always the 
points of tension / negotiation between universality and particularity’.  It is within this 613
sense that grievances, which have nothing to do with particular demands of popular 
identities, always express themselves through particularities. As a result, the names of 
universality, that are always singularities, do not stand for abstract concepts, as Deleuze’s 
theory proposes, but for empty terms invested in particularities.  
This observation implies that from the point of view of discourse analysis the 
condition of possibility of something manifests through performativity, or naming. It 
resides in the realm of discursivity, in the field of opinion and political thought.  614
Accordingly, all that is possible is conditioned by a structural impossibility persisting on 
the nominal level, that is, by the impossibility of fulfilling names of universality, such as 
freedom and liberty for all. In this sense, the structural impossibility or unevenness points 
 Ernesto Laclau, On Populist Reason (London: Verso, 2007), 97. 608
 See chapter 2. 609
 Laclau, On Populist Reason, 118. 610
 All antagonisms present in Russian Revolution were condensed in demands for ‘bread, peace and land’. Ibid., 611
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 To clarify, the realm of discursivity is corresponding with the order of signification in Deleuze’s theory. 614
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at the specific negativity underlining discursive relations. Such a dynamic analytic 
framework, as we observed in Chapter 5, entails the following operation: when universal 
principles of freedom and liberty are put into question, let’s say when they are suppressed 
by the capitalist techniques of domination, then they condense in particular or / and 
popular identities. For this reason, the possibility of popular identities does not reside in 
the possibility of human reconciliation sought, for example, in abstract concepts of 
identity.  Popular identities constitute a chain of a plurality of dissimilar demands 615
connected through identification, which is embodied on the nominal level. As this 
operation is incapable to achieve totality, then that which is embodied is always subject to 
contestation.  
Laclau writes that ‘without constructing a popular identity out of a plurality of 
democratic demands’ ‘[t]here is no hegemony’.  From the point of view of the theory of 616
hegemony, within the realm of the political we are not dealing with the unity of popular 
identities on the level of abstract conceptions of a-personal singularities, but rather on the 
level of empty terms, or names of singularities invested in persons. As it was pointed out, 
popular identities — or any particular identities — as hegemonic identities, are 
consequences of collective identifications that presuppose agreement in shared forms of 
life: the way we use language, define terms, and judge. Accordingly, identifications stand 
for the articulating principles of what Gramsci calls ‘popular wills’. Drawing upon 
Gramsci, we can see that only when the unity is organised around a collective decision or 
agreement upon the way we use terms, the quantity of various wills becomes the quality 
of popular will.  This agreement then presupposes an agreement in opinion. Drawing 617
upon Arendt, we have observed that to have an opinion means to consider a given issue 
from different viewpoints, ‘by making present to my mind the standpoints of those who 
are absent’.  This is how political identities, of which performing bodies are constitutive 618
part, shift the focus from rational truth to opinion, to doxa. Nevertheless, as we have 
already pointed out drawing upon Mouffe, the formation of opinion is a dissociative 
project which presupposes a construction of collectives through conflict or agonism.  
Given this, it becomes possible to suggest that without a constitutive unevenness of 
opinions there is no affective investments. To clarify this thought, we shall turn for a 
moment to Jacques Lacan’s psychoanalysis that inspired Laclau’s and Mouffe’s theories. 
Lacan distinguished the real from the imaginary and the symbolic. In Lacan’s theory, the 
 I have indicated in chapter 5 that identity exists as a response to the techniques of domination seen as a 615
common-cause of unity. This unity is organised on the level of identification and, hence, established beyond 
class- , race- , or gender - based conceptualisations.
 Laclau, On Populist Reason, 95.616
 Antonio Gramsci, Prison Notebooks, Vol III, ed. and trans. Joseph A. Buttigieg (New York: Columbia 617
University Press, 2007), 164. 
 Arendt, Between Past and Future, 542.618
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real stands for the organism’s pseudo-totality,  while imaginary stands for its mental 619
schema.  Imaginary is constructed in relation to the other,  and governs the investment 620 621
in objects that acquire symbolic value. Accordingly, the real is inscribed within the 
symbolic. Now, in political terms the symbolic is a result of a desire for the mythical 
fullness of reconciled society, or something universal. Since desire cannot be satisfied, 
Laclau suggests that ‘there is no achievable jouissance except through radical investment 
in an objet petit a’.  This operation implies the particularisation of the drives or plurality 622
of objet petit a.  We know by reading Lacan that the notion objet petit a designates the 623
object-cause of desire that determines relations between the subject and the other.  The 624
significant characteristic of objet petit a is that it embodies the impossibility of totality or 
fullness. This means that the radical investment of the universal or the whole in an object 
petit a ‘is always going to be embodied as a part’.  If we agree that affect (that is, 625
enjoyment) is the very essence of investment, as Laclau suggests,  then we can 626
understand why ‘the “embodying“ entity becomes the full object of the cathectic 
investment’.  In other words, the embodying entity becomes the object invested with 627
affects, the phantasmic excess of objects. From this viewpoint Laclau proposes that to 
embody something which has no consistency on its own ‘can only mean giving a name to 
what is being embodied’.  This is how objects becomes sublimated into things.   628 629
Obviously, performative operation of naming that implies the investment of objects 
with affects requires sublimation or articulation of universal into particular. Laclau 
stresses that the materiality of a part — of an embodied entity — may assume a function 
of a whole and become a source of enjoyment, or of affects.  Translated into political 630
terms, the whole is a hegemonic representation. Given this, representation points that 
 Jacques Lacan,  Écrits: a selection, trans. Alan Sheridan (London: Routledge, [1966] 2003), 96. 619
 Ibid., 230. 620
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hegemony is ‘nothing more than the investment of a purely mythical fullness in a partial 
object’.  On one hand, the partial object testifies that representation is not capable of 631
reproducing a fullness preceding it. On the other hand, it points that representation is the 
primary ontological principle. Once this is recognised, we have to agree with Laclau that 
‘representation is the absolutely primary level in construction of objectivity’.  In a word, 632
representation is the source of affects.  
performance as an agonistic choreo-political practice 
We have seen that each representation may become a source of affects. Now, we 
can start thinking about a representation as an object-cause of struggle and conflicts 
between “us” and “them”. Writing about a collective identity, about the construction of 
“we”, Mouffe observes that a human collective is constructed through ‘a passionate 
affective investment that creates a strong identification among the members of a 
community’.  What follows from Mouffe’s view is that the collective passionate 633
affective investment is enabled by identification. This type of identification requites 
shared allegiance to particular values and, hence, agreement in forms of life. We have 
already observed this as a condition for having agreement in opinion. To have agreement 
in opinion is to agree about the way we use language, that is about definitions and 
judgements of terms. To agree in opinions is hence to represent affects on a nominal level 
in such way so that it differs from the nominal level constructed by ‘them’. 
This is the point where we can say that the agreement among the people is not an 
unconditioned process, an arbitrary composition of differential and adequate positions. 
Collective agreement is a decisive and concrete unity of different demands accomplished 
through symbolic overdetermination.  The performative practice of naming points at the 634
articulating principle of different affects into representations. From the viewpoint of 
discourse analysis, representation does not stand for the corporeal embodiment of the 
incorporeal true event. Neither it stands for the actualisation of the event into a ‘true’ 
 Ibid., 116. 631
 Ibid., 115.632
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compossible field; it is not an abstraction.  This is so because affects are conditioned by 635
the body. In fact, they belong to the body, to the realm of the corporeal, to the realm of 
opinion and representation. When affects become understanding, that is, when they 
articulate into opinion, then this operation is one of representation. By this, we have 
explained that affects as semiotics always produce a specific symbolic order, which is 
partial and contingent construction. 
All things considered, we are able to conclude that the political dimension of 
performance does not reside in a kinetic phenomenon of engaging in a choreography of 
‘leadingfollowing’ that opens up gaps for the distribution of the sensible, which are then 
actualised in ‘a true affective-political field’ of compossibiles consisting of abstract 
concepts. 
From the point of view of dissociative political logic choreography entails a co-
engagement of the choreographer with the performers, and the other persons included in 
the production of performances, such as costume designer, set designer, dramaturge, 
sound and light directors, musicians or composers, and so on. The co-engagement 
stimulates a passionate affective identification that gives rise to discursive practice, 
enabling the exchange of opinions and the construction of performance. This means that a 
collective affective investment always articulates in representation. From this point of 
view, choreography is a collective acquired through that which Gramsci calls 
‘compassionality’.  Compassionality always articulate in representations, standing for 636
agreements in opinions accomplished on the nominal level. It is thought the articulation of 
affects into representation that mise-en-sense sublimates into mise-en-scène or mise-en-
forme.  Once we have recognised that mise-en-scène or mise-en-forme is a primary 637
sources of affects, we have to acknowledge that performance is not a consequence of 
something unconditional; it does not express abstractions such as unconditional truth. 
Performance is always conditioned by mise-en-scène invested with particular affects, 
giving rise to polemics, opinions, and decisions, on the ways body language is to be used 
and performed in an alternative way. When performance is envisaged as representation 
  I would like to suggest that in contrast to the political logic which implies relations among objects, the 635
economic logic implies relations between abstractions. Historian Dipesh Chakrabarty shows that despotism 
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Difference (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000); Antoine Hennion, “A Plea For Responsible Art. 
politics, the market, creation,” In Art and the Challenge of Markets, eds. Victoria Alexander, Samuli Hägg, 
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and object-cause of contestation and articulation of spectatorial codes, we can speak about 
the artistic strategies of engagement. It is within the context of the strategies of 
engagement with the common object-cause that performance contains a reason for a 
possible unity.  
The crucial aspect of performance is that it does not enclose the choreography of 
articulation within the stage. Performance links together the performers, the 
choreographers and the audience. In fact, the artistic strategies of engagement enable 
representational character of performance to employ the body in such a way so that it can 
reach the audience on the affective level. By these means performance shows its capacity 
to induce affects that make the audience see things differently, envisage different 
possibilities of constituting democratic politics and ways of living together. For this 
reason, we can say that the political dimension of performance does not reside in the 
zones of indiscernibility, but on the horizon of contingent representations, raising from the 
state of affairs. By these means, instead of creating a smooth space inhabited by 
indiscernibles, by the persons who are in-themselves pointing at unconditional truth, 
performance constitutes a striated space inhabited by agonistics. Agonistics are capable of 
uniting in their differences against a common-cause, against the capitalist techniques of 
domination. Such a decisive act of unity may take place on any level these techniques 
subordinate freedom and equality, and open up a possibility of invigorating democracy. 
On this horizon, performance does not only define possibilities; it necessarily criticises 
and challenges political narratives underlining issues as different as semiotics, gender, 
racism, poverty, populism, conflicts, terrorism, neo-colonialism, accumulation of nuclear 
arsenal, increased carbon emissions, extinction of species, and so on. For that matter, 
performance is not an event, but an object-cause of affects — an agonistic choreo-political 
practice.  
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